Review Article

Party-Directed Corruption in the Developing World

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Daniel W. Gingerich, *Political Institutions and Party-Directed Corruption in South America: Stealing for the Team* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Vineeta Yadav, *Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Jennifer Bussell, *Corruption and Reform in India: Public Services in the Digital Age* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

How do political parties affect the scope and nature of corruption in developing democracies? This question unites three recent books that together highlight a shifting research agenda in corruption studies: Daniel Gingerich's *Political Institutions and Party Directed Corruption in South America*, Vineeta Yadav's *Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries*, and Jennifer Bussell's *Corruption and Reform in India*. What emerges from these accounts is that party-directed corruption appears to be complex and well-coordinated, perhaps more so than the current corruption scholarship recognizes.

These books collectively challenge the current and all-too-simplistic understanding of corruption as they show that parties often engage in highly-coordinated illicit behavior where the main actors might not even hold public office. Oftentimes, party-directed corruption is channeled towards advancing political—and not necessarily private—goals. Based on earlier theorizing and recent analyses of corruption, including these books, I offer an alternative understanding of corruption: societally-undesirable actions involving public officials and other actors that would reduce a state's legitimacy were they to become widely known.

These books also highlight the cutting-edge of empirical corruption studies, introducing new methods and approaches for measuring what is often highly-sensitive information. Even though the three authors focus on party-directed corruption, each author designs his or her empirical investigation to target different actors: Gingerich surveys bureaucrats by introducing novel methods that protect anonymity and ensure lower bias, Yadav surveys business groups about their perceptions of party-directed legislative corruption, and Bussell combines surveys of poor peoples' perceptions and experiences together with audits of politicians' spending patterns. These studies reveal the benefits of introducing new methods to corruption studies, as well as several potential directions for further research.

A History of Corruption Scholarship

Scholars and policymakers alike have long recognized the deleterious role that parties play in fostering corruption. In the American context, the U.S. Constitution included certain provisions to lessen the potential influence of parties, and George Washington used his Farewell Address to warn of the dangers of these "factions."[1] Despite Washington's exhortations, parties soon became dominant forces across all levels of government. By the early 1800s, party officials controlled the mechanisms of the state: bribes paid to parties were commonplace, patronage was rife, and organs of the state were even being used to mobilize voters.[2]

One of the reasons why party-directed corruption is so difficult to combat is that the actors who have the power to address machine politics are usually those who have risen through these systems and stand to gain the most from their perpetuation. When party-directed corruption is prevalent, senior government officials attain their positions not by introducing new ideologies, by better serving their constituents, or by better connecting with voters, but by being loyal to the right entities in the machine. Sometimes the very continuation of their power relies upon providing sinecures while overlooking other venal activities.

It took an unusual set of circumstances for political machines to become marginalized in American politics. Although there had been calls for administrative reforms for most of America's history, it was not until the passage of the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act in 1883 that patronage was seriously addressed. Chester Arthur, the president who signed the Act, had risen through the Conkling political machine in New York.[3] For much of his career Arthur was a staunch defender of machine politics, which was not surprising given the lucrative and powerful positions he had obtained from these systems. In 1880, he was added to the Republican ticket as the vice-president under James Garfield. Garfield and Arthur won a narrow victory, but soon after the inauguration, a preacher and lawyer named Charles Guiteau assassinated President Garfield. Guiteau claimed that his actions were retribution for not receiving a senior-level political appointment after campaigning for Garfield. Following Garfield's assassination, newly-installed President Arthur faced serious popular pressure to address the influence of political machines and introduce administrative reforms. The result was a series of actions that culminated with the Pendleton Act, which stipulated that government jobs should be issued on the basis of merit rather than political affiliations.

The American experience with eradicating party-directed corruption may seem unique in its circumstances, but this history also shaped the first systematic comparative studies on the topic. In the 1950s and 1960s, many scholars proclaimed that party-directed corruption was merely a growing pain on the path to economic and political development. Once institutions became robust, scholars expected corruption to either be substituted with legal forms of lobbying or dissipate altogether, along the lines of the U.S. case. Indeed, scholars like Samuel Huntington argued that some level of party-directed corruption was a key ingredient for political and economic development in weak democracies.[4] Huntington wrote that party-led abuses of cumbersome rules would ultimately enable reforms that would trigger economic development. The money collected through corruption would then be used by parties to form the initial political bases of power. But money collected from corruption could not sustain a party on its own. Eventually, parties would have to compete over ideologies and performance records as well. Increased competition (partly enabled by ill-gotten resources) would thereby lead to political development, wherein stronger institutions would make corruption more costly as enforcement and monitoring mechanisms improved. Firms seeking to affect legislation would choose to conduct legal lobbying instead of bribing, while patronage postings would be rejected by the party machine's opponents.[5] Institutions would become robust. Considered in this light, the Pendleton Act may have been precipitated by a special set of events, but it was inevitable that civil service reform would take place at this stage of American history.

As scholars further analyzed political development and party-directed corruption, they soon recognized that corruption did not always dissipate over time. Instead, they found the opposite: in many, if not most, cases, party-directed corruption seemed to become more entrenched over time. Scholars and policymakers alike have described "vicious circles," wherein party-directed corruption begets more corruption as parties become increasingly dependent on illicitly-acquired resources while the society becomes more accepting of corruption as a practice.[6] Corrupt and otherwise weak institutions are no longer cast as symptoms of a certain stage of development but instead are recognized as the very disease itself.

This shift in perspective was actually part of a broader shift in how scholars think about political institutions and economic development. Instead of focusing on the economic indicators that precipitate good governance, there is an increasing recognition that institutions also matter in shaping outcomes.[7] With the recognition of the need to focus on institutions, however, there has been a corresponding simplification in terms of how corruption is conceptualized.

Corruption has traditionally been associated with a number of different concepts. Aristotle, for instance, saw corruption as any deviation from an ideal state.[8] Since no form of perfect government could exist, there would always be some form of corruption, and Aristotle sought to understand the trade-offs between different institutional designs. Early-modern republican theorists defined corruption as the opposite of public virtue, where public virtue refers to an individual's willingness to sacrifice his or her private interests for the community's wellbeing. Corruption, then, is the unwillingness of the individual to sacrifice one's private interests for the good of the community. In order to combat corruption, individuals need to adopt a moral sense of public virtue.

In the 1950s and 1960s, corruption came to be defined as an action. For example, Gunnar Myrdal defined corruption as follows:

> The term "corruption" will be used in its widest sense, to include not only all forms of "improper or selfish exercise of power and influence attached to a public office or to the special position one occupies in public life," but also the activity of the bribers.[9]

Myrdal goes on to recognize that corruption comes in many forms. Government officials may engage in embezzlement—where non-government actors might or might not be involved—but other forms of corruption, such as bribery, typically also involve non-government actors. Bribery not only requires a government official willing to "supply" the act, but also requires another actor who provides the "demand" for the act. According to this concept of corruption, the private actor who offers a bribe is just as culpable and just as worthy of study as the government official who accepts it.

This encompassing understanding of corruption began to change around the 1980s, possibly due to a larger intellectual movement to find governance solutions by emphasizing the shortcomings of government officials and institutions. Since then, the concept of corruption has become increasingly streamlined as scholars and policy-makers alike have come to agree that corruption should be understood as "the misuse of public office for private gain."[10] Some scholars have quibbled with parts of this definition by questioning what constitutes misuse or whether private gain includes the benefit that may accrue to a third-party such as a political cause, but the essence of this definition is widely accepted.[11] This definition also renders the concept of corruption far more simplistic than how it has previously been construed. As a private actor, the bribe-giver is not responsible for corruption. In the same vein, an actor who does not hold government office but may nonetheless be orchestrating venal acts—such as a non-government intermediary or an unelected member of a political machine—is not considered corrupt. Instead, according to this definition the responsibility of the act rests squarely with the one who is misusing his or her public office. This has become the mainstream, conventional understanding of corruption, and it has shaped subsequent scholarly theorizing and research.

By framing corruption as a misuse of public office for private gain, corruption scholars have steadfastly focused on the behavior of the government official, and rational choice theory has come to the forefront of this increasingly prescriptive literature. In the rational choice framework, if one accepts that corruption is solely the fault of the government official, then the challenge of addressing corruption reduces to a principal-agent problem. How can the citizenry or the state get the government official to act honestly? The typical answers can be articulated in complex terms, but they rely primarily upon the state or the citizenry collecting better information about the government official's actions while implementing better incentive and enforcement mechanisms to steer the government official.[12] Based on this approach, empirical investigations of corruption increasingly utilize randomized control trials, whereby a new incentive or a new enforcement mechanism is introduced to one set of communities but is not introduced to a control set of communities.[13] If the treated communities perform better than the control set of communities, the treatment is considered beneficial; if not, the treatment is abandoned. This formulation helps us understand how to deter corruption when outside actors are not involved but is of limited use when we consider party-directed corruption, or corruption in a supply-and-demand framework. It does not let us consider what incentives are affecting the agents who are not government officials.

From another orientation, scholars have considered how certain socio-cultural factors or organizational norms discourage government officials from practicing corruption.[14] These scholars also place the onus of malfeasance on the government official. For example, several scholars have argued that female government officials are less likely to be corrupt than their male counterparts.[15] Scholars have found that certain internal organizational norms can lessen corruption.[16] As with the principal-agent literature, the common framing for all of these studies is that corruption is the responsibility of the government official.

Taken together, this scholarship has been fruitful insofar as the "supply-side" of corruption deserves attention. But it has also led to some peculiar policy recommendations. For instance, Kaushik Basu, a former Chief Economic Advisor to India and currently the Chief Economist of the World Bank, reaches logically-sound yet highly questionable policy recommendations from extending this definition.[17] In order to reduce the misuse of public office, Basu suggests that in many cases private actors should be provided blanket amnesties from corruption charges. Corruption is the fault of the person who holds public office, and certain private actors, who inherently prefer non-corrupt to corrupt environments, would voluntarily testify against corrupt public officials if given immunity. This model neglects the likelihood that if a private actor reports corruption, other government officials or a political party that is connected with the accused official may level punishments on the whistleblower.

Similarly, even though the conventional definition suggests that culpability rests with the government official, private firms in developing countries oftentimes initiate bribery as they seek to exploit "non-market strategies" of business competition. By exclusively focusing on the government official who misuses his or her public office, we have come to know comparatively little about the non-government actors involved in requesting corruption.[18]

Perhaps because the conventional framing of corruption focuses on the government official who misuses one's office for one's own private gain, researchers have not adequately studied the political machines and other organizations involved in facilitating corruption throughout the developing world. This is especially concerning because corruption in many cases occurs in a highly-organized fashion, with carefully-designed political machines overseeing and even regularizing these processes. Consider an illustrative example drawn from Robert Wade's examination of public postings in Tamil Nadu, India.[19] Wade found that engineers in the irrigation department had to pay their superiors an amount almost equal to their legal salaries to obtain their positions.

This money was then passed upwards through the bureaucracy and was also distributed to local politicians. Engineers could also keep any money made from bribes. Even though engineers misuse their offices for private gain, their acts also enrich other bureaucrats and politicians in the system. The conventional framing of corruption encourages us to treat the engineer as the sole agent responsible for bribery, despite the fact that it serves the interests of many other public and private actors when an engineer accepts a bribe. To reduce the likelihood of bribery, the conventional framing of corruption would have us focus on changing the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms affecting engineers without considering the incentives of these other actors, or the larger organizational dynamics of corruption.

The three recently-published books reviewed in this article are welcome contributions to this understudied field because they break from this typical framing of corruption. Even though some of these authors define corruption along the lines of "misuse of public office for private gain," the empirical results reflect a more accurate depiction of corruption, as societally-undesirable actions involving public officials and other actors. A "societally-undesirable action" refers to any action that would reduce a state's legitimacy were it to become widely known. Parties can provide an organizational structure where these actions can be routinized, at the same time providing mechanisms that mask these actions from the population. Together, these three books shift the focus from policing a discrete action to examining the complex networks and organizations that regularize corruption. Addressing corruption, then, is not so much about stopping an individual government official from taking a one-off bribe as it is about dealing with the networks and organizations that make corruption a commonplace activity. Beyond treating corruption as a principal-agent problem, these books suggest that scholars must also consider other frameworks and approaches for analyzing and addressing corruption.

Party-Directed Corruption Today

Parties are formed by individuals who seek to realize common goals through the acquisition and application of political power. They oftentimes play a central role in enabling corruption, and party-directed corruption is a global phenomenon. Despite the fact that party-directed corruption is so prevalent, however, the ways in which parties choose to engage in corruption depend on a number of factors, from the political institutions shaping the party system to the historical and cultural specifics that may determine how a given party is organized.

Daniel Gingerich's *Political Institutions and Party-Directed Corruption in South America* provides an in-depth examination of how parties in Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile enable corruption in their countries' bureaucracies in response to the institutional configurations of these countries. Gingerich utilizes an impressive array of methods—along with a highly-innovative survey spanning bureaucracies across three countries—to reveal what should ultimately be considered an unsurprising finding: party-directed corruption is higher in polities where parties are stronger. Reciprocally, countries with weak-party systems do not have as much party-directed corruption. The strength of Gingerich's analysis rests on his methods and in his explication of the mechanisms at play.

Different democratic systems prioritize parties in different ways. In some systems, parties are strong and can dominate the political landscape; in others, parties are weak as individual politicians hold much greater influence over policy-making. Scholars have identified a range of institutional factors that affect whether or not party systems will be strong or weak. Some of these factors include whether or not independent candidates can seek office, whether or not voters must only vote for one party for all positions ("fused ballot" versus "split ticket" systems), and whether or not elected officials are allowed to vote against their parties' bills in a legislature.

Gingerich focuses on one factor in particular that affects party strength: whether a country has a closed- or an open-list ballot system. In Bolivia, parties choose candidates in a closed-list system. In such a system, citizens vote for parties, and party leaders then choose who gets to serve in the legislature based upon the number of votes or seats they win. In contrast, Chile and Brazil both have open-list systems whereby voters select the candidate. The candidate may still need to go through a nomination procedure within the party, but the candidate must ultimately appeal directly to the voters.

In each of the three countries analyzed, politicians routinely emerge from the bureaucracy.[20] In Bolivia, bureaucrats who want to become politicians must ingratiate themselves with parties in order to receive seats. Gingerich finds that these seat-seeking bureaucrats are willing to "steal for the team" in order to position themselves to be selected for future elected office. In Brazil and Chile, bureaucrats who aspire to become politicians do not display the same willingness to cheat for parties. As a result, they are less likely to engage in corrupt acts on their party's behalf.

Perhaps the strongest component of Gingerich's contribution is a summary of previous methods for systematically analyzing corruption, along with his justification for his own randomized response survey design. Corruption is notoriously difficult to measure, as those who have the best knowledge about its practice are often the least inclined to discuss it. In order to get around this problem, scholars have traditionally relied upon perceptions of corruption by asking how much corruption does an interested group think exists? Of these perceptions' surveys, Transparency International's *Corruption Perceptions Index* (CPI) is perhaps the most widely-used cross-national survey on corruption. However, using cross-national measures of perceptions comes with its own problems. For one, the individuals who are surveyed are usually most familiar with one country or region: they may know their own country's level of corruption, but their perceptions of corruption for some other country might not be accurate. Additionally, the respondents may be familiar with the levels of certain kinds of corruption but not others. The CPI usually draws surveys of international businesspeople and country specialists; businesspeople may be unfamiliar with the kinds of corruption that a poor person experiences on a day-to-day basis. A third potential problem stems from the fact that perception may be affected by factors that have nothing to do with actual amounts of corruption. For instance, in examining variation across Russia, Gulnaz Sharafutdinova finds that political competition and press freedom actually increase perceived corruption because politicians are more likely to level allegations of impropriety against one another in these environments.[21]

To get a more accurate understanding of corruption, researchers sometimes look at ostensibly objective measures—the number of corruption violations reported in the news media, for example—but this approach can be equally fraught with problems.[22] The actors involved in a corrupt act have serious incentives to hide their actions, while newspapers may be selectively targeting certain actors and not others. In India, for instance, newspapers create “treaties” with corporations, whereby firms issue equity to a newspaper company in order to avoid negative publicity; it is widely believed that government officials also engage in these kinds of protections with the media. Likewise, Manuel Balán finds that corruption scandals in Chile and Argentina are more likely to emerge for reasons that might have little to do with actual levels of corruption, as government insiders typically leak information to gain power within their own parties.[23] These findings present huge problems for systematic research as results are biased either towards identifying actors who have run afoul of the media or towards scandals that are leaked for politically-motivated reasons.

Beyond perception-based surveys and news reports, a third research strategy involves requesting services that government officials are required to provide. For example, Hernando de Soto had research assistants file a variety of government requests, from incorporating businesses to requests for driver’s licenses.[24] More recently, Leonid Peisakhin and Paul Pinto conducted a field experiment to see whether recently-enacted “right to information laws” provided an effective substitute to bribery.[25] They compared four groups of Delhi-based slum dwellers who were all requesting ration cards from their local government officials: one group filed right to information requests; the researchers paid bribes for a second group of slum dwellers; a third group had a local NGO send a letter of support on behalf of each slum dweller; while the fourth group served as the control group. Peisakhin and Pinto found that right to information requests were just as effective at getting ration cards as paying bribes, while a letter of support from the NGO was relatively ineffective.

Although these kinds of studies may present rich opportunities for scholars to understand the dynamics of corruption at a micro-level, they also introduce serious ethical concerns. The government officials and the slum dwellers who are participating in these experiments are usually not made aware that they are the subjects of scientific investigation. Researchers are expected to ensure that no harmful consequences befall the participants as a result of their investigation or when the results of their findings becoming well-known, particularly when subjects are unaware of their participation. Researchers would have to ensure that the government officials who accepted the bribes were not later punished and that those who had the bribes paid in their names were morally permissive of these actions being taken in their names. Furthermore, one might question whether it is ethical for researchers to engage in illegal actions such as corruption. Researchers and ethical boards may ultimately decide that these investigations are worth the potential moral ramifications, as they did in these cases, but a strong argument can also be made against clearly illegal research strategies.

Gingerich weighs the pros and cons of each of these research strategies as he defends his choice to conduct diagnostic surveys of government officials. In order to protect respondents so that they will give honest answers without the fear of reprisal, Gingerich implements a randomized response survey whereby any given respondent's answers are masked while information about the department is collected.[26] Gingerich designs a Warner randomized response, where a pinwheel is used to choose between two questions. Only the respondent knows which question is asked, and the same two answers are shown for both questions, but by aggregating respondents and controlling the probability of the questions on the pinwheel, the researcher can broadly ascertain the corruption level of a department without knowing any individual's particular views. If the respondent understands how the survey ensures anonymity—as was the case in Gingerich's surveys—then the incentives for lying and non-response are lower, reducing the potential for systematic bias. However, this approach comes at a cost. Without knowing which question a respondent is answering, the variance on the estimator will be greater, meaning that there is less precision in determining estimates. The tradeoff in using this approach is accepting potential bias versus accepting greater variance. Gingerich's candid discussion of methodological tradeoffs and his clever research design make this section of his book a must-read for anyone who is interested in conducting sensitive empirical research where the respondent is best-served by anonymity.

Using his surveys, Gingerich compares government departments across Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile. He asks bureaucrats about perceptions of politicization in personnel and corruption control. Although Gingerich is focused on explaining cross-country variation, there are several interesting intra-country patterns that emerge from comparing different departments within each country. In each country, some departments seem to be more immune to politicization and to corruption than other departments. Gingerich does not try to explain why this intra-country variation exists, but his statistical analyses are sensitive to this reality. He conducts matching comparisons between similar departments and compares politicized to non-politicized departments across countries. When the data are segmented in these ways, departments in Bolivia routinely demonstrate higher levels of politicization, along with bureaucrats who are more likely to engage in corruption, when compared to departments in Brazil and Chile. Nevertheless, future researchers may wish to leverage Gingerich's survey results to examine why certain departments are more prone to politicization and corruption than others in the same country.

Gingerich's theory also provides a stable building block for further inquiries. He convincingly demonstrates how one institutional configuration—open- versus closed-list systems—affects party-directed corruption, yet he recognizes that other institutional factors may also affect party-directed corruption. For instance, Brazil recently changed the rules of its national legislature, banning politicians from voting against their party platforms.[27] This should further concentrate power with party elites, and we should see a rise in bureaucratic politicization and party-directed corruption. Would this institutional change in legislative proceedings matter more than institutional configurations involving voter systems? Repeating Gingerich's survey in Brazil would give us an immediate answer.

Another useful exercise is to consider whether Gingerich's theory can be adapted to countries where politicians do not typically come from the bureaucracy. The potential for a bureaucrat to receive an elected seat may play an important role for parties to get bureaucrats to break the rules, but there are a number of countries where politicians do not routinely come from the bureaucracy. They instead rise up through party ranks or enter politics after having pursued careers in the private sector. Would institutional configurations such as closed- and open-list systems still lead to greater party-directed corruption in these polities?

Perhaps the biggest unresolved question that emerges from Gingerich's book involves the relationship between party-directed corruption and overall levels of corruption in a polity. Even though Gingerich demonstrates that institutional configurations affect party-directed corruption, he is ambivalent as to whether institutional configurations affect overall levels of corruption. At some points in the book, Gingerich suggests that overall levels of corruption might be lower in countries with open-list systems, whereas at other points he implies that candidate-directed corruption—corruption that benefits a specific candidate—might substitute for party-directed corruption. After reading this book, one is left wondering whether overall levels of corruption are lower in polities with open- versus closed-list systems. Do polities with strong-party systems experience higher levels of corruption than other polities?

The answer to this question is undoubtedly complex. On the one hand, there are compelling reasons to expect lower levels of corruption in strong-party systems. For example, parties have the potential to centralize rent-extraction, which can create a system that is more efficient than decentralized rent-extraction by smaller actors.[28] Furthermore, strong parties may choose to lessen short-term opportunistic corruption in order to establish brand names that will yield higher political returns in the long run. Institutional configurations like closed-list systems should therefore be able to hold parties accountable better than other systems.[29] Therefore polities with strong-party systems should experience lower overall corruption compared to weak-party systems.[30]

On the other hand, polities with strong-party systems might see higher levels of corruption as opportunistic parties coordinate corrupt practices in a larger and more systematic manner. Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman analyze ninety-four democracies and find that countries with closed-list proportional representation systems exhibit higher levels of overall corruption than countries with open-list proportional representation.[31] Chang and Golden call this evaluation into question by analyzing the effects of district magnitude on the relationship between party systems and corruption.[32] They find that corruption is higher in large districts with open-list proportional representation compared to large closed-list districts. This is because individuals require more resources to out-campaign their opponents in open-list systems, and larger districts require even more resources than smaller ones.

Although party-directed corruption may be higher in strong-party systems, the previous scholarship is mixed as to whether overall levels of corruption are higher or lower in strong-party systems, with compelling theory and empirics supporting both sides. Vineeta Yadav's *Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries* enters the center of this debate. Yadav recognizes that previous studies relating party strength with corruption have focused on electoral accountability. In addition to considering the effects of list systems, scholars have also considered whether presidential or parliamentary systems are afflicted with more corruption and whether federal or unitary systems affect corruption. Yadav considers another form of party strength by looking at the extent to which parties control the legislation-making process. For some legislatures, parties completely control agenda-setting and other procedures. In the extreme, it can even be illegal for legislators to vote against their parties' bills. In other legislatures, parties are not as domineering. Individual legislators from any party can introduce bills, and they can also vote against their own parties' motions. Yadav finds that overall levels of corruption are higher in democracies where parties control legislative procedures.

Yadav suggests two reasons as to why corruption is higher in democracies where parties control the legislative process. The first is that parties are expected to fulfill several roles that individual politicians are not expected to perform. In order to compete against other parties, a party must establish and maintain offices, finance several campaigns, and spend money to compete in elections. Building and sustaining this kind of organization requires resources, and parties often seek to acquire these resources through corrupt means. In comparison, a candidate competing in a country with weak parties would not have to worry about supporting such a complex organization.

A second reason why corruption is more prevalent in polities where parties control the legislative process has to do with the fact that parties that are better able to exert control over the legislature may also be better positioned to use the legislature to control other branches of government. In many polities, a legislature that is controlled by one party could theoretically pressure the judiciary or exert control over bureaucrats, either through legislative strategies or through something resembling the process that Gingerich identifies in Bolivia. In contrast, legislators in weak-party systems rarely deliver the votes required to capture the judiciary or the bureaucracy. Collaboration between corrupt officials and politicians may happen from time to time in these systems, but it will not reach the same systemic levels as in strong-party systems.

By investigating the legislative processes in Brazil and India, Yadav comes to the conclusion that strong-party systems are likely to exhibit higher levels of corruption. As she is interested in examining how legislative control affects levels of corruption, Yadav selects Brazil and India because they are similar on a number of other institutional dimensions. Both countries have similar developing economies with a federal-democratic political structure. Both countries saw competitive democracy set in at around the same time, with Brazil experiencing a shift from authoritarian rule to competing democratic rule in 1988 and India experiencing a shift from one-party dominance on the part of the Congress Party to sustained multiparty coalitions and a more vigorous opposition by the late 1980s. Although Brazil is a presidential system and India is a parliamentary system, Brazil resembles a parliamentary system in that it has among the strongest legislative bodies of any presidential system in the world.[33] Furthermore, both countries have bicameral legislatures where the main houses follow open-list proportional rules for election.[34] Crucially for Yadav, they also have similar interest group rules, with both countries allowing state-sponsored organizations as well as voluntary groups to directly lobby the legislatures.[35]

Where Brazil and India differ is in the way bills are passed through their legislatures. India's system privileges the party in power through the entire process, from the introduction of the bill to its ratification. Party leaders must approve the bill before it can be proposed, giving them an agenda-setting ability. They then select whether committees review the bill or whether the it can be voted on in its current form; amendments can either be added in committee or during the final consideration before the vote, usually requiring the consent of the Speaker of the House, who is from the ruling party or from a coalition partner. After this final consideration, the bill is either approved or rejected. If the Supreme Court rejects the constitutionality of the new law, the Indian Parliament can easily change the Constitution, perhaps more easily than any other democracy. The legislature's entire schedule is controlled by the Speaker, and, in turn, the Speaker is controlled by the party.[36] A Member of Parliament can lose his or her seat for voting against or abstaining to vote on any motion that the party whip requires. A member can also be removed from Parliament for switching parties. Party control over the legislature runs deep in India.

In contrast, Brazil's legislative system gives much more power to individual legislators. Bills can be proposed by a number of different actors including the legislators, the president, the judiciary, senior bureaucrats, and even citizens. Committees review the bills, but members of either house can bring bills through committees by calling floor votes. Bills must pass through both houses and must be approved by the president, who also has a line-item veto. Simple majorities in both houses can overturn a president's veto. The agenda of each house is controlled by a body comprised of legislators from different parties. Individual legislators from any party can introduce amendments without first getting approval of the party leaders. In Brazil, ruling party leaders do not have the same level of legislative control as their counterparts in India.

What does this difference mean for business firms or other actors who seek to influence the legislative process? In India, a lobbying group only has to appeal to the senior leaders from the ruling coalition. Winning their approval results in immediate legislative power that can reverberate through the entire legislative process. In contrast, in Brazil a lobbying group will probably have to construct a broad-based alliance across both houses. Winning support for a bill in Brazil does not simply rely upon winning over a few party bosses.

One might imagine lobbying costs would be lower in India because the legislative process is so highly-coordinated, and, with lower lobbying costs, we should expect lower corruption. On the other hand, one might expect that with so many different avenues for gaining support in Brazil, lobbyists might find that influencing policy is less expensive than it would be if a few party bosses controlled the entire process. This would mean that Brazil had lower lobbying costs and therefore lower corruption. To resolve this puzzle, Yadav surveys business groups in both Brazil and India on their perceptions and experiences with corruption. She surveys 179 business groups spread across India and 158 business groups across Brazil. In order to get a more complete picture of lobbying, she also surveys a smaller sample of labor and civil society groups. Since Yadav is asking relatively sensitive questions about whether and how lobbying groups engage in influencing the legislative process, concerns of systematic bias arise as some groups may not have been willing to honestly divulge such sensitive information.[37] Nevertheless, almost 60 percent of the groups in India reported that the corrupt selling of parliamentary votes by firms in their sector has had a significant impact on their business, while 32 percent of those firms surveyed in Brazil reported a significant impact. Other questions designed to get at the differences in lobbying elicited similar patterns.

It could be the case that corruption is just as prevalent in Brazil; it is just that Indian firms are more comfortable discussing corruption. In order to address this concern of bias and to give a more complete picture of the differences in the lobbying process, Yadav conducts several open-ended interviews with government officials, union leaders, business managers, academics, and journalists in Brazil and India. She further buttresses her comparison by tracking the lobbying efforts surrounding two bills in each country. When combined with the surveys, the empirical evidence presents a clear picture: legislature-based corruption is higher in India than in Brazil, and this is due to the comparative strength of parties in the legislative process.

However, Yadav's larger claim—that corruption is higher in legislatures with strong-party systems—is not fully proven. Although there may be good reason to expect it, Yadav does not adequately explain why she expects the level of legislative party control to affect corruption in other government agencies such as the judiciary or the bureaucracy, nor does she do justice to the gamut of mechanisms that may be involved. Nevertheless, to provide evidence that strong party control over the legislature affects overall levels of corruption across the state, Yadav asks her respondents in Brazil and India to what extent the following forms of corruption impact these business groups' sectors: political patronage, bribery, the purchase of court decisions, and illegal contributions to parties. Asking about these forms of corruption allows Yadav to consider how extra-legislative institutions such as the judiciary and the bureaucracy are affected by strong-party systems. Yadav's survey indicates that perceived corruption is higher in India's bureaucracy compared to Brazil's, while perceived corruption is equally low for the judiciaries in Brazil and in India. Given that India has an open-list system and that politicians rarely come from the bureaucracy, it remains unclear how and why Yadav expects parties to affect bureaucracies. It is also unclear why strong parties are able to corrupt the Indian bureaucracy but are unable to affect the judiciary to the same extent. There may be good reasons why parties affect the bureaucracy differently from the judiciary, but Yadav does not present them.

To further demonstrate that party control over the legislature affects overall levels of corruption (and not just legislative corruption), Yadav creates an institutional measure of a party's ability to practice agenda-setting, to amend bills, and to expel parliamentarians who do not vote in line with the party. This dataset covers sixty-four developing democracies from 1984–2004 and is constructed using a notable array of primary and secondary sources. On its own, this new dataset should find immediate applications for those who study cross-national legislative processes. Yadav uses various cross-national measures of corruption perceptions—including Transparency International's CPI, the World Bank's *Control of Corruption Index*, and the International Country Risk Guide's *Corruption Index*—to test whether levels of corruption are affected by party control over the legislature.[38] Yadav finds that perceptions of corruption are consistently higher in countries where parties control legislatures.

Yadav's survey—like other cross-national perception-based surveys of corruption—measures the perceptions of corruption according to business people and country experts. It makes sense to survey businesses and civil society organizations regarding lobbying and the potential for legislative corruption as they are more likely to engage with legislators compared to other organizations or individuals. Indeed, Yadav's evidence is very strong in suggesting that legislative-based corruption is higher when parties control the process. However, other state institutions such as the judiciary and the bureaucracy are expected to engage with a cross-section of society, not just businesses.

To accept Yadav's empirical argument that overall levels of corruption are higher when parties control the legislative process, one has to accept the assumption that businesses' perceptions of corruption reflect overall corruption levels. This is a widespread and often implicit assumption with most cross-national corruption research, and as such, it is worth questioning its validity. On the one hand, a case can be made that different levels of corruption should accompany one another. If a party is willing to illegally accept money from a business to influence legislation or other large-scale, one-off government provisions such as contract tenders (this is often categorized as a form of "grand corruption"), the party may also be more likely to engage in "petty corruption" such as collecting regular, small-scale bribes from individuals who seek public services. On the other hand, parties and government officials may be strategic in choosing what kinds of rents to collect. If they do not want to engage in grand corruption, they may rely on petty corruption to sustain their activities. Businesses would report lower perceived levels of corruption, but corruption would be just as rampant, albeit taking a different form.

Unfortunately we know little about whether this assumption is plausible or not as previous studies have rarely considered how different types of corruption may be related to one another. Asking how different forms of corruption accompany or substitute one another is perhaps the most important topic in contemporary corruption studies, and Jennifer Bussell's *Corruption and Reform in India* reveals the potential promise of further investigations in this direction. Bussell explores the extent to which incumbent parties rely on grand corruption versus petty corruption across Indian states. Bussell is interested in understanding when and why incumbent parties are likely to adopt technology-enabled administrative reforms. Such reforms are often introduced to reduce petty corruption as they make it easier for citizens to request and receive services, to register complaints, and to register certificates and licenses. But even though they are designed to reduce petty corruption, these reforms often involve public-private partnerships which lend themselves to grand corruption opportunities, typically in the form of contract tendering. Bussell argues that the incumbent party will choose to adopt these reforms based upon whether they primarily rely on petty or grand corruption. If the incumbent party already relies on grand corruption and not on petty corruption, then it is more likely to apply these technology-enabled reforms; if instead the incumbent party relies on petty corruption, it will delay the adoption of these reforms. The decision may also be tilted by various strategic decisions: for instance, an incumbent party who controls government through a coalition will not introduce reforms if its coalition partners object. If the incumbent party relies upon both forms of corruption, reforms are also unlikely to be adopted.

The strategic decision-makers in Bussell's account are parties, and parties are interested in maximizing their power. According to Bussell, parties in India pursue power through raising funds first and foremost. Appealing to voters through performance or through ideology is of secondary concern. Bussell explains "that the desire to retain flexible sources of campaign finance in the form of rents will generally outweigh the more diffuse benefit of providing policy goods to constituents, even in a targeted manner" (p. 20). This is a controversial assertion. After all, parties in democracies are thought to be citizen-oriented. However, in India, voters have historically received what parties want them to receive, not necessarily what they want most.[39]

Because parties focus on money more than votes, parties in power choose to implement technology-enabled reforms based upon how these reforms will affect their funding. In order to test her theory, Bussell sets a difficult task for herself. She is not only measuring corruption for each Indian state, but differentiating petty corruption from grand corruption. In order to measure state-level grand corruption, Bussell reviews audits of the Members of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme (MPLADS). MPLADS issues Rs. 10 million (~$200,000 USD) to each member of the national parliament; MPs are supposed to spend this money on development initiatives in their constituencies. Bussell finds that several audits report questionable allocations of this money and codes these audits to construct a state-level index of grand corruption.

To get a measure of petty corruption, Bussell relies on a 2005 national survey conducted by Transparency International and the Centre for Media Studies. Respondents were asked to assess eleven government agencies by answering six questions related to their perceptions of corruption for each agency as well as whether they had paid a bribe to anyone in this agency during the previous year. Their responses were then used to construct an index of corruption for each state. Respondents were all members of below-the-poverty-line households. Because the respondents were asked sensitive questions and because they are among the most vulnerable in their societies, this survey comes with serious concerns of response bias. However, one of the benefits of comparing respondents in the same country is that these concerns should be consistent across all states: there is no reason to expect that respondents from one state are any more or less likely to report perceived corruption than respondents from another state.

The earliest reforms that Bussell considers were introduced in 1999, and because several of the reforms were introduced before the survey was conducted, there are concerns of endogeneity: these reforms should reduce petty corruption, but the prevalence of petty corruption is supposed to have shaped the decision to introduce these reforms. To address this endogeneity, Bussell also compares state-level corruption among police agencies, as police services were not reformed by introducing these new technologies.

Bussell uses these measures of corruption, along with a standard battery of control variables, to identify how long it takes for states to implement technology-enabled administrative reforms. She also considers whether the reforms were initiated as a public-private partnership and the scope of technology-enabled services offered in each state. In line with her theory, the nature and scope of these reforms are affected by the levels of petty and grand corruption. In states where petty corruption is entrenched, reforms take longer to enact, and when they do take place, they do not offer as many services as reforms in other states. In states where grand corruption is more prevalent, reforms are adopted more quickly, yet they are implemented in the form of public-private partnerships. Although the observed effects are weaker, coalition governments are less likely to adopt comprehensive reforms as well, since some alliance parties may be dependent on petty corruption.

Bussell's rigor and unique approach to measuring different kinds of corruption in the Indian context are worthy of close attention on their own. However, in order to suggest that these dynamics extend beyond India's borders, Bussell concludes with a discussion of technology-enabled administrative reforms in Brazil and South Africa. Bussell asserts that Brazil had low levels of petty corruption prior to the adoption of these reforms, making these reforms more palatable to politicians. South Africa also exhibits a pattern that appears consistent with Bussell's theory, although it is hard to assess these cases without the same quality of corruption data that was found in India. Finally, Bussell concludes with a cross-national regression of the effects of perceived corruption levels on e-government ratings.[40] The presence of perceived corruption is associated with lower levels of e-government adoption; the presence of electoral competition does not have the same strength of association with e-government adoption.

However, these cross-national analyses raise more questions than they answer. The survey of perceived petty corruption that Bussell uses in her analysis of Indian states targets those who are below-the-poverty-line, while the surveys she uses in her cross-national analyses primarily measure the perceptions of corruption among businesspeople. As Yadav suggests, businesspeople are more likely to engage in grand corruption such as influencing legislative processes and seeking protections from industry-specific regulations. Therefore it is possible that these cross-national surveys reflect grand corruption patterns, not petty corruption as Bussell suggests. Even at their best, these cross-national surveys reveal perceptions of overall corruption, not whether petty corruption is more prevalent than grand corruption. Also, Gingerich and Yadav both suggest that politicians and parties will source corruption funds differently depending on the institutional rules of the polity in place. Bussell chooses to look at different states in India precisely to control for these institutional rules as all states in India have similar governmental structures. But in her cross-country analysis, Bussell neglects to consider how different institutional configurations may affect the type and scale of corruption.

Setting these criticisms aside, Bussell's theoretical contribution to the field of corruption studies is path-breaking, and she deserves special commendation for introducing creative new measures of petty and grand corruption. Parties protect certain kinds of illicit sources for funds even as they introduce reforms to limit other sources of corruption money. And although she focuses on technology-enabled administrative reform, her findings should generalize to other kinds of reform. If parties rely upon petty corruption, they are unlikely to introduce reforms that threaten these revenue streams, whether or not these reforms involve introducing new technology. Parties that depend on grand corruption should be less likely to initiate reforms designed to reduce grand corruption compared to parties that depend on petty corruption, although further research would be required to definitively establish this relationship. Also, if parties are strategic actors, then they might seek to undermine their rivals' revenue sources. A party may suffer from reducing one form of corruption, but it is possible that by reducing this form of corruption, the party's rivals suffer even more. Further research could establish whether or not parties introduce reforms to undercut their rivals.

Conclusion

Scholarship has come a long way since the first systematic studies on party-directed corruption from the 1950s and 1960s. In contrast to this earlier research, most scholars no longer believe that corruption is a temporary side effect of development, nor does it automatically phase out as states mature. Instead, the scope and the nature of corruption in a country are affected by institutional configurations, and corruption can become more entrenched over time. These patterns do not necessarily phase out, and in many cases anti-corruption efforts require institutional changes that are difficult to implement, as Gingerich and Yadav suggest, or a special opportunity to phase out one kind of corruption in favor of another, as Bussell finds.

The involvement of parties also highlights that corruption is not just a simple principal-agent problem, nor can it be reduced to an ordinary market transaction between two actors. Instead, corruption can be highly-organized, with large networks of public and private actors participating in illicit actions that become routinized over time. Parties are central actors as they facilitate the connections and protections necessary for corruption to take place. In contrast to those who think that corruption is carried out merely by those who seek personal gain, parties also have their own political interests at stake, and they seek to maximize these interests by acting strategically in condoning or shutting down illicit practices. In Gingerich's words, corruption is frequently about "stealing for the team," not necessarily stealing for oneself.

The types of corruption that parties engage in depend to a large extent on the institutional configurations of the polity. Gingerich shows that party-directed corruption is higher when parties can dangle the opportunity for bureaucrats to become politicians through closed-list elections. Likewise, Yadav shows that when parties control the legislative process, business groups believe that corruption is higher. However, we still do not know how overall levels of corruption are affected by all kinds of institutional configurations. At this stage, we have reasons to believe that corruption is less pervasive when parties are weaker—at least in developing country democracies—but further research is needed to fully understand how strong- and weak-party systems either increase or reduce overall levels of corruption.

From Bussell, we also come to learn that institutional structures do not explain everything. She shows that even across the same country—where institutional configurations are held constant—some parties engage in petty corruption while others are more likely to engage in grand corruption. Few scholars have considered how petty corruption is related to grand corruption. Although Bussell observes that parties are differently driven by the forms of corruption they rely upon, we do not yet know why certain parties prefer one kind of corruption over another. Further research could illuminate any potential non-institutional factors which drive parties to engage in corruption so differently. Perhaps it has something to do with the types of businesses or the kinds of private actors in a region; alternatively, it might have something to do with the organizational structures, the ideologies, or the histories of the parties themselves. On this dimension, future studies would do well to open the “black-box” by asking how a party’s history and organizational structure affects how it engages in corruption.

Taken together, these books provide several important insights for understanding how parties affect the scope and nature of corruption in developing democracies. The findings suggest that corruption is more complex than what previous theorizing maintained: corruption often involves a diverse array of public and private actors taking part in societally-undesirable actions. Just as important, the new methodological approaches presented in these works offer several exciting new paths for future studies of party-directed corruption. These new contributions offer corruption scholars a solid theoretical and methodological base for future explorations of party-directed corruption.

NOTES

1. *Washington’s Farewell Address*, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp, accessed September 13, 2014. Corruption is also a recurring theme throughout *The Federalist Papers*, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fedpapers.html, accessed November 6, 2014.

2. There are several excellent histories of machine politics from this time period. For a balanced account of perhaps the most famous machine boss, see Kenneth D. Ackerman, *Boss Tweed: The Corrupt Pol Who Conceived the Soul of Modern New York* (Falls Church: Viral History Press LLC, 2011). For an overview of machine politics, see Brian F. Schaffner, *Politics, Parties, and Elections in America* (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2011).

3. Zachary Karabell, *Chester Alan Arthur* (New York: Times Books, 2004).

4. Samuel Huntington, "Modernization and Corruption," *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 59–71.

5. Many scholars still suggest that corruption should decline with economic development. They conceptualize corruption as an inferior good, and the demand for corruption is thought to go down as incomes rise. For two important examples, see Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini, and Francesco Trebbi, "Electoral Rules and Corruption," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 1 (June 2003), 958–89 and Daniel Treisman, "The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study," *Journal of Public Economics*, 76 (June 2000), 399–457. More recently, Harstad and Svennson develop a formal model where firms choose whether to illegally bribe or legally lobby based upon the costs of each action. Where bribing is easy and consequences are minimal, firms choose to bribe. When bribing is more expensive—as is the case in polities with stronger political institutions—firms instead choose lobbying. Bård Harstad and Jakob Svensson, "Bribes, Lobbying, and Development," *American Political Science Review*, 105 (2011), 46–63.

6. Raghuram Rajan, "Finance and Opportunity in India," Address at the Twentieth Lalit Doshi Memorial Lecture (August 11, 2014). Ajit Mishra, "Persistence of Corruption: Some Theoretical Perspectives," *World Development*, 34 (2006), 349–58.

7. For a summary on the literature that corruption inhibits growth, see Arvind K. Jain, "Corruption: A Review," *Journal of Economic Surveys*, 15 (February 2001), 71–120.

8. Patrick J. Dobel, "The Corruption of a State," *American Political Science Review*, 72 (1978), 958–73. Dobel treats corruption as the loss of capacity for loyalty; corruption does not depend on legality of the action.

9. Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, Vol. 2 (New York: Pantheon Publishers, 1968), 937. Myrdal's definition is based on the Santhanam Committee Report issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. Myrdal's contemporary, Joseph Nye, offers a definition that includes actors who do not hold public office: "Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence." Joseph Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," *The American Political Science Review*, 61 (June 1967), 419.

10. Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 91.

11. For discussions on the widespread acceptance of this understanding of corruption, see Pranab Bardhan, "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," *Journal of Economic Literature* (1997), 1320–46. Also see Abhijit Banerjee, Hanna Rema, and Sendhil Mullainathan, "Corruption," *MIT Department of Economics Working Paper*, no. 12–08 (2012).

12. Ferejohn developed one of the first retrospective voting models, whereby voters commit to reelecting an incumbent if performance exceeds a certain threshold (and conversely, if corruption stays below a certain threshold). See John Ferejohn, "Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control," *Public Choice*, 50 (1986), 5–25. Other models of accountability built on the principal-agent framework have recommended institutional prescriptions that augment political competition, to the voter's benefit. See Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland, and Guido Tabellini, "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112 (1997), 1163–202. Principal-agent models have also been applied to bureaucracy. For a review of this literature, see Sean Gailmard and John Patty, "Formal Models of Bureaucracy," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 15 (2012), 353–77.

13. For example, see Benjamin Olken, "Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia," *Journal of Political Economy*, 115 (2007), 200–49.

14. Seymour Lipset and Gabriel Lenz, "Corruption, Culture, and Markets," in Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington, eds., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 112–24.

15. Lori Beaman, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, and Petia Topalova, "Political Reservation and Substantive Representation: Evidence from Indian Village Councils," *India Policy Forum*, 7 (2010). Also see David Dollar, Raymond Fisman, and Roberta Gatti, "Are Women Really the 'Fairer' Sex? Corruption and Women in Government," *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 46 (December 2001), 423–29.

16. Francis Fukuyama, "What Is Governance?" *Governance*, 26 (July 2013), 347–68.

17. Basu specifies that this amnesty should only be extended to those who bribe for services that they are already entitled to receive, not necessarily for other forms of bribery or grand corruption. Kaushik Basu, "Why, for a Class of Bribes, the Act of *Giving* a Bribe should be Treated as Legal," *Working Paper* (March 2011).

18. The pervasiveness of corruption may also shape the consolidation of various business networks, leading to cooperation between unlikely allies. Examining post-Soviet countries, Duvanova finds that

business associations oftentimes emerge in response to corruption. See Dinissa Duvanova, "Bureaucratic Corruption and Collective Action: Business Associations in the Postcommunist Transition," *Comparative Politics*, 39 (July 2007), 441–61.

19. Robert Wade, "The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India," *The Journal of Development Studies*, 18 (1982), 287–328.

20. Gingerich reports that between 47% and 60% of each country's legislature is comprised of ex-bureaucrats; similar ratios were also identified in Argentina, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Gingerich is quiet on the many democracies where politicians are not drawn from the ranks of bureaucrats.

21. Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, "What Explains Corruption Perceptions? The Dark Side of Political Competition in Russia's Regions," *Comparative Politics*, 42 (January 2010), 147–66.

22. Glaeser and Goldin examine the history of corruption in the United States from 1815–1975 using newspaper word counts. They find a substantial decrease in (the reporting of) corruption from 1870 to 1920, and a second decrease in the 1910s. See Edward L. Glaeser and Claudia Goldin, "Introduction," in Edward L. Glaeser and Claudia Goldin, eds., *Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America's Economic History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 3–22.

23. Manuel Balán, "Corruption by Denunciation: The Political Dynamics of Corruption Scandals in Argentina and Chile," *Comparative Politics*, 43 (July 2011), 459–578.

24. Hernando de Soto, *The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World* (Perennial Library, 1990).

25. Leonid Peisakhin and Paul Pinto, "Is Transparency an Effective Anti-Corruption Strategy? Evidence from a Field Experiment in India," *Regulation & Governance*, 4 (September 2010), 261–80.

26. Apart from randomized response, another possible way to get honest answers about corruption is by asking one group of respondents a seemingly innocuous question, while a separate group of respondents are asked the same question with a controversial prompt included. Researchers can then compare the results from the two groups. This approach is known as a list experiment, and it has proven successful in getting honest answers regarding the domestic popularity of international forces in Afghanistan. Graeme Blair, Kosuke Imai, and Jason Lyall, "Comparing and Combining List and Endorsement Experiments: Evidence from Afghanistan," *American Journal of Political Science*, 58 (October 2014), 1043–63.

27. Yadav, 78. Both Gingerich and Yadav completed the empirical portions of their research before this legislative change took place in 2007.

28. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, "Corruption," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108 (August 1993) and David Kang, *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). These analyses maintain the Huntingtonian perspective that certain forms of corruption can be beneficial.

29. Roger Myerson, "Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 5 (January 1993), 118–32.

30. John Gerring and Strom Thacker, *A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

31. Jana Kunicova and Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption," *British Journal of Political Science*, 35 (October 2005), 573–606.

32. Eric Chang and Miriam Golden, "Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes," *Social Science Quarterly*, 91 (March 2010), 1–20.

33. Matthew Shugart and John Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 155.

34. Most of the members of India's senior house (the Rajya Sabha) are chosen by the state legislatures. For India's lower house (the Lok Sabha), which is far more powerful than the Rajya Sabha, members are directly elected according to plurality rules. In Brazil, the Senate follows majority rules for election while the House of Representatives functions through a plurality system.

35. Brazil and India are different in another key respect. Feraz and Finan and Winters and Weitz-Shapiro find that Brazilian voters remove corrupt politicians when they are made aware of their venality. Although it is unclear whether voters are equally likely to reject known-to-be-corrupt politicians in India, corrupt politicians should be more prevalent because it is more difficult to inform Indian voters compared to their Brazilian counterparts: compared to Brazilians, Indians have lower literacy levels and are less likely to have access to media outlets such as radio and television. See Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan, "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123 (2008), 703–45, and Mathew S. Winters and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, "Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?" *Comparative Politics*, 45 (July 2013), 418–36. For further evidence that more educated citizens reject corruption, see Rory Truex,

"Corruption, Attitudes, and Education: Survey Evidence from Nepal," *World Development*, 39 (July 2011), 1133–42.

36. In 2008, the Speaker of the House was expelled from his party for abstaining from a no confidence vote. He was a member of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), and his party was originally a coalition member of the Congress-led coalition government. When the Communists withdrew from the coalition, he refused to vote against Congress; this resulted in his expulsion.

37. Yadav suffered from a particularly low response rate when she asked how much money the firms contribute to individuals versus parties. Only 61 firms in India and 82 firms in Brazil answered this question.

38. Yadav constructs separate models for each of the three corruption indices. She uses time-series models to analyze patterns of corruption. Given that Transparency International itself says its CPI measure should not be used for such time-series analyses prior to 2012, her results involving this measure should be dismissed. Of her remaining two measures, she fails to mention that one measure—the ICRG *Corruption Index*—is used to construct the other measure, the World Bank *Control of Corruption Index*.

39. Examining India, both Myron Weiner and Atul Kohli suggest that party ideology and cohesion have more to do with developmental outcomes than voter preferences. Myron Weiner, *Party-Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), Atul Kohli, *The State and Poverty in India: The Politics of Reform* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

40. Bussell relies on the ICRG *Corruption Index* and Transparency International's CPI. Like Yadav, Bussell uses the CPI in a time-series model, despite Transparency International's own guidance not to do so. Bussell acknowledges this limitation, however (242).