

Indigenous Social Movements and Ecological Resilience: Lessons from the Dayak of Indonesia

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List of Acronyms

ABRI	<i>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Armed Forces)
ADP	Area Development Program
AMA	<i>Aliansi Masyarakat Adat</i> (Alliance of Adat Peoples)
AMAN	<i>Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara</i> (Alliance of Adat Peoples of the Archipelago)
ATA	<i>Aliansi Tambangan Adat</i> (Adat Mining Alliance)
BAILEO	Natural Resources Management Network
BAPPEDA	<i>Badan Pembangunan Daerah</i> (Agency for Regional Development)
BPR	<i>Bank Perkreditan Rakyat</i> (People's Development Bank)
CU-PK	<i>Credit Union Pancur Kasih</i>
DPR	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i> (House of Representatives)
DSMD	Health and Pension Plan
EAF	Ethno-AgroForest Initiative
ELSAM	<i>Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat</i> (Legal Advocacy and Research Institute)
FKKM	Community Forestry Communication Forum
FPK	<i>Forum Petaupan Katouan</i> (Natural Resources Forum in North Sulawesi)
GOI	Government of Indonesia
ID	<i>Institut Dayakologi</i> (Dayakology Institute)
ILO	International Labor Association
INFID	International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development
JAGAT	Network of Adat Community Movement of East Nusa Tenggara
JAPHAMA	Indigenous Peoples' Advocacy Network
Jaring-PELA	<i>Jaringan Kerja untuk Pesisir dan Laut</i> (Coastal and Marine Consortium)
JATAM	Mining Advocacy Network
JKPP	<i>Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif Jaringan Pemetaan Masyarakat Adat Sebagai</i> (Network of Adat Community Mappers)
KALBAR	<i>Kalimantan Barat</i> (West Kalimantan)
KAPET	<i>Kawasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Terpadu</i> (Integrated Economic Development Zone)
KMAN	<i>Kongres Masyarakat Adat Nusantara</i> (National Congress of Indigenous Peoples)
KONPENMA	<i>Konsorsium Penguatan Masyarakat Adat</i> (Consortium for Indigenous Peoples' Empowerment of Irian Jaya)
KPA	<i>Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria</i> (Agrarian Reform Cooperative)
KPD	Rubber Cooperative
KPMD	<i>Konsorsium Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Dayak</i> (Consortium for the Empowerment of Dayak Peoples)
KPSHK	<i>Konsorsium Pendukung Sistem Hutan Kerakyatan</i> (Community-Managed Forest Systems Consortium)
LATIN	<i>Lembaga Alam Tropika Indonesia</i> (Institute for Indonesian Tropical Resources)
LBBT	<i>Lembaga Bela Banua Talino</i> (Legal Assistance NGO)
LMD	<i>Lembaga Musyawarah Desa</i> (Village Assembly)
LPPSEPK	Rubber Planters Network
MITRA KASIH	Printing Press
MPR	<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i> (People's Consultative Assembly)
P3D	Gender Initiative
PBI	Unity in Diversity Party
PDKB	Love Democracy Christian Party
PEK	People's Economic Development
PK	<i>Pancur Kasih</i> ("Fountain of Love"), abbreviation of YKSPK
PPSDAK	<i>Pemberdayaan Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam Kerakyatan</i> (Community-Based Natural Resource Management NGO)
PRO-BELA	Forest Investigation Forum
TNI	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesian National Armed Forces)
WALHI	<i>Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Environment Forum)
WKIPA	West Kalimantan Indigenous People's Alliance
YBSD	<i>Yayasan Bina Sumber Daya</i> (Social Security Foundation)
YKSPK	<i>Yayasan Karya Sosial Pancur Kasih</i>
YLBHI	<i>Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation)

Preface

The Dayak and other Indonesian indigenous groups have struggled for decades to slowly build the grassroots base for a social movement to assert their civil rights, and their rights to control their forests and waters. They have made significant progress. Their strategies and tactics deserve the attention of indigenous groups struggling in other countries.

In this volume, we join several Dayak activists to reflect on the progress of the indigenous peoples' social movement in Indonesia. The papers in this volume have been written from each person's perspective as actors and supporters to this social movement. As editors, we have chosen to preserve each author's particular voice, rather than edit their words to conform to a standard style and single story. We believe this allows the authors to convey their intent and interests clearly, and we hope that the readers will tolerate the ambiguities that inevitably mark real stories. The "grey literature" background documents and newspaper articles referenced herein are on file in the library at the Institut Dayakologi in Pontianak.

These chapters were written between September 1997 and August 2000, a time of tremendous political turbulence in Indonesia. In 1998, the longtime military dictator Suharto fell after students took to the streets of Jakarta to protest his corruption and human rights abuses. East Timor finally achieved its independence in 1999, while Aceh and Papua (Irian Jaya) provinces continue to seek autonomy. More changes lie ahead. The story continues to play forward.

Globalization is bringing tremendous social, economic and ecological changes to Indonesia and the rest of the world. Indonesia's people struggle with the political turbulence associated with transition from dictatorship. At a global level, democratic pluralism is being heralded as a prerequisite for global governance. Yet rural resource-dependent communities largely remain invisible in this context. They are in danger of being left out of processes that will govern their future. Without a democratic pluralism that includes these voices and institutions, local people who are concerned about local ecological degradation will be unable to play a critical role in managing natural resources for the future.

Forests and biodiversity co-occur in the same geographic areas where indigenous groups and their traditional governance systems are struggling to survive. Donors are concerned about the need to address this problem, but are wary of the high transaction costs of dealing directly with many weak, disorganized groups.

In this context, we hope this story and its insights will be useful for other indigenous peoples, their support groups, donors, and academics.

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1

An Introduction to the Linkages between Ecological Resilience and Governance

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Our case study of a social movement in Indonesian Borneo offers insights into how a social movement can counter the erosion of ecological resilience (Box 1.1). From a political perspective, the struggle between national society and the indigenous movement is a confrontation between different definitions of the situation. Dayak associations' actions and reactions redefine the situation, transforming national society's understanding of the problems and options for solutions. The case study builds on the extensive literature on the ecologically-adapted management practices of Borneo's people, and extends the analysis to identify some of the key political strategies that Borneo's people are employing to nurture ecological resilience.

Today, Dayak face two problems typical of tropical forests around the world where indigenous peoples are struggling to adapt to new technologies and needs while staving off invaders, international investors, or national governments that claim their resources.² Dayak are among the world's remaining "ecosystem people" – people who have adapted to, and depend on, local ecosystems.³ Their collective identities, cultural traditions, and management practices have often enabled them to maintain resilient, productive ecosystems.⁴ Yet these societies and their management systems are being disrupted by stresses at two different scales: at the local scale, by changes within the local population; and at the national scale, by stresses from the larger society of the nation state within which the indigenous society finds itself.⁵ National societies linked to the global economy are "biosphere people," who do not depend on local ecosystems and are decoupled from ecosystem feedback.⁶

When the international investment capital of "biosphere people" funds legal and illegal resource extraction from homelands over which "ecosystem people" lack formal tenure, "ecosystem people" protest this social and ecological injustice. Cultural erosion and physical intrusion by colonists and companies threaten indigenous societies' collective identities and the resource base for their livelihoods. The self-images of "ecosystem people's" societies undergo transformation from viewing themselves as collective units responsive to ecological feedback into seeing themselves as a disorganized population detached from their local natural environment.

Even when people are committed to local renewal and innovation as a means of navigating change while retaining their local identities, their efforts can be swamped by national-scale waves, because, while both large and small scale societies can be resilient, large scale societies generally wage greater political power. The dominant society has the power to bless concessionaires' and migrants' land use with legitimizing laws and subsidies, while using coercion and education to reduce the strength of indigenous societies' resistance.⁷

We are not proposing that local-scale institutions, *a priori*, will always manage resources better than national-scale institutions. Local leaders can be just as despotic and shortsighted as national leaders

can sometimes be. We are, however, asserting that by virtue of their proximity to, and dependence on, natural resources and the ecosystems that sustain them, local communities are better positioned to monitor and respond to ecological feedback. They have accrued detailed practical information and culturally viable mechanisms for reacting to observed ecological changes. National-scale institutions need positive connections to local scale institutions in order to support broad-scale ecosystem resilience. We join others in proposing that a radical new relationship between the state and local communities is required—a break from the centralized state model.⁸ Changes in accountability between local and national levels will be essential to secure reforms in their relationship. True decentralization will also require allowing a diversity of institutions to coexist, mirroring the complexity of the environments and the problems being addressed by government.

Because the sources of ecological stresses are both local and external, the challenge is to both: (1) couple the higher scale governance institutions to local ecological feedback; and (2) renew self-governance and ecological resilience at the local scale. Our case study explores the instructive case of how Dayak society has responded to this challenge and analyzes the elements contributing to their progress.

Box 1.1. What is ecological resilience? How can social movements affect ecological resilience?

When a resilient ecosystem is disturbed, it retains the ability to reorganize and renew itself without loss of function or diversity.⁹ The natural processes of evolution, competition and succession in communities of diverse species form the foundation for ecosystem resilience, but human management must keep disturbance within certain bounds so that this foundation is not lost.

As population sizes, technologies, incentives, values, and social, economic and political conditions change over time, these transformations can cause ecological damage unless people respond to ecological feedback and modify their management institutions. Ecological resilience therefore springs from biological communities but depends on the evolving institutions that govern people and their use of natural resources.

Cross-scale conflicts are especially difficult to resolve. Resilience depends on decisions made by people using their cultural norms and institutions at different scales. Effective governance requires good cross-scale links in order to harmonize decisions made at local, national and international levels. When different cultural norms exist at different scales, conflicting management decisions are made at different scales. Changes can also create conflict between those different management levels. These conflicts must be resolved through political action.

Thus, in complex societies, resilience depends on a vibrant political life in which multiple interests participate. If the political system is closed to participants concerned with modifying institutions in response to negative ecological feedback, as in this Indonesian case, then ecological resilience will diminish until the ecosystem is degraded or transformed into a less complex ecosystem (e.g., forest becoming transformed into *Imperata* grasslands).

Social movements can prevent ecological degradation if they successfully challenge the dominant political system to accommodate marginal voices concerned about ecological feedback.¹⁰ Inclusion of those voices in national political discourse is insufficient for change, however. Social movements are only effective when national leaders have the political will to respond to these voices, and when institutions are in place to protect advances toward change, including a judicial system which upholds new laws and policies.

Chapters Two through Five describe threats challenging Indonesian social and ecological systems. Stressors create problems at very local scales in local forests, at the larger scale of watersheds, at the regional scale of forests and major rivers of the island, and at the national scale of the Indonesian archipelago. Some of the stresses are constant; others are spatially and temporally unpredictable. The

system and its perturbations, in short, are in dynamic flux, but feedback is constrained by the national level. The state's "control response" to rural resistance to ecological degradation has been to increase political repression.¹¹

While the market produces stresses, the most damaging systemic stresses originate in national policies and laws which do not protect citizens from abuses and undermine indigenous values and governance. In Chapters Two and Three, Stefanus Masiun and John Bamba detail these threats, which include, education policies, social policies, anti-swidden policies, forest policies, concessionaire policies, and governance policies. Masiun and Bamba also describe Dayak responses to counter these threats. Despite the repressive political environment, a strong Dayak rights movement has grown around environmental concerns.¹² Dayak responses are hampered by lack of knowledge of their rights and the ways in which they can assert their rights. In Chapters Four and Five, Ita Natalia and Antoinette Royo explore the ways in which mapping and networking are scaling up awareness and responses to those threats. Chapter Six presents recommendations, derived from the Dayak case, for other indigenous groups, and their support organizations, that are facing similar stresses.

THE DAYAK SITUATION: ECOLOGICAL AND SOCIOPOLITICAL BACKGROUND

Across Indonesia, local indigenous, *adat* (Box 1.2) institutions are nested within nationally defined institutions which in turn are nested within the global economy. Over the past thirty years, the cross-scale links have intensified through a turbulent process where the national and local levels run at cross-purposes, each exerting energy to divert the others' direction.

The National Level

Indonesia encompasses over 17,000 islands joined by a vast expanse of sea bridging the Australian and Asian continents with their distinct flora and fauna. This geographic situation makes Indonesia one of the world's most biodiverse countries. Indonesia is also one of the most culturally-diverse nations, with 210 million people comprising over 250 indigenous cultures speaking over 600 languages. Each group has evolved its own locally adapted ways of sharing space with nature, supported by local *adat* laws and political institutions which govern behavior. The majority of Indonesians are directly affected by the health of natural ecosystems.

The history of Indonesia's people is one of stress, change and resilience. Indigenous resource management systems and *adat* institutions have been surprised by unexpected changes for millennia. They responded to the shifting constellations of trade networks linked to Asia for thousands of years before Europeans arrived.¹³ In the late 1500s, Europeans added their demands to those of competing Islamic sultans and local kings to which communities were attached. During the 19th century, the Dutch colonial administration enforced radical transformations of local commercial production systems; local subsistence systems were forced to adapt. Regional wars between colonial powers at the turn of the last century and the Japanese occupation during World War II caused more disruptions. Yet at the dawn of the Indonesian State, in 1949, the health of Indonesia's extensive forests and productive waters stood as evidence that local institutions had effectively managed their resources through all these disruptions. Thus, the social and cultural elements for renewal were in place when the most recent stresses manifested themselves in the latter half of the 1900s. Political turmoil resulting from attempts to create a new state reigned from 1945 to the early 1960s. After General Suharto overthrew Sukarno's government in 1966, Suharto instituted a "New Order" regime with increasingly repressive tactics until he fell from power in 1998.

Five decades of state consolidation created a social and ecological crisis in Indonesia. In 1949, forests covered 150 million ha, 75% of Indonesia. By 1990, some 35% of that forest cover had been removed.¹⁴ Hidden in these statistics lies more than a story about the conversion of forest ecosystems. The extent of the forest cover change reveals the extent to which the Indonesian state has disturbed local institutions associated with forest ecosystems—a surprising shock successively suffered in many separate localities that are home to the over 40 million people whose farming practices include forest management.

The central government's actions to control access to forests and rivers are in direct conflict with *adat* systems controlling access to these same resources. Yet the Indonesian state has finessed this contradiction through rhetorical discourse that extols the virtues of diversity even as it strives to assimilate all its internal nations into one Indonesian national identity and transform them from self-governing landowners into a compliant workforce on plantation estates.

Box 1.2 What is *adat*?

Adat refers to the cultural beliefs, rights and responsibilities, customary laws and courts, customary practices, and self-governance institutions shared by an indigenous group prior to incorporation into a colonial or post-colonial state. The specifics of *adat* are location-specific; they vary from place to place, and they adapt to new situations over time.

When colonial Europeans (such as the Dutch, in the case of Indonesia) annexed an area, they generally allowed all these pre-existing systems (lumped together as “*adat*” in Indonesia) to persist until the new rulers created new institutions to replace the pre-existing institutions. Over time the conflicts between the new ruling authority and pre-existing systems increase, and when the conflict between the old and new systems becomes unacceptable, the ruling authority may formally terminate those pre-existing rights. However, when Indonesia became independent from the Dutch, the new Indonesian state continued the Dutch policy of recognizing *adat* when it didn't conflict with the state's interest.

The term *adat* is used as a noun and as an adjective. It confers legitimacy to actions. *Adat* has legal, religious, moral, and cultural aspects. *Adat* governs the behavior between individuals, as well as within and between families, communities and outsiders. *Adat* also governs the relationship between people and nature, and nature is viewed as an active agent in that relationship. Performing *adat* refers to doing an *adat* ritual ceremony, such as prayers and offerings when preparing a new swidden field.

Adat law is *hukum adat*. *Adat* fines are imposed on those who break *adat* laws, including outsiders. The Indonesian state has taken its recognition of *adat* quite seriously at times. For example, the Head of the West Kalimantan Plantations Office, (a Javanese) was found guilty of libel under *adat* law, because he publicly accused Dayak swidden agriculturalists of causing the terrible forest fires in 1997. In this case, the provincial military authority supported the *adat* process of justice, hosted the hearings, and enforced the official's payment of the *adat* fine.¹⁵

A community that is bound together by *adat* is called *masyarakat adat*. *Musyawarah adat* is a consensus-based meeting governed by *adat*. New *adat* law and processes can be created by *musyawarah adat*.

Wilayah adat is the community's territory. The area of greatest conflict between the state and *adat* is nature-people relations, particularly land use and land tenure. Only a small percent of Indonesia's lands are privately titled; most forests and rivers remain in the hands of members of *adat* communities who only own their property under *adat*. Conflict arises when the state allocates concessions for plantations or logging forests on *adat* lands where forests are already being managed for local livelihood benefits.

At independence, elites from Java took over the colonial administrative apparatus and wrote the Constitution to consolidate the neocolonial state. They also created a companion document to the Constitution—the Five Governance Principles (Pancasila). The Pancasila supports: (1) belief in one God;

(2) Indonesian unity; (3) justice and civility among peoples; (4) democracy through deliberation and consensus among representatives; and (5) social justice for all. While the Constitution and Pancasila could be interpreted to lay out the basis for a pluralistic society, they instead have been used to legitimize the rule of a strong central government enforced with repressive military force.

The Constitution creates a strong President, a weak Parliament and no independent judiciary. As one analyst has noted, “The responsibilities of the authorities toward the citizens are not clearly defined or regulated in juridical terms . . . [I]t is impossible to sue the authorities . . . for improper enforcement of the law.”¹⁶ While *adat* rights and institutions are recognized in the Constitution, agrarian law only recognizes *adat* laws, rights and institutions if that recognition does not create problems for “development.” As is typical of states where indigenous forest societies find themselves around the world, Indonesia views indigenous peoples as having rights to development but not rights to their resources. The Indonesian state can impose its will in any place at any time to eliminate diversity and *adat*, and legitimize those actions as “development.”

The Indonesian elite has valued personal profits and patronage relationships based on the elite’s control of access to the vast mineral and natural resources of the archipelago. The elite’s values directly affect land use decisions, which in turn affect ecosystem resilience. Values and discourse frames provide the structure against which any social movement must struggle. The values of Indonesia’s ruling elite can be seen in their actions. The elites have extracted resources and organized labor for the benefit of “crony capitalists” who surround the president and military. The Indonesian state defines this process as “development” and uses that “development” framework to shape any discussion of ecological degradation. Any resistance to development in Indonesia is officially castigated as backward or treated as insurgency.

The state uses the military (ABRI) to coerce compliance. ABRI is formally recognized as playing the “dual role” of military and political power. ABRI created the ruling Golkar party which controls legitimizing elections. According to official policy, the people float apart from politics as a “floating mass.” For three decades, political parties have been forbidden to have any political mobilization or other activity in rural areas, except at election time. Golkar, through ABRI, has maintained a constant presence in all villages.

Political activity is further restricted by the Anti-Subversion Law under which no more than five people are allowed to meet without informing the police. Indonesia maintains a large internal intelligence force that monitors its citizens. As another analyst observed, “Suharto has created a political system that has shaped a political place merely for the elite...on the one hand we witness the expansion of the economy but on the other hand the worsening of the political scene.”¹⁷ Politics has been restricted to a small circle of elites who use the state apparatus to benefit themselves.

Decades of increasingly severe suppression of political feedback under Suharto’s New Order government left the state brittle and vulnerable to social movements. In 1998, after the 1997 economic downturn, Reformasi protests forced the aging General Suharto to step down, and Habibie was appointed caretaker President. Elections brought a new coalition to power in 1999, and ABRI was subsequently split into TNI and National Police. But while public expression is now more open, the state’s policies have changed little. While some positive changes have been felt in rural areas, political adventurers and regional elites are also taking advantage of their new freedoms to extract resources, arming militias and orchestrating new violence to maintain control.

The Local Levels

People have made their homes in Borneo's forests for at least thirty-five thousand years, adapting to changing political and ecological circumstances.¹⁸ The indigenous cultures living in the interior of Borneo are collectively known as Dayak. Today there are over three million Dayaks, living at an average density of fourteen people per square kilometer.¹⁹ Dayak societies share many features although there are dozens of subgroups with different languages, social structures, and governance traditions.

Dayak territory is rich in natural resources, including watersheds of great rivers and vast forests which are home to an incredible diversity of fish, over five hundred species of birds, many endemic species, a poorly known flora including over three hundred fifty species of dipterocarps valued for their timber, and a rich fauna of rare species, including orangutans, banteng cattle, sun bears, elephants, and rhinos.²⁰ For centuries, Dayaks have relied to varying degrees on agriculture, fishing, hunting, and gathering products from the forest, shifting their emphasis as situations changed. As Padoch and Peluso note, "[t]he dynamism of how Borneans manipulate resources must...be understood in the context of a constantly changing forest environment."²¹ Dayaks, like Europeans, have adapted their resource management institutions to the droughts, famines, fires, wars and population fluctuations that have also been common, if not predictable, challenges to making a living on Borneo.



Figure 1.1 Map of Southeast Asia, showing Borneo's division under three states—Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei.

Borneo is now divided by three states—Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei (Figure 1.1). Indonesian Dayak territory (collectively called Kalimantan) is divided into four provinces—East Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, and West Kalimantan. Dayak political activity was vibrant through the mid-1900s in all three countries. After independence from the Dutch, the Dayak Unity Party formed, and they won the 1955 elections in West Kalimantan. But in 1959, General Sukarno signed a regulation that political parties must have branches in seven provinces in order to field candidates. This effectively disrupted the link between Indonesia's diverse "ecosystem peoples" and national politics, because the political legitimacy of Indonesia's internal nations is based on geographically-localized polities (none of which spans more than a few provinces).

While all Dayak subscribe to customary *adat* law and tradition, even within a given district, different Dayak communities have different processes for creating and enforcing those rules. *Adat* law includes rules and procedures for allocating tenurial rights to land and trees.²² The structure of authority typically includes a group of elders in addition to other leaders and their assistants. In some areas, there are small federations with governance uniting several communities. Anyone, including outside authorities, must obey the *adat* laws of the village in whose territory they find themselves.

Box 1.3 What is governance?

Governance is defined as the interaction between government and civil society. Civil society is “the multitude of non-state organizations around which society organizes itself and which move in and out of the public realm of politics in accordance with their specific needs and agendas of interest”.²³ Examples of civil society organizations range from local clans and other kin-based groups to self-help societies, business organizations, labor organizations and NGOs that focus on issues such as development, health, disaster relief, and/or environment.

Good governance is sometimes used as a term to politely refer to the reduction of corruption in government, but “good governance” and “bad governance” best describe the relationship between government and the people being governed, not the government itself. The characteristics of governance include: transparency, accountability, rule of law, human rights, and civil society’s participation in decision-making. “Good governance” refers to a healthy relationship where government decision-making processes and budgets are transparent, where citizens and government are held accountable to laws within a fair system of justice, and where civil society represents the voices of all factions of the citizenry in providing input to government decisions. In cases of authoritarian governments, improving governance requires strengthening civil society so that citizens, in turn, can assume responsibility for controlling and improving government. NGOs that support “good governance” do not seek to replace government with NGOs, but rather seek to nurture a positive relationship between citizens and government.

With recent globalization trends, including instant global communication through the internet, there is increasing discussion of “global governance.” Urban elites are identifying themselves with a global civil society. Global labor organizations, global business organizations, and international NGOs are becoming a global civil society with limited representation from rural and marginalized parts of global society. While there is no global government, these global organizations develop relationships with national governments and with the United Nations. Some analysts believe that global civil society can support better governance in all countries; while others worry that well-financed Northern civil society organizations will not bring the voices of local concerns to national governments.²⁴

If local concerns are not voiced in global fora, ecological resilience will suffer. Good governance can support ecological resilience, if the roles, rules and responsibilities for monitoring and responding to ecological feedback are clarified. Structural changes in government’s relationship to civil society are the essential foundation for changes in environmental governance. In countries with large rural, natural resource-dependent populations and centralized governments, NGOs concerned with environmental problems join forces with human rights NGOs and other civil society organizations to nurture grassroots social movements to reform governance.

DAYAK MAINTENANCE OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE: TRADITIONAL PATTERNS AND RECENT CHALLENGES

The Dayak, like many other indigenous peoples in Indonesia and elsewhere, developed agro-ecosystems adapted to tropical forest ecosystems. The agro-ecosystems, and the behavior of the people who use them, are governed under indigenous *adat* institutions—rules created and enforced by

community consensus through community-based political processes. Dayak institutions evolved as a good fit for the ecosystems they manage.²⁵

The Dayak vision of prosperity reflects core values that river, land, and forest are essential to Dayak identity. That same vision is reflected in the shifting mosaic land use pattern that Dayak create in the forest ecosystems in which they live. In a typical Dayak land use mosaic (Figures 1.2 and 1.3), there are patches of natural forest, managed forests, rotating swidden/fallow, and permanent fields molded to the ecological conditions of the mountains, wetlands and river valleys of a particular community's territory. Permanent wet rice fields are the only non-forest areas. Each community's landscape is different, yet forest cover is consistently substantial. In a sample of twenty-one communities who mapped their lands and created internal conservation agreements to resist forest or mining concessions between 1996 and 1999, territories ranged from 900 ha to 126,000 ha in size—averaging 12,500 ha (ca. 28,000 acres), with a median of 4,600 ha (ca. 10,000 acres). Forest cover ranged from 50% to 99%—average and median being 70%. Primary forest cover averaged 29% with a median of 25%.

In the past, millions of hectares were covered by this shifting patchwork creating a vast resilient landscape. Today, communities following indigenous management practices are interspersed with communities that have ceded their lands to oil palm plantations where monoculture has replaced diversity, communities whose forests have been felled by timber or reforestation concessions, and lands taken by migrant non-Dayak communities. Unlike some countries such as Mexico, Indonesia offers no tenurial shell to protect indigenous systems.²⁶

Although virtually all of Kalimantan has been designated as concession areas (and illegal concessions are found in nature preserves), some 63% of Kalimantan is still forested—representing 35% of Indonesia's remaining forests.²⁷ Kalimantan's forest is mostly found on territory claimed by Dayak communities. Larger patches of forest are in inaccessible areas. In other spots, Dayak communities' forests offer isolated patches of refugia habitat in an expanse of monocultural oil palm plantations. Some Dayak community's patches are almost identical to those of non-Dayaks; others are transitional. Within a given community's patch, distribution of the smaller patches of land use types is determined by the historical governance under *adat* and past disruptions suffered in the area. Centralized, national land-use decisions determine the expanding gaps in the landscape where plantations, colonists' farms and degraded lands replace healthy ecosystems.

The resilience-sustaining practices and “scripts” of Dayak land use systems that create this resilient mosaic are similar to those of other indigenous peoples, but richer in diversity—perhaps due to the lower population density, the historically large market for multiple non-timber forest products, the range of ecological variation available for exploitation in a single community, and the strong indigenous institutions that resisted colonial administration until very recently.²⁸ Descriptions of Dayak ecological knowledge and practices used in resource management have been elaborated in many publications.²⁹

Like other swidden agriculturists, Dayaks use disturbance to create space for food production and use forest succession processes as a production resource.³⁰ Rice, central to the Dayaks' swidden system and identity, is respected and surrounded by rituals and work activities that bind the community's households together in mutually dependent relationships. While Dayaks spread risks by depending on a variety of resources through fishing, hunting, forest products for sale and use, and agricultural products, community social cohesion also serves to maintain the integrity of the overall system—which is essential to respond to expected but unpredictable events, like drought, fire, or flood. The widespread use of auguries for decisions (like the selection of a swidden site) both supports adherence to indigenous belief system and throws a randomizing variable into decisions based on recent experience. This thereby enhances the chances for experimentation in places that would not usually be chosen if the choice were

based on existing ecological knowledge.³¹ The yield of swidden is believed to depend on the quality of the agreements that the farmer made with the spirits of nature that control the harvest.

Forests and forest products are important, and different forest patches are managed more or less intensively for different products through enriching natural forest.³² Dayaks use many subsistence products from their forests; for example, a typical Dayak community uses two hundred species of medicinal plants from forests.³³ Rituals related to the bounty or scarcity of fruit yields demonstrate the importance of the principles of reciprocity and exchange.³⁴ The Dayak view the fruit and nut harvests as indicative of the quality of the relationships between people and the relationship between people and nature. Because many native fruits are mast fruiting species (having large production of fruit some years and none in other years), the event of a scarce harvest every few years serves to remind community members of their relationships with nature and each other.




Figure 1.2 Dayak landscape. This map shows the land use mosaic of two adjacent communities (2500 ha) surrounded by oil palm plantations in West Kalimantan. (Adapted from maps provided by Pancur Kasih, PPSDAK.)

A remarkable number of commercial species have been integrated into forests over the centuries. Thirty-five native fruits are harvested from Dayak forests for sale in the provincial capital of Pontianak, with an annual market value of over half a million dollars.³⁵ Other native plants produce commercially valuable rattan, resins and oilseeds.³⁶ Some introduced nonnative species have become important as well. Para rubber was introduced into Dayak forests in the early 1900s. Rubber production from the many small Dayak rubber plots made Indonesia one of the world's leading producers of rubber.³⁷ Yet Dayak rubber-producing forests are very species diverse.³⁸

Dayak have been cautious about maintaining the balance between economic dependence on forest products and subsistence rice production—the balance between maintaining a forest ecosystem and

transforming it into a plantation landscape. For the Dayak, to make swidden is to be.³⁹ Major Dayak rituals are linked to rice cultivation. Rice has a soul that must be properly cared for and respected through proper swidden management.⁴⁰ These beliefs support the resilience of the swidden system. In the 1930s, for example, when rubber prices rose and fell erratically, one man's dream about rice-eating rubber quickly spread across Kalimantan, warning people to protect the forest swidden system and to balance rubber with swiddens.⁴¹



Figure 1.3 Typical Dayak landscape with river, forest and agricultural land (photograph courtesy of Pancur Kasih).

Today however, concessions cover Dayak forests, and the ecological damage from concessions is extensive. Only about 4% of logging concessionaires follow ecological guidelines.⁴² In the early days of the Reformasi opening in 1998, a national *adat* forest movement coalition demanded that the state “revoke the status of state forests by redefining the border between state forests and forests that have been owned and controlled by traditional and local communities,” and “revoke all regulations and policies regarding the exploitation and violation of community rights to manage natural resources”.⁴³ But the new Forest Law No. 41, 1999, promulgated in response to those demands, fails to significantly change the situation, while paying lip service to *adat*. This change is evidence that the movement is gaining strength—a limited reform was rushed into place to avoid greater change; the control group has given up little so far. Communities are still coerced into accepting the rights asserted by the concessionaires unless they can mobilize unified action to resist the company.⁴⁴

Because these stresses are relatively recent, communities generally lack indigenous ways to recognize and address them. Active adaptation requires awareness of a problem. For example, people are often unaware of the limits of their community's forest territory, and after coercion by concessionaires, they sign away rights to vast tracts of forests that actually belong to other communities. This lack of awareness of their territorial borders also contributes to the lack of awareness of ecological feedback or landscape-level problems that they themselves are creating—such as excessive clearance of forest leading




Figure 1.4 Cross-scale information flows. Policies are often created by national government in response to international agencies and the global market. NGO support groups assist people to solidify a social movement that amplifies the feedback of local information and policy recommendations from multiple local sites up to policy makers at the national scale. The support NGOs respond to negative social and ecological feedback, by working to promote local evaluation and change local policies, as well as creating networks for local groups to communicate upward their concerns about the policies flowing down from the national scale.

to loss of access to useful species that had always been abundant. Upriver communities are unaware of the downriver impacts of their forest-clearing activities. Lack of awareness about pending threats, such as concessions that are invisible until the machinery arrives, means that people literally awake in their beds to the unexpected sound of chainsaws in their forests. The ensuing chapters provide specific details about Dayak responses to these challenges.

SUPPORTING ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE: THE ROLES OF NGOs AND CIVIL SOCIETY ASSOCIATIONS

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society associations perform many different functions in society.⁴⁵ NGOs do not necessarily support social movements and those that do attempt to achieve that goal are often ineffective.⁴⁶ Yet, NGO coalitions and their network links—upward to government, and downward to local communities—give them a unique structural strength that can be used either to improve governance or to short circuit civil society processes by speaking on behalf of communities without being held accountable to those same communities. Many NGOs and other civil associations lose their way and function as self-serving interest groups that are ineffective in promoting change.⁴⁷

Our case study focuses on how donors, NGOs and civil society associations can support indigenous communities. The Dayak associations described in the following chapters have two broad, integrated strategic objectives related to renewing ecological resilience: 1) renew local links to ecological feedback; and 2) reorganize local societies into an active polity that can effectively work to change the policies and attitudes of the dominant national polity, so that ecological feedback and human rights are respected. To achieve their objectives, Dayak rely on indigenous memory, culture and institutions that have adapted to their local, social and ecological circumstances. At the same time, however, they have expanded the movement's base to include multiple ethnic groups who share similar concerns, and reached out for urban dwellers' support.

The “force” nurtured by these associations aims to affect actions that affect the environment, but also have a broader political benefit (Figure 1.4). People contribute to the force of this movement in order to defend their territory, their livelihoods, and their rights to participate as equals in the future of the larger nation of which they are a part.⁴⁸ Social movements do not achieve success overnight. Many splinter or fizzle out before any social change indicators register significant change. It is possible to make major strides during periods of political turbulence, such as the current Indonesian situation. But, such turbulence also makes it difficult to identify cause and effect relationships behind changes.

The tactical strategies of civil associations that effectively promote change are seldom studied.⁴⁹ Activists rarely take the time to reflect on their practical experience in order to share their insights with others. In the following chapters, the insights of the Dayak activists Bamba, Masiun and Natalia offer a unique perspective on ways to support an emerging social movement. They contribute indigenous voices to those of the myriad of academic, donor and government analysts attempting to understand ecological and social change in Indonesia. Their insights are also useful for those interested in the rise of global civil society.

Notes for Chapter 1

1. Janis B. Alcorn is the Director of the PeFoR program and the Asia and Pacific Division of BSP: World Wildlife Fund, 1250 24th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20037, USA; Tel: 1-202-778-9697; Fax 1-202-293-9341; Email: mjalcorn@internetconnect.com; <http://www.bsponline.org>. She gratefully acknowledges the encouragement and support from members of the Resilience Network coordinated by Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics at the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, particularly Carl Folke, Fikret Berkes and Johan Colding.

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3. Raymond F. Dasmann, "The Importance of Cultural and Biological Diversity," in *Biodiversity: Culture, Conservation, and Ecodevelopment*, ed. M. L. Oldfield and J. B. Alcorn (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 7.

4. Fikret Berkes, *Sacred Ecology: Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Resource Management* (Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1999), 61.

5. Janis B. Alcorn, "Ethics, Economics and Conservation," in *Biodiversity: Culture, Conservation, and Ecodevelopment*, ed. M. L. Oldfield and J. B. Alcorn (Boulder: Westview Press 1991), 324.

6. Dasmann, 7.

7. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 282. Authoritarian control has focused on making rural institutions and agricultural practices "legible" by ensuring that diverse systems and local knowledge are replaced with tidy systems dependent on centralized knowledge and amenable to central control. As Scott observes, the new order thus imposed is fragile, yet it damages the resilience of ecosystems and societies (352).

8. Scott, 353. For other respected political scientists who have argued for new polycentric systems, see: M.D. McGinnis, *Polycentric Governance and Development* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); and Elinor Ostrom, "Polycentricity, Complexity and the Commons," *The Good Society* 9.2 (1999): 37-41.

9. C. S. Holling, "Cross-scale Morphology, Geometry and Dynamics of Ecosystems," *Ecological Monographs* 62 (1992): 447-502.

10. We have found McAdam's "political process theory" of social movements to be the best fit for explaining the Dayak social movement. Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). Social movement theorists debate the defining characteristics and causes of social movements. For reviews of social movement theories, see McAdam, 5-59. Also, Klaus Eder, "The 'New Social Movements': Moral Crusades, Political Pressure Groups, or Social Movements," *Social Research* 52.4 (1985): 869; Barry D. Adam, "Post-Marxism and the New Social Movements," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 30.3 (1993): 316; and D. Friedman and Doug McAdam, "Collective Identity and Activism: Networks, Choices and the Life of a Social Movement," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theories*, ed. A. D. Morris and C. M. Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 156.

11. For an explanation of the concept of "control response," see McAdam, 56. Efforts to dominate rural resistance are historically typical of any institution that seeks to assert hegemonic control (e.g. religious institutions, utopian communities, etc), not just states, as noted in James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 124-128.

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14. Charles V. Barber, *Case Study of Indonesia, Project on Environmental Scarcities, State Capacity, and Civil Violence* (Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the University of Toronto, 1997), 3.
15. *Suara Pembaruan Newspaper*, 14 October 1997, 18.
16. Kastorius Sinaga, *NGOs in Indonesia* (Saarbrücken: Verlag Entwicklungspolit, 1995), 96.
17. Sinaga, 52; see Kleden's quotation.
18. Victor King, *The Peoples of Borneo* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 59.
19. Mark Cleary and Peter Eaton, *Tradition and Reform: Land Tenure and Rural Development in South-East Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 94.
20. Brookfield, Potter and Byron, 74; and Cleary and Eaton, 192.
21. Padoch and Peluso, 3.
22. For more specific examples concerning the allocation of tenurial rights under *adat* law, see: George N. Appell, *The History of Research on Traditional Land Tenure and Tree Ownership in Borneo*, Working Paper No. 6 (Phillips, Maine: Social Transformation and Adaptation Research Institute, 1992); Cleary and Eaton, 94; T. H. G. M. Ngo, "A New Perspective on Property Rights: Examples from the Kayan of Kalimantan," in *Borneo in Transition*, ed. C. Padoch and N. Peluso (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 142; Peluso and Padoch, 126; Nancy Peluso, "Fruit Trees and Family Trees in an Anthropogenic Forest—Ethics of Access, Property Zones, and Environmental Change in Indonesia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38.3 (1996): 510-548; and Nancy Peluso, "Legal Pluralism and Legacies of 'Customary Rights' in Indonesian and Malaysian Borneo," *Common Property Resource Digest* 47 (1998): 10.
23. Gary Hansen, "Constituencies in Reform: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Civic Advocacy Programs," *USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 12*, (Washington DC: USAID, 1996), 12.
24. Michael Edwards, *Future Positive: International Cooperation in the 21st Century* (London: Earthscan Publications, Ltd, 1999), 179.
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28. For more information see: Janis B. Alcorn, "Indigenous Agroforestry Systems in the Latin American Tropics," in *Agroecology and Small Farm Development*, ed. M. A. Altieri and S. B. Hecht (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 1990), 203-220; Janis B. Alcorn and V. M. Toledo, "Resilient Resource Management in Mexico's Forest Ecosystems: The Contribution of Property Rights," in *Linking Social and Ecological Systems*, ed. F. Berkes and C. Folke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 216-249; Don A. Messerschmidt, ed., *Common Forest Resource Management: Annotated Bibliography of Asia, Africa, and Latin America* (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 1993); and Katherine Warner, *Shifting Cultivators: Local Technical Knowledge*

and *Natural Resource Management in the Humid Tropics* (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 1991).

29. For detailed descriptions of Dayak resource management practices, see: Mark Cleary and Peter Eaton, *Borneo: Change and Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); C. J. Colfer, *Shifting Cultivators of Indonesia: Marauders or Managers of the Forest? Rice Production and Forest Use Among the Uma' Jalan of East Kalimantan* (Rome: FAO, 1993); Carol J. Colfer, *Beyond Slash and Burn: Building on Indigenous Management of Borneo's Tropical Rain Forests* (Bronx: New York Botanical Garden, 1997); Michael R. Dove, *Swidden Agriculture in Indonesia* (New York: Mouton Publishers, 1985); V. T. King, *The Peoples of Borneo* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993); and Christine Padoch and Charles M. Peters, "Managed Forest Gardens in West Kalimantan Indonesia," in *Perspectives on Biodiversity: Case Studies of Genetic Resource Conservation and Development*, ed. C. Potter, J. Cohen and D. Janczewski (Washington DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1993).

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32. Padoch and Peters, 174.

33. I. Caniago, "The Diversity of Medicinal Plants in Secondary Forest Post-Upland Farming in West Kalimantan," in *Management of Secondary and Logged-Over Forests in Indonesia*, ed. P. Sist, C. Sabogal, and Y. Byron (Bogor: Center for International Forestry Research, 1999), 13.

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37. Dove, "Process versus Product," 43.

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39. Dove and Kammen, 92.

40. Stepanus Djuweng, "The Dayak: Children of the Soil," *Kalimantan Review* (English Language Version) 1 (1998): 7.

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42. Potter, 113.

43. KUDETA (Coalition for the Democratization of Natural Resources), "Return Natural Resources to the People!" Position statement released to the media: 11 June 1998, Jakarta. Please see Appendix II of this text for a copy of the statement.

44. Anonymous, "Plantation Projects and Logging Concessions: Impacts and Resistance," *Kalimantan Review* (English Language Version) 1 (1998): 26. For a list of protests against concessionaires in Ketapang, see Appendix III.

45. Volumes have been written reviewing NGOs and their performance. Two recent reviews can be found in: W. F. Fisher, "Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 26 (1997): 439; and Gary Hansen as cited above.

46. Fisher, 451.

47. M. Edwards, "NGO Performance—What Breeds Success? New Evidence from South Asia," *World Development* 27 (1999): 361-374. See also, Fisher and Sinaga.

48. Rural peasants and indigenous peoples have long historical ties to their lands and resources they have allocated among themselves under customary law. As a result, they view their lands and resources as entitlements to those endowments. Their sense of entitlement gives them a strong motivation for collective action; see Peter Veit and George Faraday, *Re-Rooting African Democracy: The Role of Accountable Environmental Governance in Fostering Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington DC: World Resources Institute, in press). Also relevant in this context is the extended entitlements approach: Melissa Leach, Robin Mearns, and Ian Scoones, *Environmental Entitlements: A Framework for Understanding the Institutional Dynamics of Environmental Change*, IDS Discussion Paper 359 (Brighton, UK: University of Sussex, 1997), 16.

49. Fisher discusses this topic in further detail.

2

National Frameworks Affecting *Adat* Governance in Indonesia, and Dayak NGO Responses

Stefanus Masiun¹

“*Jika Negara Tidak Mangakui Kami, Kami Tidak Akan Mengakui Negara.*”
[If the government will not recognize us, we shall not recognize the government]

-Indigenous Peoples Declaration, Jakarta, 1999

Indonesia’s national motto, “*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*” [Unity in Diversity] is a fitting slogan for a pluralistic nation composed of hundreds of indigenous nations. Article 18 Part II of Indonesian Constitution 1945 states, “Within the Indonesian territory were found more or less 250 *Zelfbesturende Landschappen* and *Volksgemeenschappen* such as *Desa* in Java and Bali, *Negeri* in Minangkabau, *Dusun* and *Marga* in Palembang and so on. Those territories possess their own indigenous structures; therefore, they can be considered as special territories. The Republic of Indonesia respects the territories and any state’s regulations related to the territories will take into account their original rights.”

The 1945 Constitution also recognizes the existence of traditional political entities derived from the cultural systems of the indigenous peoples of Indonesia. This recognition includes indigenous institutions, as well as organizations, mechanisms, laws, rights and obligations within the institutional system of the indigenous peoples. Furthermore, since indigenous territories can be considered special territories, attention from the state should be special as well. It should implicitly include the recognition of the autonomy of these territories. Indigenous peoples have specified institutions, rights, and obligations which differ from mainstream groups within the country. Implementation of a regulation from outside the community should be under license of the community itself or at least negotiated by the affected communities.

The current governance crisis in Indonesia offers new opportunities for decentralization by re-empowering Dayak self-governance.

Each Dayak group in West Kalimantan has its own laws and structures. *Adat* and *adat* laws are not the same. *Adat* is tradition. It does not involve formal sanctions. Violations of *adat* result only in moral sanction and peer pressure or social sanction. *Adat* law does however, enforce sanctions. When one violates an *adat* rule, he will be fined. Natural resource management systems are regulated in the *adat* law. *Adat* laws are enforced by *adat* leaders and by their methods of governance. Violators of the laws governing natural resource management and land use are fined using *adat* law. All members of the community are responsible for the enforcement of these laws. Formally, the *adat* leaders are responsible for fining whoever violates the law. The fines are decided upon depending on the degree of violation.

For example, a Kanayatn Dayak *tuha tahutn* (the leader with the greatest farming tradition) decides when to start farming, burning, and planting. The *tuha tahutn* also chooses the time to hold the rituals that must be conducted by all community members before they begin the farming season. His role is to keep the *adat* traditions of farming, making sure all the rituals are conducted properly. If these rituals are not conducted properly, the farm crops will not be as satisfying as anticipated. In addition, there are rules for the fruit seasons.

While the *adat* law protects natural resources against new threats, a community can also get together to make a conservation agreement. This agreement will bind all members of the community to obey the laws, and it threatens those who break the agreement or *adat* law with fines that are enforced without any possibility of legal appeal. Any violation of this rule is considered *salah basa*, and the offender must be fined according to the regulations of the agreement.

This kind of agreement has been adopted in Tapang Sambas, Desa Dayak of Sanggau district. This agreement protects natural resources from any destructive action by people both internal and external to the community, as both insiders and outsiders are subject to the agreement. The Mayau Dayak also made a similar agreement in Kotup, Sanggau district, and many other villages have created conservation agreements with facilitation of YKSPK. Moreover, in Pendau, the Simpang Dayak of Simpang Hulu in Ketapang district have sworn under *adat* to protect the natural resources within their territory, after previous efforts could not prevent certain people from within and outside of the community from logging. Having adopted conservation as an integral part of *adat*, these Dayak communities have saved their territories from destructive actions.

LAND USE AND NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

For thousands of years, the Dayak system of managing natural resources has existed in Borneo. Prior to the rule of the Malay Sultanates, the Dutch and Japanese colonial regimes, and the Indonesian government, the Dayak management system played the determinant role in sustaining Borneo's natural environment. The Dayaks have coexisted with nature for centuries, thus proving that their system of managing natural resources is sustainable and friendly to nature.

The two examples described in Box 2.1 reflect the landscape created by natural resource management systems implemented by the Dayak of West Kalimantan. There are, however, some variations depending on the local ecosystem. Notwithstanding, 95% of the Dayak natural resource management systems is relatively similar. The natural resource management systems of the Dayak are integrated into day-to-day life.

There is no fallow, *lahan tidur* (sleeping land) or *tanah terlantar* (mismanaged land) as the Indonesian government suggests. All parts of the territory are managed by the Dayak (Box 2.1). Capitalist development paradigms consider the Dayak land use unproductive, primitive and out of date. But indigenous peoples are friends of nature. They live in the forests. Natural resources are their lives. It is inconceivable that they would destroy their own livelihoods as is intimated by the government, who labels the Dayak as “forest destroyers,” “moving farmers,” and “isolated communities.”

Box 2.1 Two examples of Dayak natural resource management systems.

Iban Dayak

- *Rumah panjai* – residential areas
- *Taba'* – area for building a longhouse
- *Temawai* – area near the longhouse or temporary houses; fruit trees dominate this area
- *Damun* – fallow or *ladang* (dry rice field); grouped into five stages:
 - pengerang tuai* – *ladang* after 15 to 20 years
 - pengerang* – *ladang* after 10 to 15 years
 - temuda'* – *ladang* after 3 to 5 years
 - dijab* – *ladang* after 2 years
 - kerukoh* – *ladang* after 1 year
- *Tanah mali* – sacred grounds; no trees may be cut in this area; *adat* rituals called *Pase' Manua* are held here
- *Pendam* – a cemetery
- *Rarong* – a cemetery for *Iban* heroes or those respected within the community
- *Pendam anak* – a cemetery for children
- *Pulau* – an individual forest reserve
- *Rimak manua* – a village-owned forest, includes a hunting area, medicinal plants, housing materials, etc.
- *Redas* – an area for vegetables
- *Tapang manyi* – an area containing trees used for honey
- *Tanah kerapa* – a swamp area for wet paddy rice fields
- *Tanah endor nampok* – an area for hermits
- *Umai, ladang* – dry rice fields (swidden)

Kayaan Mendalaam Dayak

- *Tanaa'umaa'* – residential areas
- *Lapu'un* – area of fruit trees; usually near residential areas
- *Ba'ee* – area of young *ladang*
- *Ba'ee lako* – area of year old *ladang*
- *Ba'ee sepitang* – *ladang* after 2 to 5 years
- *Talun* – *ladang* areas after 5 to 10 years
- *Talun aya'* – *ladang* after 10 years; this area is secondary forest
- *Tanaa' pulu* – sacred grounds; rice fields and tree cutting are prohibited here
- *Tanaa' jakah* – areas which can be used for any purpose
- *Liaang* – a cemetery
- *Pawa'* – a cemetery for those who did not die within the village; their graves are marked with statues and clothes
- *Tuaan avaang* – area of *tengkawang* trees
- *Tuaan lung* – reserved forest
- *Tuaan rebok* – resin forest
- *Tuan buaa'* – forests filled with fruit trees
- *Busaang* – forest owned by the community
- *Tuaan usaang kaka* – special forest for hunting; housing materials, medicine, and daily needs can be found here
- *Kebun karep* – rubber garden areas
- *Tanaa' luma'* – the specified territory for paddy
- *Tanaa' luma' peka'* – swamp areas for wet paddy fields
- *Hunge pujun* – rivers where people fish without using any local or chemical materials
- *Bawaang* – lakes where people can fish
- *Hunge tapha* – areas of rivers reserved for *tapha* fish
- *Hunge pejawan* – special areas of rivers reserved for *biawan* fish
- *Levho' belida'* – deep areas of rivers reserved for habitats of *belida'* fish
- *Tuaan nanga'* – swamp areas for sago palms

DAYAK ADAT GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS

Dayak have diverse local governance institutions. The following examples are representative of local government structures.

Mayau Dayak Adat Governance

The Mayau Dayak have inhabited a small territory in Bonti, Sanggau district, since the 18th century when they moved from Sungkung, in Sambas district. The first village built was *Tamputn Romun*; currently Mayau consists of seven villages: Kadak, Kolompu, Upe, Lanong, Entiop, Enkayuk and Kotip.

Prior to 1979, the highest rank of *adat* governance of Mayau Dayak was called *Temenggung*.² He had authority over the entire the Mayau territory. A *Temenggung* was authorized for *adat* fines above 6 *tail*. The second rank was *Domong*. The authority of a *Domong* was within a village, covering *adat* fines ranging from 3-6 *tail*. Under *Domong* is *Kebayan*. *Kebayan* is responsible for *adat* fines ranging from 1-2 *tail*. The fourth rank is *Pengurus*. A *Pengurus* deals with light fines (e.g. *robanyu lopet sampai dengan samos paben beras* - a plate full of rice).

Jawan Dayak Adat Governance

The Jawan Dayak live along the Menterap River, in the Sekadau Hulu sub-district of Sanggau district. The total population of the Jawan Dayak is approximately four thousand people, consisting of fourteen villages. For the Jawan Dayak, *adat* governance structure consists of the *Temenggung* as the highest rank, followed by the *Damong*, and the lowest is rank is *Kepala adat*.

Iban Dayak Adat Governance

Iban Dayak, which is the original community in the northern part of Kapuas Hulu District, is similar to the previous example. The highest ranking *adat* institution is *Temenggung*. A *Temenggung* has authority for between two and seven villages. After *Temenggung*, the second rank is *Pateh*. There are two *Patehs*. The first *Pateh* is responsible for one specific village. The second is mobile, and therefore is responsible more than one village. This second *Pateh* is the assistant of *Temenggung*. The last rank of Iban Dayak *adat* governance is *Tuai Rumah*. A *Tuai Rumah* is responsible for a longhouse. Most Iban Dayak live in longhouses.

Kanayatn Dayak Adat Governance

Even following the implementation of the Law on Village Government No. 5, 1979, the existence of the *adat* governance is relatively strong. This strength stems from the strong base *adat* customs have within the village.

Timangong is the highest rank of Kanayatn *adat* institution. A *Timangong* has authority over a *binua* (an *adat* territory consisting of five to seven villages). A *Pasirah* has authority over the village level. The lowest rank of the hierarchy is *Pangaraga*. A *Pangaraga* has authority over a sub-village, which consists of thirty or forty households.

INDONESIAN GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS

The President is elected by the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR)* or the People's Consultative Assembly. The President is the chief of state, the chief of government, and the highest military commander. The presidential office in Indonesia is the most powerful governmental institution.

The *Menteri*, or Minister, is a presidential assistant, appointed by the President. Each *Menteri* is the chief of a department or state ministry. Indonesia currently has thirty-seven ministers who head thirty departmental ministries, three state ministries and four coordinating ministries. A departmental ministry has branches at the district or even sub-district levels (e.g. the Department of Education and Culture), while a state ministry does not administer departments at lower levels (e.g. the State Ministry of Environment). Most of the departments only operate at the district level.

The *Gubernur* is the chief of provincial government. During the New Order regime, according to Local Government Law No. 5, 1974, a *Gubernur* is elected by the provincial parliament after the candidates are selected and agreed upon by the Minister of Internal Affairs. Usually there are only three candidates, although the law states that it is possible to nominate five. The period of a *Gubernur administration* is five years. After five years, a *Gubernur* may be elected for one more five-year term. There is a two-term limit for a *Gubernur*. Local Government Law No. 5, 1974 has been amended into Local Government Law No. 22, 1999. This change is significant because the *Gubernur* and Deputy *Gubernur* are now elected as a pair by the provincial parliament.

The *Bupati* is the chief of a district. Formerly, the mechanism for electing a *Bupati* was the same as for electing a *Gubernur*. This mechanism was also regulated in Local Government Law No. 5, 1974. Formerly, a *Bupati* was officially selected by the district parliament and agreed to by the Minister of Internal Affairs. Though, in most cases in West Kalimantan, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the military recommend the *Bupati*. After the implementation of Local Government Law No. 22, 1999, the process appears to be more democratic. Aspirations from below are organized and each candidate should perform their vision when they are elected *Bupati*. Similar to the selection procedure for the *Gubernur*, the *Bupati* and Deputy *Bupati* are elected as a pair.

The *Camat* is the chief of a sub-district, who is appointed by the *Bupati*. There is no term limit for a *Camat*. A *Camat* may serve for many years as long as he maintains a good relationship with the *Bupati*. The *Camat* position is unique within the Indonesian governance structure, as he is not elected through a democratic appointment process.

The *Kepala Desa* is the chief of a *desa*. According to the Law on Village Government No. 5, 1979, a *desa* may consist of five to seven villages, depending on the number of people who live in the *desa*. A *Kepala Desa* is elected directly by popular vote amongst the villagers. Prior to the election, a candidate must have a special investigative analysis completed to show whether or not he was involved in the Communist Movement of 1965, or whether he is currently involved in activities that are against government policies. A *Kepala Desa* can govern the village for eight years. After eight years, he may be re-elected.

ADAT JUSTICE SYSTEM

Indigenous peoples have their own *adat* justice system. People who lived in Borneo were familiar with the concept of law long before the Dutch colonial government came to Borneo. Muslim people were familiar with Islamic Law, while indigenous peoples had their own laws called *adat* laws. The Dutch introduced their own laws, known as European Continental Law, or Western Law. The

Indonesian government is totally influenced by the laws that were introduced under Dutch colonialization. *Adat* laws are still strong among the Dayak groups of West Kalimantan, therefore the people have difficulty understanding national laws, which are repressive and colonial.

According to Dayak *adat* laws, when a person violates a rule, the victim can question the offender as to the reason for the violation. They will argue among themselves, but if they cannot resolve the matter by themselves, they will take the case to the lowest *adat* leader (in most Dayak groups). Each person involved in the dispute must prepare to present or defend his case with witnesses and proof. To hold *adat* court, the persons involved have to negotiate with the leader. *Adat* court is usually conducted in the house of either the violator or the violated; alternatively, it can be conducted in the house of the leader. When court is in session, the *adat* leader explains the specific procedural rules that are to be followed. Anyone in violation of these rules will be fined according to *adat* laws.

During the court proceedings, each party is given the opportunity to re-tell his version of the chronology of events in the case. The leader facilitates the process. After the chronology, the next steps are clarification and argumentation. Both parties must be able to produce proof through witnesses, history of the case, or other evidence. Each party questions the other in order to clarify the facts, and the judge is able to clarify the arguments and ask questions of both parties. According to the cases presented by the parties in conflict, the judge decides who wins and who loses. The losing party must pay the fine and give some compensation. Each party is given an opportunity to do his best to prove that he is right. It is a public process, conducted openly before all villagers who are interested. If a decision cannot be made after all efforts and processes have been exhausted, there are these final options:

- The first is *staying under water*. This is a ritual in which each person submerges himself in water. A ritual is conducted to tell the Lord and universe that they are looking for the truth. Both ask the Lord and any creatures of the universe to reveal the truth by helping the one who is telling the truth and by rejecting the liar. There are witnesses and judges present at this process. The judges will tell the people to gather around he who gets out of the water first, because he is the loser. The decision is final. This process is often used by the Desa Dayak and by other Dayak groups in West Kalimantan.
- The second is *fighting cocks*. Each party is represented by a cock. Before the cocks fight, a ritual must be conducted, similar to the ritual followed in the *staying under water* process. The cock representing the vindicated party will win the fight. This system is practiced in the Iban community.
- The third is *putting hands under hot water*. The one whose hand does not get blistered belongs to the victorious party. A ritual similar to that conducted for *staying under water* and *fighting cocks* is followed. This system is also practiced in the Iban community.
- The fourth is *adat oath*. The *adat oath* is usually avoided, as it has very serious and long lasting effects on the loser. It depends on the oath itself. For example, if the oath demands the loser's death in three days, this will happen, or the loser will suffer for seven generations. Both parties express their oath in front of the *adat* leaders. A ritual is also conducted before the oath.

In the context of defending and protecting natural resource management system of indigenous peoples, the existence of the *adat* justice system is very important. The weakening of the *adat* justice system which is enforced by *adat* structures, will directly influence the quality of resilience of Dayak

indigenous natural resource management. When *adat* structures are weak, it consequently weakens the resilience of the natural resource management of the Dayak.

INDONESIAN LEGAL THREATS UNDERMINING ADAT GOVERNANCE

The Indonesian Constitution of 1945 recognizes territorial, institutional and legal authorities of indigenous peoples of Indonesia as described in Article 18. Fifteen years after independence, the Central Indonesian Government introduced Basic Agrarian Law No. 5, 1960. This law marginalizes the rights of the indigenous peoples of Indonesia. Seven years later, in 1967, after Suharto came to power, his administration introduced Basic Forestry Law No. 5, 1967. This law enables domestic and international investors to exploit the forestry sector in Indonesia. In 1968, the Suharto administration issued Mining Law No. 11, 1968. Furthermore, in 1979, the Suharto administration imposed the Law on Village Government No. 5, 1979 and Spatial Planning Law No. 24, 1992 and Minister of Internal Affairs Regulation No. 3, 1997 on the 'Empowerment, Sustainability and Development of Customs, People's Tradition' at the Local Government Level.

The impact of these laws is described in detail below:

- **Basic Agrarian Law No. 5, 1960**

Article 5 states that the Agrarian Law of Indonesia regarding earth, water and sky is *adat* law; as long as *adat* law does not conflict with national interests, as they are defined by the state.

This law marginalizes indigenous peoples in Indonesia, particularly the Dayak in Kalimantan. This law develops the paradigm of national interest against development. It recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples where they exist, and where they are not in opposition to national interests. It gives the State the total right to control land.³ Under the New Order regime, national interests have been interpreted as government interests and government interests mean the interests of the elite groups in power around Suharto.

Basic Agrarian Law No. 5, 1960 introduces the concept and legal standing of land titles. Article 19 of this law states that in order to guarantee legal accuracy by government, land titles will be granted throughout Indonesian territory, which entails measuring, mapping, land book-keeping and giving certificates for land ownership. The Dayak are not familiar with the concept of title. They have their own law, *adat* law, which though unwritten, is understood to regulate the ownership of lands. Unwritten law, in terms of legal accuracy, does not present a problem for the Dayak, nor for outsiders who respect *adat* law.

From the State's perspective, the reason indigenous peoples' land rights must be adapted to the national interest is that nation-tribes and indigenous peoples are no longer independent and are now Indonesians. Rights based on collective rights over their lands, which prior to independence were absolute under the authority of *adat* leaders or indigenous peoples, must change. The supreme decision-makers within the indigenous administration must cede to the central government as the supreme administration, as the latter is the legal holder of all state territory.

Basic Agrarian Law No. 5, 1960 states that it is forbidden for indigenous people to use their collective rights to hamper the issuance of *hak guna usaha* (utilization right licenses) to the private sector when these licenses represent the interests of the population at large. Yet, these rights do not give government the right to sanction big projects which clear huge tracts of forest

for an increase in food production and transmigration. The government rationalized this law by saying that indigenous rights have slowed down “development” programs.⁴

The marginalization of indigenous rights is purposely designed by central government. Basic Agrarian Law No. 5, 1960 later became the basic argument for other laws which failed to respect indigenous peoples rights over natural resources control and management.

- **Basic Forestry Law No. 5, 1967**

In the first year of the New Order, the Suharto administration issued Basic Forestry Law No. 5, 1967. Article 2 states that state forest is any area of forest within non-owned lands. This law does not recognize the *adat* forests of the Dayaks, and *adat* forests are categorized as state forests.

As a result of this policy, indigenous peoples’ forests were given to forest concessionaires. The conflicts between indigenous peoples and logging companies started to explode; in West Kalimantan, conflicts between the Dayaks and logging companies started in the 1970s. The Dayaks have to fight against the forest concessionaires and the government—in particular, the Department of Forestry, which gives cutting licenses to forest concessionaires.

Forest concessions introduced by the Suharto administration were meant to generate economic growth in Indonesia. At first they were given to influential generals; later these generals gave their concessions to conglomerates. In West Kalimantan, forest concessions started in 1968. If there is no change in current trends, the forests of West Kalimantan will be gone in eight to ten years.

The existence of indigenous peoples is not recognized. This is in contradiction to the Indonesian Constitution of 1945, Article 18. According to Basic Forestry Law No. 5, 1967, indigenous peoples only have the rights to take benefits from the forest, but not to own or control forests within their territories. There is a conflict between Law No. 5 1967 and *adat* law followed by indigenous peoples. According to *adat* law, indigenous peoples have full ownership and control over their forests. It is therefore understandable why conflicts between indigenous peoples and logging companies—and later timber plantations—have gotten worse in the past few years.

- **Mining Law No. 11, 1968**

The New Order under Suharto promoted the extraction of natural resources. Minerals are among the natural resources to be exploited. Exploiting mines for gold is a tradition. The Dayak way of mining gold is very friendly to nature, though it is considered out of date and not productive. Yet modern ways of mining gold (and other minerals) are very destructive. They pollute nature, rivers, the ground, and the air. This law has made the Dayak lose control over their territory. The State has full control over mines all over the country and the Dayak cannot prevent the pollution and destruction caused by the mines.

- **Law on Village Government No. 5, 1979**

The Law on Village Government No. 5, 1979 is the most destructive law against indigenous peoples in Indonesia. This law does not recognize the roles of *adat* leaders in indigenous communities. *Adat* governance is totally rejected. The system of village government is made uniform all over Indonesia, following the Javanese system, where the *Kepala Desa* falls under the authority of the *Camat*, officially a member of the central government structure. It puts every

Kepala Desa under the control of someone in an upper position within the Indonesian governance structure.

The motivations behind the Law on Village Government No. 5, 1979 are the domination by the central government and development. This law also reflects the implementation of an integral state of Indonesia, such that Indonesia is a unitary state where village administration is made uniform and more open to “development.”⁵ Under this law, local government regroups five to seven villages into one *desa pengembangan* (developing village). The *desa* is formed by considering the area, the size of population, and other conditions in the indigenous villages.⁶

As the result, the naming of a *desa* is rather peculiar. For some *desas*, the name is made by just abbreviating the first letter of the name of the indigenous village, or by still using the old name, though this mostly depends on the *Camat*. When the *Camat* was a *Batak*, he named the *desa* using a place in North Sumatra. For instance, *Desa Rantau Prapat* in Embaloh Hulu, Kapuas Hulu district of West Kalimantan is named after a district in North Sumatra. The implication of this uniformization of the village administration system following the Javanese system is that all over Indonesia, indigenous peoples use the terms: *Kepala Desa*, *Kepala Dusun*, *Ketua RW* and *Ketua RT*. This is a totally Javanese structure exported to regions outside of Java. *Desa* administration only consists of *Kepala Desa* and *Lembaga Musyawarah Desa* (Desa Assembly). A *Kepala Desa* is assisted by a Desa Secretary and *Kepala Dusun* (smaller village headman). It is clear that this law does not recognize the role of *adat* leaders and *adat* structures. This law introduced a totally new system for the indigenous peoples who live outside of Java.

Moreover, the requirements established for *Kepala Desa* candidates severely limit participation by *adat* leaders. Candidates for *Kepala Desa* must at least have graduated from secondary school. This condition does not give the *adat* leaders an opportunity to become *kepala desa*. As the result, the *Kepala Desa* is usually a young man who has graduated from secondary school, but knows nothing about *adat* law, rituals, traditional wisdoms, or natural resources management.⁷

This policy made the merged villages lose autonomy over their own territory. Each individual village is subordinated to the “developing village,” which is administered from the village located centrally between all other villages. In West Kalimantan, the distance between the villages ranges from two or three kilometers up to eight to ten kilometers. As a result, communication between the villagers and their *Kepala Desa* is very limited. Not all the villagers are familiar with their *Kepala Desa*.

The result of the structural position, uniform system and limited communication that exists between the *Kepala Desa* and his people is that the village administration does not run transparently. There is no control by the community. When the villagers are dissatisfied, the community attempts to control the *Kepala Desa* by asking him to verify things within the village. In most cases, the *Kepala Desa* replies that his bosses are the *Camat* and the *Bupati*, not the villagers, despite the fact that the villagers elect him. It is understandable that within this situation, corruption, collusion and nepotism are able to grow rapidly. This is the situation that the New Order government has built. Most conflicts at the village level derive from this situation.

Twenty years after the implementation of the Law on Village Government No. 5, 1979, Dayak *adat* institutions in West Kalimantan have weakened. Dayak leadership positions have been extinguished. Their reliance on *adat* law has been lessened, and many *adat* leaders have been co-opted. *Adat* leaders are not independent anymore, nor are they necessarily on the side of the villagers. Only very credible *adat* leaders keep on defending *adat* rules. The Dayak institutions

are destroyed by the law, and the capitalist economy promotes forest concessions and palm oil plantations, while natural resources in West Kalimantan are carelessly exploited.⁸

- **Spatial Planning Law No. 24, 1992**

Spatial Planning Law No. 24 1992, organized by the State Ministry of Environment, is actually a more promising legal document because the government is required to consult with villages when preparing the official land use plans. This progress was closely related to the integrity of Mr. Emil Salim, who served as the Indonesian State Minister of Environment during that time. In terms of building Dayak *adat* institutional governance resilience, however, the law's contribution is not significant because it does not address the problem of who represents the villages for those consultations. The participation of people in determining the provincial, district, sub-district and village authorities is still mediated through formal government structures.

- **Ministry of Internal Affairs Regulation No. 3, 1997 on the Empowerment, Sustainability and Development of Customs, People's Tradition and Adat Institution at the Local Government Level**

This regulation has two implications for the Dayaks in West Kalimantan. The first de jure implication, is that the indigenous peoples' customs, traditions and structures are recognized. For a long time, most Indonesian laws and regulations did not recognize this fact. But this recognition is still in government hands.

The second implication of this regulation introduces a new structure to the Dayaks in West Kalimantan, which creates an "Adat Council" in every district and sub-district throughout West Kalimantan. At the provincial level this translates into a *Majelis Adat* ("Adat Assembly").⁹ This regulation tends to ignore the existence and the origin of *adat* institutions owned by the Dayak people.

Now, these "Adat Councils" serve as the government means of intervention in *adat* affairs, and as such have positioned the real *adat* leaders as subordinates. Formerly, the highest-ranking *adat* institution was *Temenggung*, but now, the Sub-district and District Councils, and the "Adat Assembly" at the provincial level, have become superior. The result is that the *adat* leaders are no longer independent. Intervention by "Adat Councils" is very strong. Most members of these "Adat Councils" are those who are in government—businessmen in fact—who have very limited understanding of *adat* and *adat* law. These people use the "Adat Council" to promote issues in their own interest. "Adat Councils" have provided a means to legalize palm oil plantations and forest. Only a few of the "Councils" actually reflect the will of the indigenous people.

DAYAK NGO RESPONSES: LBBT'S ROLE

Seeing the reality of the bad position in which indigenous people find themselves, NGOs who are concerned with the Dayaks, such as Pancur Kasih, Institut Dayakologi and Lembaga Bela Banua Talino (LBBT), facilitate and prioritize Dayak empowerment. This section will focus on what LBBT does in this empowerment process.

Community Organizing

LBBT's core program is focused on community organizing. LBBT works with the members of Pancur Kasih Consortium for the Empowerment of Dayak Peoples. Currently, LBBT focuses its work in three districts in West Kalimantan: Sanggau, Sambas, and Kapuas Hulu. We facilitate five areas in those districts. LBBT is also involved in the facilitation of the other districts through handling cases and through cooperation with churches and communities within these areas.

Within the scope of these community-organizing activities, we live in the communities, analyze bad laws, conduct social analyses, facilitate legal and human rights training, revitalize *adat* structures and organize gender training. We try to integrate the political, social, economic and cultural aspects of the people in the community organizing process. Our role is merely to facilitate the empowerment of the communities.

Revitalizing *Adat* Structures

Adat structures are crucial for building sustainable natural resource management systems within the indigenous peoples' territories. The function of *adat* law in managing natural resources is very closely related to the existence of *adat* structures. When *adat* structures are weak or co-opted, the community becomes weak and achieves less collective resilience. In West Kalimantan, *adat* structures are weak and co-opted; therefore, oil palm plantation companies can easily take people's land. Before a plantation comes to an area, the first thing its management does is to attempt to influence *adat* structures.

In its work, LBBT puts emphasis on the empowerment of *adat* structures. But this is not easily done because we face resistance from the co-opted groups in society who benefit from this situation, as well as resistance from the government. After the implementation of the Law on Village Government No. 5, 1979, the quality of Dayak *adat* structures has decreased systematically and rapidly. Between 1979 and 1999, *adat* structures were progressively destroyed, *adat* law became dysfunctional, and *adat* leaders used *adat* law for their own interests. Most community members continue to face leadership crises in their villages.

LBBT works to initiate dialogue on the problems the community encounters. During these dialogues, indigenous peoples' meetings, and social analysis meetings, everything is open for debate. This way, people are able to see the root of their problems and start thinking where and how to begin doing things to solve their problems independently. They create their own agendas. The first thing they usually do is reinforce their *adat* laws. At the same time, they also have to know Indonesian laws in order not to be fooled by outsiders. To make the *adat* law strong, community members must empower their *adat* leaders so that their law can function effectively. Of course this takes a lot of time and energy. The problems facing the community are very complicated, which results in a process that is slow and requires more patience. The revitalization of *adat* structures should be parallel with other efforts; the empowerment of *adat* structures only deals with the political aspect of a situation. From this experience, we have learned that it is better to integrate attention to the political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of a community.

Advocating Against Bad Laws

At the grassroots level, the aforementioned laws are the laws that we discuss during the community organizing process. There are three main aims in discussing these laws. The first is to make explicit how the laws justify the authoritarian regime in Indonesia, to demonstrate how the laws are on the side of elite businessmen and politicians. The second is to observe how the laws have affected indigenous

peoples by focusing on the realities around them in their daily lives. Comparing their lives before the laws with their lives after the implementation of the laws is very important. The third is to teach them how to fight against the laws so that they will not undergo further victimization.

At the national level, LBBT, in cooperation with other NGOs in Indonesia, conducts policy advocacy through their Policy Review and Reform Division. To reform agrarian policies in Indonesia, LBBT is involved in an Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA). The Consortium consists of more than three hundred NGOs and individuals who are struggling to achieve agrarian reform in Indonesia. To promote human rights, LBBT, in cooperation with other human rights based NGOs, is involved in human rights training, in the handling of human rights cases, and in campaigning for the protection of human rights through requesting the Indonesian Parliament (DPR) to ratify the International Conventions on Political Civil, Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. The main partners of LBBT are Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (ELSAM) in Jakarta, and the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) and their branches.

In the forestry sector, LBBT collaborates with national and local NGOs to promote indigenous peoples' rights. For example, LBBT was actively involved in drafting and revising the Forestry Law Draft proposed by the government to Parliament, that has now become Forestry Law No. 41, 1999. At the national level, we cooperated with WAHLI, ELSAM, Telapak Indonesia, and FKKM (Community Forestry Communication Forum). FKKM proposed to Parliament an alternative draft of the Forestry Law. At the local level, LBBT and other concerned NGOs formed the "Green Robe" alliance to protest against the government draft of the forestry law, and to initiate dialogue with local parliament and local governors. We also participated in talk shows on radios, speaking to the press to raise public awareness on various issues. Unfortunately, the alternative draft had little influence on Parliament's decision and it was not accepted. The final law is completely negative and in favor of the status quo.

LBBT and other NGOs were involved locally and nationally to change Local Government Law No. 5, 1974 and the Law on Village Government No. 5, 1979, in a bid to prove that these laws negatively affect the local and indigenous peoples. These groups campaigned and talked to the press and to members of local and national parliament. Both laws have now been changed into Local Government Law No. 22, 1999. In theory, this law gives more autonomy to the district level and more respect to indigenous peoples' rights. But in reality, the new law does little to address the problems inherent in the old law.

Legal and Human Rights Assistance

LBBT also provides legal assistance via legal empowerment. LBBT avoids going to court because judiciary institutions in Indonesia are not the places to get justice. Our legal assistance consists of legal training for the particular communities who are facing cases that we label "structural" and "public dimensional" cases. Except in cases which have a structural implication for the state versus civil society, LBBT does not deal with individual cases. Legal empowerment is used in natural resources cases, mostly in relation to the fight against forest concessionaires, oil palm plantations, industrial timber plantations, and mining companies. The military is usually involved in these cases.

During the legal training, we facilitate the discussion of indigenous peoples' rights—land rights, human rights, rights to natural resources and environment, and criminal law. We show videos, share experiences, and explore case studies; we also role-play on how to talk to companies and the government, and on how to face the military. After this process is finished, the villagers have better perspectives on how to plan to defend their rights. Our experiences so far prove that this training is very useful for the villagers, as the knowledge and skills put them in a better bargaining position.

In handling a legal case, we do not work by ourselves. We work together with other local and national NGOs. At the local level, we also work together with student organizations based in Pontianak. Many times we facilitate villagers going to Jakarta to meet government officers. Networking among NGOs makes the division of responsibilities possible; when villagers go to Jakarta, they are facilitated by Jakarta-based NGOs.

ILO (International Labor Organization) Convention 169 Ratification Campaign

Respect for the rights of indigenous peoples in Indonesia is very weak. While at the international level respect exists to a much greater extent, LBBT uses the ILO Convention 169 to promote them. Based on Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution, the Indonesian government is obliged to respect the rights of indigenous peoples. According to the Indonesian law system, an international instrument to ensure the respect of indigenous rights will be officially available when it is ratified by Parliament. As long as the instrument is not ratified, international standards have no standing in Indonesia.¹⁰

The campaign has three goals:

- To make known the respect which exists at the international level for the rights of indigenous peoples.
- To promote the ILO Convention 169 as the tool of empowerment of the indigenous peoples, and the Dayaks in particular, such that they can strengthen their position by seeing the trend outside of Indonesia.
- To insist that, one day, the government of Indonesia will respect the rights of indigenous peoples and ratify ILO Convention 169.

Together with other NGOs, we have discussed the Convention with the Minister of Labor, under whom the authority of ratifying the Convention will be authorized. So far, the follow up from the government is still obscure concerning the ratification of the Convention. The campaigns for the ratification have been voiced by many NGOs, Indigenous Peoples' Organizations and individuals. It seems that the Indonesian government refuses to acknowledge the ratification of the Convention as a priority.

International Policies Formulation

Indonesian NGOs realize that international pressures can be effective and respected by the Indonesian government. Therefore, Indonesian NGOs, including LBBT, are involved in formulating some international policies on indigenous peoples. LBBT has been actively involved in at least two policies; the first is the Asian Development Bank Policy on Indigenous Peoples, and the second is the European Union Policy on Indigenous Peoples.

We are also enthusiastically involved in international networks to change and to form policies. Considering the fact that our internal efforts have little influence on the Indonesian government, we choose to use international channels.

NGO Concern Center

After the ethnic unrest between Dayak and Madurese immigrants in 1999, LBBT and other NGOs in West Kalimantan formed the NGO Concern Center to help Madurese refugees. We seek donations from funding groups, individuals and other parties. This Center works together with student groups working at the refugee camps, seeking to rebuild relationships across ethnic divisions.

Organizing the West Kalimantan Indigenous Peoples Alliance and the Archipelago Indigenous Peoples' Alliance

The empowerment process has already been conducted for many years by various organizations in Indonesia. The next struggle is to unite and synergize all efforts towards the recognition and respect of all indigenous peoples in Indonesia. NGOs concerned with indigenous peoples formed the Indigenous Peoples Advocacy Network (JAPHAMA) in 1993. From 1993 to 1999, many indigenous peoples' organizations became more active in organizing, networking and advocacy. For example, Baileo Maluku works for indigenous peoples in Maluku; Lemasa works with the Amungme community in Irian Jaya; Yayasan Tanah Merdeka works in Central Sulawesi; LBBT in West Kalimantan; Lembaga Bina Benua Puti Jaji in East Kalimantan and Yayasan Citra Mandiri with the Mentawai People in West Sumatra.

The struggle in West Kalimantan under the auspices of the Consortium of Dayak Peoples Empowerment facilitated the establishment of the West Kalimantan Indigenous Peoples Alliance (AMA Kalbar) in 1998. We realize that the indigenous peoples' movement in West Kalimantan should be "bottom-up," not "top-down." The process of building the Alliance was initiated in 1997. Reformasi also provided an opening to facilitate the Alliance. The establishment of the Alliance was marked by a demonstration to the provincial government in Pontianak in August 1998. One of the demands was to stop the implementation of the Law on Village Government No. 5, 1979 and Local Government Law No. 5, 1974.

This Alliance then co-organized the Archipelago Indigenous Peoples Congress from March 17-23, 1999 in Jakarta. The organizations that formed the Steering Committee included:

- Baileo Mauluk
- Bio-FORUM
- INFID
- Mining Advocacy Network (JATAM)
- East Nusa Tenggara Indigenous Peoples Movement Network (JAGAT)
- Participatory Mapping Network (JKPP)
- Indigenous Peoples Advocacy Network (JAPHAMA)
- Marines and Coastal Network (Jaring PELA)
- Consortium of Agrarian Reform (KPA)
- Support Consortium for Community Forest System Management (KPSHK)
- Consortium for Indigenous Peoples Empowerment of Irian Jaya (KONPENMA)
- Indonesian Forum for Environment (WALHI)

The result of this Congress was the establishment of the Archipelago Indigenous Peoples Alliance (AMAN). The political bargaining position of indigenous peoples in Indonesia is now stronger after the Congress and the establishment of AMAN.

Three months after the Congress, the Minister of Agrarian Affairs and National Chief of Land Administration, Hasan Basri Durin, issued Regulation No. 5, 1999 on *Adat* Land Dispute Handling. This regulation recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples on *adat* land. These rights in turn will be determined by local regulations, which are currently being developed.

Lobbying Parties

After Reformasi, there are more possibilities for us to lobby for political parties to promote concern for indigenous peoples. We try to lobby only the parties that we consider to have concern for indigenous peoples, and the activists are mostly the indigenous peoples themselves. Two parties are

particularly enthusiastic about the issue—the Love Democracy Christian Party (PDKB) and the Unity in Diversity Party (PBI).

In the future, LBBT and other NGOs in West Kalimantan will initiate legislative training for local parliament members. We want the parliament members to be sensitive to the aspirations of indigenous peoples. Moreover, there is autonomy at the district level after Local Government Law No. 22, 1999. We will become deeply involved in drafting local policies on natural resources at the district level.

Socialization of Local Government Law No. 22, 1999 and Minister of Agrarian Affairs Decree No. 5, 1999

Local Government Law No. 22, 1999 recognizes the *adat* structures and territorial rights of indigenous peoples, while Minister of Agrarian Affairs Decree No. 5, 1999 recognizes the land rights of indigenous peoples. In 1999, LBBT, PPSDAK, PPSHK and IPS Alliance (AMA), conducted workshops in six districts of West Kalimantan. The goal of the workshops was to promote awareness of Local Government Law No. 22, 1999 and of the Minister of Agrarian Affairs Decree No. 5, 1999. We have to promote awareness of these two new policies, as they are relevant to the increase in respect for indigenous peoples' rights.

The socialization of the laws took place from October to December 1999. The Catholic Church was also involved in the workshops. Indigenous peoples enthusiastically attended the workshops in each district. This is the first indigenous peoples' workshop conducted in all the districts of West Kalimantan. Through these workshops, we want to raise "bottom-up" initiatives to change policy at the district level, where every district is now authorized to formulate their own policies. We want to use this opportunity to organize people's legal drafting of the district policies on natural resources management and protection.

District Parliament Facilitation

After the district workshops, we then organized a training for parliament members in the Sanggau district. This was the first ever district parliament members training in Indonesia. Forty-five parliament members attended the training, which lasted for five days. The training focused on the concept of autonomy, the rights of parliament members, district potencies, a vision of district development, and the budgeting and drafting of district policies.

The facilitators of the training are experts from the Agrarian Reform Consortium, LATIN, and Telapak Indonesia. The training is fruitful for the members because they gain more perspectives on how they should play their roles. As a follow up to the training, we established a Political Officer Office in Sanggau to better facilitate the Parliament's performance in controlling the executive administration and guarding the people's interests.

CONCLUSION

Adat institutions are determinant factors in defending the rights of the Dayak people over their natural resources. Indonesian legal and policy frameworks have significantly marginalized the rights of the Dayaks in West Kalimantan. The advent of forest concessionaires, timber plantations and palm oil plantations were followed by regulations and policies which then have weakened *adat* governance within the Dayak society. The Dayak's natural resource management system will only be sustainable if their *adat* institutions are functional. Government intervention in *adat* institutions results in *adat* institutions being co-opted, and therefore the roles of *adat* leaders are weakened.

Efforts have been conducted to revitalize Dayak *adat* institutions by Dayak-based NGOs in West Kalimantan in order to maintain the resilience of the indigenous peoples' system of natural resource management. The success indicators are as follows:

- Critical awareness of the Dayaks is improved in the facilitated areas; this is shown by the increased resistance of villagers to the land acquisitions, logging exploitation, oil palm companies, timber plantation, and mining in *adat* forests.
- More people and villages are defending their territories from various projects and holding their *adat* leaders accountable for natural resources exploitation which is supported by community leaders.
- There are more and more demands from indigenous peoples that ask the government to withdraw bad laws that do not respect the rights of indigenous peoples.
- Some bad laws have been removed after years of advocacy. These laws have given more respect to indigenous peoples' rights—especially concerning natural resource management and *adat* structures.
 - Basic Forestry Law No. 5, 1967 was changed into Law No. 41, 1999
 - Local Government Law No. 5, 1974 and the Law on Village Government No. 5, 1979 were replaced by Local Government Law No. 22, 1999, and the issue of Agrarian State Minister Decree No. 5, 1999.
- Our facilitation is welcomed by various parties, including government agencies and members of parliament.
- The indigenous peoples' empowerment model in West Kalimantan has inspired other groups of indigenous peoples in other parts of the archipelago to learn, share, and train.

Notes for Chapter 2

1. Stefanus Masiun is the Director of Lembaga Bela Banua Talino (LBBT), Pontianak, West Kalimantan; Email: banua@pontianak.wasantara.net.id.

2. In 1997, PPSDAK Pancur Kasih facilitated a documentation of Mayau Dayak *adat* institutions and recorded the structure of the community's *adat* governance institutions before the implementation of the Law on Village Government No. 5, 1979.

3. See Articles 2 and 4 of Basic Agrarian Law No. 5, 1960.

4. General Explanation Part II/3-W of Law No. 5 1960.

5. See Consideration, Point B, Law on Village Government No. 5, 1979.

6. See Article 2 of Law on Village Government No. 5, 1979.

7. See Articles 3 and 4 of Law on Village Government No. 5, 1979.

8. In 1999, LBBT, YKSPK, and the West Kalimantan Indigenous Peoples' Alliance conducted six workshops in all districts in West Kalimantan. We concluded that approximately 70% of *adat* structures in West Kalimantan are damaged. In Kapuas Hulu district, the eastern-most part of West Kalimantan, *adat* structures and laws still function well. This is also true in Pontianak district. In other districts (such as Sanggau, Sambas, Ketapang and Sintang), *adat* structures only function at 30-50% of previous levels.

9. In West Kalimantan, the local government facilitates the establishment of the "Adat Assembly" at the provincial level and the "Adat Council" at the district and sub-district level.

10. LBBT and ELSAM have translated a version of the ILO Convention 169 into Bahasa Indonesia. This book has been distributed to indigenous peoples in Indonesia through LBBT and ELSAM networks.

3

Land, Rivers, and Forests: Dayak Solidarity and Ecological ResilienceJohn Bamba¹

DAYAK. For many people, this word is associated with Borneo, headhunting, hornbills, and beautiful Dayak women dancing, following every beat of Dayak music, interrupted only by occasional male dancers' war cries. The richness, beauty, uniqueness and exoticism of Borneo have been trademarks ever since colonial times. Unfortunately, few people realize that the richness and the uniqueness of Kalimantan forests exist due to the presence of a supportive system that is the total of the indigenous way of life—including traditions, religions, arts and customary laws—that has allowed the Dayak culture and the environment to co-exist for thousands of years.

Sasak Behundang, Arai Beikan, Hutan Bejalug. [There are shrimps under the leaves sunk on riverbeds, there are fish in the water, there are animals in the forests.] This saying from the Dayak Jalai in Ketapang District, West Kalimantan, describes their vision and dream to live in happiness and prosperity. It also represents the Dayak's general view of life. The Dayak have developed a distinct management of natural resources based on living in harmony with nature.

Land, rivers and forests are the three most important elements that allow a person to live as a real Dayak. For centuries, these three elements have formed a unique identity that we now recognize as Dayak Peoples, Dayak Culture, Dayak Customary Laws, and Dayak Religion. The Dayak are able to maintain their existence and their distinctive way of life by applying seven principles in their management of natural resources.² These seven main principles can be found in all aspects of Dayak natural resource management. They consistently apply these principles in practicing what is commonly referred to as sustainable development. Many experts say that sustainable development must meet at least three criteria: first, it must be economically beneficial; second, it must be ecologically sound; third, it must not be culturally destructive. The Dayak have been practicing sustainable ways of extracting natural resources for ages.

This chapter will focus on past and present Dayak self-governance in the context of its relationship to the Indonesian government, and illustrate how Dayak communities have built solidarity to resist concessions and other incursions that damage their natural resource management systems.

DAYAK INSTITUTIONS

The district of Ketapang is a typical Dayak community located in the southern area of West Kalimantan Province. It covers 35,809 km² of the total area of West Kalimantan. Ketapang is divided into fourteen sub-districts, and the Dayak live in eleven of them. According to ethnolinguistic research carried out by Institut Dayakologi, there are over 110,000 Dayak people who belong to forty-six sub-

ethnic groups. The Dayak comprise about 28% of the total population of Ketapang, which is about 400,000 people total.³

Ketapang is well known for its timber products, especially iron wood. It is also the main producer of rubber. This district is also very rich in mineral resources, most notably bauxite, gold, Kaolin and Quartz Sand. Big companies such as PT. Alas Kusuma have been exploiting timber resources since the late 1960s, although massive mining activity has not started yet.⁴ Gold mines in Tumbang Titi sub-district are now exploited by individual miners who are destroying thousands of hectares. In general, logging operations, palm oil and industrial tree plantations, transmigration and uncontrolled individual mining activities have heavily degraded the environment in Ketapang district.

Even within a small area, there can be great variation between local *adat* institutions. While one of the special characteristics of the Dayak of Ketapang is that they have no headhunting tradition, though in the southern part of Ketapang, one village, Sumanjawat, had such a tradition.⁵ Ketapang is also unique for having a Dayak Kingdom called *Kerajaan Hulu Aiq*. The kingdom's territory is called *Desa Sembilan Demung Sepuluh* [Nine Villages, Ten Customary Chiefs], while the King is better known as *Raja Hulu Aiq* [The King of the Upriver].

Most Dayak in Ketapang have an *adat* institution structure in which a village has full autonomy with its own *adat* institution and leaders.⁶ In Jalai Dayak, for example, a village is led by a *Damung* who is the chief of the village government. The *Kepala Bantan*, as the *adat* chief of the village, assists the *Damung*. The *Damung* is also assisted by a *Kabayan*, who is in turn assisted by a *Ketuhag*. The *Kepala Bantan* has three assistants, a *Pemukah Lucung*, a *Pemerang Buluh* and a *Pehuyang Tentabus*. These three assistants have the task of collecting materials that are needed for various rituals performed in the village.

Apart from the village head and *adat* chief, another group that has substantial power within the community is called *Mantir* [the Elders]. These are people who are esteemed for their wisdom, experience and skill; therefore they are awarded with certain titles by the *adat* chief.⁷ However, the *Mantirs* have no functional position and are not involved in the administration of *adat* institutions. Their roles are fashioned in a more consultative and advisory manner, for example, when *adat* court or assembly is held. A big gathering is described as *Damung Betatai Mantir Bebaris* [*Damungs* gather, *Mantirs* line up.]

Belian [shamans] are also prominent figures within the village. Unlike a village head or *adat* chief, the authority of a shaman to perform shamanic ritual has no geographic limits. Unlike shamans who is able to perform their own rituals and laws anywhere, village heads and *adat* chiefs can only exercise their authority and laws in their own village; if they go to another village, they have to obey the laws of the other village.



Figure 3.1 Dayak ritual initiation of an *adat* leader (photo courtesy of Pancur Kasih).

This heterogeneous set of structures have been changed and co-opted by the Indonesian government. The government used the Village Regrouping Policy to homogenize this structure. Administratively, several villages (usually five) are grouped together under the leadership of a Village Head, called *Kepala Desa*. The *Kepala Desa* in turn controls each individual village head, called *Kepala Dusun*. Villages previously called *kampung* are now called *dusun*. Although every *dusun* has its own *adat* chief and is independent from others within the village group, the appointment of an *adat* chief must now be legalized by the District head through an SK (decision letter). The *adat* chief is now included as the member of what is called Village Community Welfare Body (LKMD)—headed by the *Kepala Desa*—which is subordinate to the sub-district level government. In practice, both heads of the village group and the sub-district have the authority to intervene in decisions made by the *adat* chief.⁸ In Tangerang Village, Jelai Hulu Sub-District, to perform a ritual, the people have to get a license from the police office at the sub-district level under the regulation on mass gathering. The *Adat* chief, who was formerly called *Kepala Bantan*, is now called *Damung*. It is very clear that the government has been trying their best to create confusion in order to be able to co-opt the *adat* institutions.

As mentioned above, one of the special characteristics of the Dayak in Ketapang district is the existence of a Dayak King called *Raja Hulu Aiq* (RHA).⁹ Unlike other kings, the RHA has no political power; he is not a king with a feudal government. In fact, the RHA has no government at all. He is the highest spiritual leader of the Dayak. He has a territory called *Desa Sembilan Demung Sepuluh*, but it is not a territory of a state. It is more a territory of cultural binding that recognizes him as the highest leader of *adat*. All the Dayak in *Desa Sembilan Demung Sepuluh* believe the RHA is chosen to become the guarantor of the Dayak's good fate, especially in relation to farming activities. Therefore, a special tribute is always paid to RHA by mentioning his name in every prayer the Dayak perform during farming rituals.

The RHA performs a special ritual called *meruba* every year to honor the sacred *pusaka*, which is inherited from generation to generation by the king's family. Only a RHA has the right to take care of the *pusaka*, which consists of a yellow gold *keris*, a box, and a plate.¹⁰ The *pusaka* is stored in a special room

with a lamp that must always be lit. RHA carries out regular meditation in this room. No one, except RHA, is allowed to touch or look at the *pusaka*, not even to enter the room where the *pusaka* is stored. Even RHA himself is not allowed to look at the *keris* when he cleans it during *meruba* ritual, or else he will go blind.

The *pusaka* is believed to possess the power of determining the course of nature. When the *meruba* ritual was held in 1997, RHA found dry sand in the *pusaka*. This signified to him that there would be long dry season and his people would face hardship in their life. In the *meruba* ritual the following year, the *pusaka* was full of mud and water, and the *keris* was very hot. This indicated that the weather would be dominated by rainy seasons, and the *keris* had given a sign to the people that they would face riots and disturbances.¹¹

The RHA is highly respected by the Dayak people. Considering his role as the owner of the *pusaka*, the Dayak oral traditions in Ketapang tell that even the Malay sultan highly respected him. The RHA is not a king in any political sense, but rather, the highest cultural leader of *adat*.

In an interview with Thomas Tion Sutton, Raja Singa Bansa, the present RHA, said that the territory of *Desa Sembilan Demung Sepuluh* in fact covers the whole island of Borneo, including Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei Darussalam. Those *Desa Sembilan* [Nine Villages] are Buliq-Belantiq (now in Central Kalimantan Province), Puring-Katingan (also in Central Kalimantan Province), Kayung-Tayap, Jalai-Pesaguan, Jekaq-Laur, Bihaq-Krio (all in Ketapang District, West Kalimantan), Desa Darat Pantai Kapuas (along Kapuas River and its sub rivers), Mahap-Sekadau (now Sanggau District), Sabah-Sarawak (now in Malaysia, including Brunei Darussalam).¹²

DAYAKS IN POLITICS

Similar to the fate of other indigenous peoples in other parts of the world, the history of the Dayak is also dominated by colonialism, oppression, and violation of their basic rights and the marginalization of their existence. The richness and beauty of Kalimantan Island have exacerbated these issues, as people come, not to develop the island and the people, but to make money out of its richness and the honesty of its people.

Before colonialism, the Dayak already had their own share of problems. Several Dayak sub-ethnic groups were facing quite serious problems with fighting each other. Dayak sub-ethnic groups who had headhunting traditions, including the Iban, Kayan and Kenyah, often fought each other in the past. For example, in Sarawak, the British exploited this situation by using Iban warriors as shock troops against their Malay and Chinese opponents.¹³

The Dayak also experienced double colonialism under the rule of the Malay sultanates. In most cases, the Malay did not treat their Dayak brothers justly or as equals. In Ketapang, for example, the Dayak were forced to become the Sultan's slaves and regularly provide the Sultan with food (rice, chickens, and eggs) as a tribute; every village had to send ten men to work for a period of six months. In the Sultan's house, they performed housework such as getting water from the river, collecting firewood, carrying the Sultan when he traveled, and raising his chickens and cows. The Dutch supported the Sultan's oppression of the Dayak by maintaining the existence of these sultanates. Although the Dutch initiated the Dayak Assembly in Tumbang Anoi, Central Kalimantan in 1894 to eliminate the headhunting and slavery practices within the Dayak communities, they did not do anything to the Malay who made the Dayak their slaves.¹⁴ Moreover, the Dutch made use of the Malay sultanate as their political extensions to maintain their existence and strengthen colonialism over the Dayak.

Throughout history, the Dayak had to continually fight for better conditions for themselves. When the Japanese took over the colony from the Dutch, thousands of Dayak were forced to work in *romusha* and were beheaded by the Japanese *kempetai* after they finished digging their own graves. The Dayak fought the Japanese who treated them as slaves. In Ketapang, the *Kamit* [slavery by the Malay Sultan] was lifted by the Dayak themselves after meeting with the Sultan to ask him to stop the practice.

According to the Dayaks' oral traditions in Ketapang, the first Malay Sultan was the first Dayak King's younger brother. This story was believed even in the era of the last Malay sultan, Panembahan Saunan, who refused to be saluted by the Dayak King when they met. It is likely that the Dayak King was not aware of the *Kamit* practice, or did not want to interfere, which supports the idea that the RHA should not involve himself in political issues.

Prior to Indonesia's Independence, the Dayak in West Kalimantan established a state called Madjang Desa. There were at least three battles in which the Dayak fought directly against the Japanese: the Pinoh/Melawi War under the command of Pang Semangai, the Sidas/Ngabang War under the command of Pak Kasih, and the Meliau War under the command of Pang Suma. The victory in Meliau War in 1942 resulted in what was called The State of Madjang Desa with Pang Suma as the Head of State, Panglima Sulang as the Minister of Defence and Order and J.A.M. Linggie as the State Secretary. However, the founding fathers of this country decided to join the Republic of Indonesia when it was proclaimed in August 17, 1945.¹⁵

In the era of Sukarno, after Indonesia became independent, there was a revolt in Kalimantan known as PGRS/Paraku. This revolt was part of the Indonesian Communist Party's movement to create a Communist Indonesia. After the failed coup in 1965, the Communist members in Kalimantan created what they called PGRS/Paraku and continued their armed struggle through guerilla warfare. Most members of the Communist Party in Kalimantan were Chinese who received direct support from Beijing.

To eliminate the Communist Party members in Kalimantan and to stop the guerilla movement by the PGRS/Paraku, the Indonesian army (already under the Suharto influence) engineered an ethnic conflict that pitted the Dayak against the Chinese. The conflict resulted in thousands of Chinese deaths, including members of the Communist Party.

During the Old Order government under Sukarno, the Dayak had more freedom to take part in political life. Sukarno government's policy allowed Dayak freedom of association and participation in general elections. The Dayak in West Kalimantan established the Dayak Unity Party on October 1, 1945.¹⁶ The Dayak Unity Party (DUP) won the 1955 General election with 40% of the vote, and brought J.C. Oevang Oeray, the DUP's Chairman, to the Governor's seat. Along with him, M.Th. Djaman, G.P. Djaoeng, A. Syahdan and A. Djaelani were elected as District Heads of Sanggau, Sintang, Kapuas Hulu and Pontianak respectively. The Dayak, through struggling in the political arena at the provincial level in the Sukarno era, were successful in dominating bureaucratic posts at the provincial to the sub-district levels, but they failed to secure long-term roles for Dayak at the national, political elite level.

But the golden era of Dayak political life did not last long. As soon as Suharto took power, he allowed only three political parties in Indonesia. In 1959, the president of Indonesia produced a regulation called Penpres No. 7, 1959 in which all political parties in Indonesia must have branches in at least seven provinces in Indonesia to remain active. DUP could not meet these criteria and thus the party disbanded. Some of its members joined Indonesian Parti (Partindo); others joined the Catholic Party or the PDI, a small party with no significant political power in New Order Indonesia. This was the beginning of the death of the Dayak's role in politics.¹⁷

Since there was no political freedom under Suharto's government, Dayak politicians (including former members of DUP), through Yayasan Mandau Perisai (Mandau Perisai Foundation) for example, could only establish some boarding houses for Dayak students in Pontianak. Catholic and Protestant churches close to the Dayak tended to avoid political issues and thus only established formal schools, boarding houses and hospitals.

During Suharto's regime, there was never any Dayak Governor or Dayak District Head. In 1995, S. Jacobus Frans Layang, SH was 'elected' as District Head of Kapuas Hulu. Many people believe that the election of Jacobus was highly motivated by the Golkar's political game to regain Dayak support for the 1997 General Election rather than to increase the Dayak's political power. Jacobus, who was then the Chairman of Dayak "Adat Assembly," was considered the right person to hold this position. Although there were suggestions and demands—especially from younger generation Dayak—that he reject the appointment, Jacobus decided to accept this position. During his office term as District Head, Jacobus was the focus of demonstrations and protests—especially by the Malay groups—accusing him of practicing KKN (Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism). However, among the general Dayak population, he was a symbol of Dayak pride as he was the only Dayak to become District Head during the Suharto era. It is obvious that Dayak have a positive attitude towards him, because he was able to calm an angry crowd during the 1997 ethnic conflict between the Dayak and Madurese.

The Dayak's lack of political power during the Suharto regime was the result of the government's success in centralizing its power in Jakarta and marginalizing local powers. Although the Dayak are the indigenous peoples of Kalimantan, and make up 41% of the population of West Kalimantan, their political role has been very small, in terms of the number of Dayak people that hold a position in government.

Through various policies formulated by a government full of corruption, collusion, and nepotism, the state hegemony has protected the interests of the business conglomerates, Suharto's family and cronies, and the military, rather than the interests of the people. For many decades, the government's policies on forest management, religion, education, political activities, and other issues that directly touch the lives of the people created a disempowerment process. For the Dayak in Kalimantan, it caused the destruction of their environment, loss of their land and forest, disempowerment of their local *adat* institutions, destruction of their culture, and the creation of uncertainty with regards to their future as indigenous peoples in Kalimantan.

THREATS AND CRISES

The process of disempowerment and marginalization has turned the Dayak's cultural values upside-down and created an unsafe society. What was good in their culture before now has become bad; what was right has become wrong, and what was wise is unwise. This situation has created an uncertainty with regards to the future; as a result the Dayak have become very vulnerable and sensitive. When the Dayak culture interacts with another ethnicity that coincidentally has opposing cultural values, such as the Madurese, violence is regarded as the easy solution. The situation deteriorates when there is no law enforcement and politics become involved in the various ethnic conflicts that occur.

The government's systematic policies aimed at the destruction of Dayak culture and local institutions have resulted in massive devastation of natural resources and the environment on one hand, and paralyzed of the Dayak's economic and political life on the other. The destruction of Dayak culture is due to five dominant factors: big religions, destruction of longhouses, formal education, media technologies, and government's policies on natural resources management. The role of local institutions

at the village level has been altered by the central government's policies on village regrouping that substantially changed the institution's structure and roles, and destroyed democracy in the village.

Dewan Adat (Adat Council) – The Government Vehicle to Disempower Dayak *Adat* Institutions

As the land became scarcer and the Dayak became more critical of government, and after many cases and bitter experiences concerning the government's programs on plantations and forest management, the government engineered the establishment of what they called *Dewan Adat* or "Adat Council" at District Level. The "Adat Council" is an institution that claims to be representative of the Dayak and a tool for improving Dayak rights. However, the government never consulted with the Dayak people, or the Dayak *adat* chiefs regarding the establishment of the council. The government appointed Dayak government officers and politicians to sit in the "Adat Council," complete with titles.

After several "Adat Councils" had been established and had started work, it became very obvious that their mission was not to empower the Dayak but to fight for the government's interests—especially taking the land from the Dayak for various government programs. The works of the "Adat Council" included the organization of a meeting with the intent of persuading Dayak people whose land had been targeted to give their land for a palm-oil plantation project. The "Adat Council" also made a formal statement in front of high level government officials to condemn the indigenous farming activities and promised on behalf of the people to stop the practice because it destroyed the environment and was an unproductive economic activity. The "Adat Councils" also gave honorary *adat* titles to several ministers, governors and district heads and appointed them as Dayak paramount leaders.

Actions taken by the "Adat Council" have created anger among the Dayak. In Ketapang District, when the *Tolak Bala* ritual was held in 1998, the Dayak King (RHA), on behalf of the Dayak peoples from *Desa Sembilan Demung Sepuluh*, stated the Dayak people's rejection of the "Adat Council" and disbanded it. This statement of rejection, partly caused by various disappointments with the "Adat Council's" actions, was also triggered by the "Adat Council's" attitude toward the *Tolak Bala* ritual itself. The "Adat Council" fined the coordinator of the ritual according to their "pseudo-adat law" for not involving or informing them about the ritual being held.

This was a very naïve and childish action, since it countered the legitimate representatives and Dayak *adat* chiefs and shamans who came from all over Ketapang to protect the people from chaos and rioting, by holding the *Tolak Bala* ritual. Rioting was occurring almost everywhere in Indonesia as the direct impact of the economic crisis at that time. At the ritual, the Dayak King made his first public appearance after being marginalized by the government for forty years. Therefore, this ritual had two important meanings: to show the Dayak commitment to rejecting violence; and to re-affirm the Dayak King's role and existence in Dayak life. These two meanings also had a political effect that strengthened the existence of the Dayak in general.

It is therefore understandable why the government has been trying its best to marginalize the role of the Dayak King by introducing a new structure of pseudo-*adat* institutions. As the paramount *adat* leader, the RHA could be a serious threat to the government, as Dayak *adat* is still very strong. Under the Suharto government, the Dayak were aware that by maintaining the role of the King in their life they could be accused of being unfaithful to the government, thus turning the existence of the RHA into a political issue. From the King's perspective, he did not have any personal interest in maintaining his role since it was up to the Dayak people whether they wanted to preserve the tradition or not. The King believes that his role as the *adat* paramount leader of the Dayak and as the keeper of the *pusaka* is a situation that he can not reject or assume. He has no government or political power. All he has is the *pusaka* and its power to determine the harmony of nature with the people which he was destined to look after. Therefore, during the Suharto era, the King still regularly visited the Dayak in Meliau-Sanggau

District where he received fair treatment and homage. During the Suharto era, for most of the Dayak, the King only existed in history, not because they did not want to accept his role anymore, but because he just suddenly disappeared from their life.

Therefore, in the King's first public re-appearance in Tolak Bala Ritual, all the Dayak in Ketapang District reaffirmed their commitment to revitalize the role of the King. By rejecting and disbanding the government-sponsored "Adat Council" and deciding that the only valid *adat* institutions are those that are found in every village with the RHA as the *adat* paramount leader, the Dayak in Ketapang decided not to support any actions or activities taken by the so-called Adat Council.

A few years before the *Tolak Bala* ritual in Ketapang, the government supported the establishment of the *Majelis Adat Dayak* or Dayak Adat Assembly (DAA) by several Dayak academicians, government officers and politicians in Pontianak. The DAA was designed to be a central body that provides an umbrella to all "Adat Councils" in West Kalimantan. As noted earlier, first chairman elected was S. Jacobus Frans Layang, SH who was then appointed by the government as the District Head of Kapuas Hulu.

Big Religions – Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam

Big religions in Indonesia, especially Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam, contribute significantly to the destruction of Dayak culture. The Dayak beliefs were accused of being superstitious, demon worshipping, backward and uncivilized. According to J. J. Kusni, Ph.D., "The Christian proselytizers, shouldering what they called *la mission sacrée* of civilizing the savage peoples, saw the Dayak culture as obsolete yeast, worth disposing of. The 'obsolete yeast' concept tends to drain the Dayak of their culture and fill them with new values."¹⁸ These religions claimed to not only bring salvation, but they also were symbols of modernization, and thus justified the assimilation of the Dayaks into their religions. The case is worse when Dayak convert to Islam, because afterwards they tend to deny their identity as Dayak and considers themselves members of the Malay ethnic group.¹⁹

Compared to Catholicism, Protestantism is more incompatible with Dayak culture. In most cases, the Dayak who has become a Protestant follower has to abandon all Dayak culture and traditions because they are considered to be pagan beliefs. (However, they do not need to alter their ethnic identity, as is the case when converting to Islam.) A Protestant is no longer allowed to hold a Dayak wedding or funeral ritual. In one village used as a base by a Protestant mission, posters are plastered at the local church building to intimidate Dayaks from practicing their own cultural traditions. One such poster illustrates a path branching in two. The left is "the road to hell," with a picture of a Dayak ritual at the end of the road. The right is "the road to heaven," with a picture of modern life portrayed at the end of that road.

What the Catholics do is more sophisticated and diplomatic.²⁰ For instance, the Dayak ritual held to bless the paddy seeds and ask for good harvest from the spirits is changed into bringing the paddy seeds to the Church to be blessed by a priest during Sunday Mass. This new, Catholic ritual denies the Dayak's philosophy of being an integral part of nature. The wedding ritual of a Dayak couple who have become Catholic should be carried out after the wedding at the Church and not before it, as the Dayak wedding ritual is considered invalid. However, some parts of the ritual such as the smearing chicken blood to the forehead and cheeks of the married couple, which is the core of the ritual that validates the Dayak wedding, must be ignored since it is considered to be a pagan practice. The cemetery for the Dayak who died as a Catholic is different from those who did not, even if they were members of the same family.

Educational opportunities and better health care are also used as a means to convert the Dayak into Christians. In fact, the first activity of the Christian missionaries is either to build a school or a

health care center or hospital. Scholarships are also provided for the Dayaks to be better educated outside Kalimantan. Priority is given to seminary study, which is at the university level with an eventual undergraduate degree. In many cases, the main motive in accepting these scholarships is to continue studying at higher level rather than to become priests.²¹

The Indonesian government makes use of the religion issue very well for their political interests. Indonesia even has a Department of Religions, one of the few in the world. The government has used religion as a tool to tame the people's political activities. Passing the authority of even God himself, the government states that there are only five true religions, and only these five exist in Indonesia. The Dayaks have to choose one of these five religions. Anyone who is not a follower of one of those religions is considered to be an Atheist or a Communist. Afraid of being labeled Atheist or Communist, many Dayak will say that they are Christians whether or not they believe in or obey its teachings. The law is oppressive in that it makes indigenous people embarrassed or scared to profess their true faith, their own indigenous beliefs.

The government's policy on religions, combined with the attitude of the religious proselytizers, has had a great impact on the Dayak. The number of shamans (ones who maintain the spirituality of the Dayak) has decreased significantly due to targeted accusations of lying and demon worshipping. These accusations are spread through all mediums: schools, Sunday mass, and church meetings, thus weakening the people's confidence in the role of shamans as the people who could solve their health problems.

It is encouraging that not all Christian pastors and priests have this negative attitude toward Dayak culture and traditions, especially because there are more and more Dayak who have become pastors and priests. Aware of the fact that many Dayak cultural values and teachings are compatible with Christian teachings, some Dayak pastors and priests are currently quite open to Dayak culture and traditions.

Formal and Informal Education

School is another institution used by government to marginalize the indigenous peoples in Indonesia. Formal education in Indonesia is cultural domination imposed by outsiders over the Dayak people. It lacks a local cultural base and drives the pupils towards careers as technocrats, and they adopt the idea of modernization as the only option for the better future of human beings. The cultural erosion process that the Dayak community is experiencing is believed to be one of the products of the formal education system.

Moreover, formal education in Indonesia has been engineered by the government to act as an effective tool to spread the political propaganda through various extra courses such as *Penataran P4* (Pancasila State Philosophy "Upgrading") that became obligatory in every level of formal education in Indonesia during the Suharto regime. Subjects such as civics and history—including the special subject of the history of the nation—have been used to spread lies and the cult of Suharto. Therefore, students are not able to think critically and analytically as a result of school education. On the contrary, it has become a process of colonization of mind and awareness.

Consequently, formal education has created a gap between the recipients of this formal education and their cultural roots. Children learn about trains, horses, fertilizer and pesticides, and foreign folk stories that are designed to make them believe that the Dayak culture is primitive and obsolete. Thus their understanding about what is a job and not, what is employment and unemployment, also changes. A job is defined as being a government officer or employee of a company; being a farmer or rubber tapper is never considered a job. This creates dependency rather than independence, and brain drains Dayak villages as more and more people of the younger generation look for jobs in towns or cities as hard

laborers. In Pontianak, for example, dozens of Dayak girls end up working in bars, *karaoke* joints and hotels.

Until 1994, the school curriculum was so homogenized and centralized that “local content” was not allowed to be taught. In 1994, the government introduced a new school curriculum, which required 20 % “local content.” However, “local” does not necessarily mean the local cultural heritage of the Dayak peoples. “Local” is defined in a manner that suits the propagandist agenda of a centralist government. Consequently, the lifestyles of many Dayak youth have significantly changed; their way of thinking has been badly co-opted. They are intrigued and swayed by modern, novel things from outside cultures, but on the other hand, they are not in a strong position to understand how harmful these things may be to Dayak values.

There have been many complaints from the elders that the younger generations who have studied at institutions of higher learning no longer respect the Dayak culture and traditions. Returning from school, the younger generation brings with them new and foreign concepts that view Dayak culture and way of life as obsolete. *Adat* laws that keep the Dayak cultural values alive have been translated into valuing money rather than moral guidelines. This becomes clear in cases of out-of-wedlock pregnancies. *Adat* law has defined certain rules and procedures that have to be obeyed in this situation. Due to the decreasing power of *adat* institution and the change of behavior of the younger generation regarding the *adat* laws, *adat* sanctions are increasingly measured in terms of monetary rather than cultural values. Thus, a man who makes a girl pregnant could escape from his moral responsibility by paying a certain amount of money. This change in values allows hidden prostitution within the Dayak community.



Figure 3.1 Satellite dish alongside a Dayak longhouse (photo courtesy of Patrick Breslin).

Media Influence on Values and Desires

The influence of media, especially television, is astonishing. It is not only replacing the community communication that occurs during leisure time in the evening, but it also introduces a new culture of modernization that changes people's perception of life. In villages where electricity is not yet available, people are willing to walk 5-7 kilometers to the neighboring village just to watch television programs in the evening. Armed with a flashlight, a torch, or neither, people—old and young, men and women—rush to the neighboring village as soon as they return from their farm.

Television has become a very effective media to brainwash the Dayak. The provincial state-run TV broadcasts a Dayak farmer's daughter who sings about regretting her destiny as a Dayak farmer who practices "shifting cultivation" that brought her and her family into suffering and misery. The government policy that encourages the Dayak to stop their indigenous farming system is also carried out by condemning this practice through other media such as newspapers and radio. By labeling the Dayak's farming system unproductive, traditional, and destructive, the government aims to stop the Dayak's dependence on their natural resources, thereby increasing the government's chances at successfully encouraging them to give up their land for conversion into various government projects, notably plantations. Although Suharto himself, in 1997, stated that the forest fires in Indonesia were not caused by "traditional" farmers but by the plantation companies, West Kalimantan local government still put the blame on the Dayak. Even this year, when the smog covered Kalimantan once again, the local government is still blaming the Dayak farmers although no farmers had started burning yet when the smog came.

Television programs are full of distortion and lies. Violence is introduced through movies as the only solution. TV series, a symbol of modernization and happiness, introduce glamorous and luxurious lifestyles. Through commercials, the audience is introduced to many "new needs" as a condition for living as modern people, which results in increased consumption.

The impacts are obvious. New cultural activities and products infiltrate the Dayak community, such as: birthday parties, which are unknown in Dayak culture; *karaoke*, which is changed into erotic dances; and cheap, low quality food. Cosmetics and perfumes are displayed in the local merchants' shops, and Dayak barter rubber or other valuable forest products for them. More villagers own chainsaws to get valuable timber, gold mining activities are adopted that use unsafe means of exploitation. Also, the people of the younger generation are beginning to involve themselves in crime, and they often end up working as hard laborers or prostitutes in nearby towns or cities. The perception of happiness and prosperity has changed. The possession of the material things promoted by the television commercials brings happiness and prosperity, not living in harmony with nature.

Longhouse Destruction

The longhouse is the basic element that supports the existence of the Dayak culture. The lifestyle of the longhouse keeps the spirits of solidarity and collectivity alive and it fosters the automatic transfer of knowledge between older and younger generations. When the Dayak still lived in longhouses, the spirit of solidarity was very strong, because communication had no barriers. Every important moment in life—such as a birth, a wedding, a sickness, or a death—was automatically shouldered together as if they were a big family. When one member of the longhouse caught an animal from hunting activities, the meat would be shared with all the longhouse members. The spirit of working collectively on their lands was also much stronger.

If Dayak lived in longhouses, they could easily gather together to discuss the various issues and problems encountered in their everyday lives. Collectivity would be guaranteed, and renewal of their culture would be secured. For example, after coming back from their farm, the inhabitants of a longhouse could gather in the verandah and discuss the problems and challenges they face. The elders could automatically transfer their knowledge of weaving, dancing, and storytelling to the younger generation. Everybody could easily take part in welcoming any visitors, which might include sharing dinner, since the inhabitants of a longhouse could easily bring their food directly from the [shared] kitchen and serve it together. Entertainment might follow to introduce the visitor to the culture of the community.

Another important benefit of living in longhouses is safety. The longhouse works as a community defense system from outsiders and intruders. Although there is no longer a threat from headhunters, the outsiders who come because of government-sponsored transmigration or spontaneous migration activities bring with them more property hunters (thieves and robbers). Longhouses are constructed with long columns or pillars that make them high from the ground, so they offer much better protection for the people living in them.

Unfortunately, since the 1960s the Indonesian government has destroyed longhouses. Afraid of the spirit of solidarity and unity that came from living within the Dayak's longhouses, the government accused the way of life in longhouses of being unhealthy, immoral, and similar to the way of life of Communists. Then the destruction started, and the Dayak were powerless to stop it, especially since there were Communist issues involved. In Ketapang, Sambas, Sanggau, and Sintang districts, longhouses no longer exist. The only longhouse in Pontianak district that is still maintained is in Sahapm, and this is only for the sake of tourism. There are still several longhouses in Kapuas Hulu, since it is located in a more remote area; also, the longhouse tradition of the Iban, Kayan and Kenyah Dayak is stronger and thus not able to be easily destroyed by the government.

The result of the change in the lifestyle from longhouse to single houses is very clear. The spirit of solidarity and unity among the Dayak people has been weakened. The destruction of longhouses in West Kalimantan also affected the *adat* institution. The chief of a longhouse who also acts as the head of the village government disappears when there is no longhouse. This has in turn changed the ways that decisions about resource management are made. Therefore, the destruction of longhouses has not only affected the spirit of solidarity, the transfer of indigenous knowledge and culture, and the village defense system, but it has also resulted in a major change in the livelihood of the Dayak.

Logging Concessions

Indonesian development policy has been designed to achieve high economic growth. This policy has resulted in development programs that ignore the environment, and cause heavy social and cultural costs. This policy lead to lack of people's participation and a lack of democracy.

After Suharto took over the government of Sukarno, economic development in Indonesia was fueled by foreign loans and paid for by massive exploitation of natural resources, especially timber. During the Suharto regime, Indonesia's foreign debt accumulated at the amount of US\$144 million, with the total net transfer/deficit of about US\$39 million for the period of 1991-1998 and almost Rp 9 billion for the period of 1966-1990.²² Suharto's mismanagement of Indonesia's economic and development paradigm has resulted in a deadly trap that has forced Indonesian people to pay the foreign debt which has turned into a capital flight to the borrowing countries at the amount of hundreds of billions of US dollars.

Foreign debts have led to massive deforestation at a rate of 1,314,700 hectares annually.²³ Kalimantan, which is very rich in timber, was Suharto's main target. In 1990, there were 575 logging concessions (HPH) in Indonesia, covering about 60 million hectares of forest with total production of 26

million cubic meters of wood. Of that number, 301 logging concessions operated in Kalimantan, occupying about 31 million hectares, more than 50% of the total forest concessions in Indonesia.²⁴ The total forest area in Kalimantan alone is about 45 million hectares. This means that almost 70% of the total forest areas or 92% of the total production and converted forest areas have been given to logging concessions.

There are 75 logging concessions that have operated in West Kalimantan since 1968. Of the 9 million hectares of forest area in West Kalimantan in 1967, twenty years later the forest areas have decreased 30%. The logging concessions hold 74% of the total forest areas of West Kalimantan or 47 % of the total area.²⁵ Ketapang District shares 535,184 ha logging areas that are operated by seven companies.

The timber will soon be gone if the current policy is not changed. Data shows that compared to ten years earlier, log production in West Kalimantan has decreased by more than 50% in 1996. This trend will put an end to West Kalimantan forests by the year 2020.²⁶

The impacts of logging operations are tremendous. In Ketapang district, logging activities have caused heavy soil erosion, flood and pollution. The logged over areas are also very prone to forest fires.

Oil Palm Plantations

After most forests in West Kalimantan had been cleared by logging operations, the government invited investors to convert the remaining West Kalimantan forests into oil palm and industrial tree plantations. The West Kalimantan local government reserved 3.2 million hectares for plantation projects to achieve the target of 10.9% annual economic growth for the period of 1994-1998. All these reserved areas are the Dayak's customary lands. There have been several warnings—including one from the JICA Research Team—that this policy will result in a heavy environmental load; among the concerns is the chemical pollution will flux into Kapuas River.²⁷ According to JICA's prediction of the environmental load that West Kalimantan would have to shoulder if the planned area of 871,807 hectares of the total 3.2million hectares was converted to oil-palm plantations, over 60 million tons of soil would be eroded a year, and thousands of tons of nutrients would be leached out from the fields.

Transmigration

Transmigration has social and ecological impacts. Transmigration programs also contribute to deforestation. Although the World Bank has stopped supporting transmigration programs, they have been combined with plantation projects to provide labor for plantation companies. The number of families that have moved to West Kalimantan since Repelita I have totaled 133,055. Through the PIR-TRANS scheme, every family that participates in transmigration will be given 2.5 hectares of land—in which 2 hectares are cultivated with oil palm trees and the other .5 hectare as an allowance for settlement and subsistence for one year. Many transmigrants have sold their plantations to local businessmen. Regardless, the government shows no inclination to change this policy.²⁸

If the Dayak elect to join a plantation, they have to give up 7 hectares of their land to the company, of which 2.5 hectares will be returned to them. Then they have to make payments for 20 years to cover the operational costs the company had spent for the plantation. This injustice and discriminatory treatment by the company towards the Dayak has created disappointment and social jealousy among the Dayak who joined the plantation. The total area of Dayak land taken by logging, plantations and transmigration programs has amounted to 1,143,170 hectares.²⁹

According to Morkes Efendi, the District Head of Ketapang, since March 2000, Ketapang has already opened up about 126,000 hectares of oil palm plantations, which is 13% of the total of about 982,000 hectares that was reserved for the forty-two plantation companies in this District. Ketapang has also received about 83,000 transmigrants—which is about equal to 10% of the total population. Although Ketapang only started receiving transmigrants during Repelita III (1979-1984), in the Repelita VI (1994 – 1999) this district received the biggest share with 45% or just over 38,000 transmigrants. The following reflect JICA’s comments on Transmigration Program and its impacts on the local people:

The typical scheme of transmigration [consists] of about 2,500 families [One Settlement Unit-SP constitutes of 500 households, and five SPs form one Area Development Unit-SKP], which occupies more than 10,000 ha of land. Since the existing village [*dusun*] is usually formed of 50-100 households, the impact of transmigration on the local villages is excessive.

Some transmigration sites also have been established by sacrificing the lands and lifestyle of the local people. There is a major negative and probably irreversible impact on indigenous [peoples] particular those who depend on the forest for their economic and spiritual livelihood. Some seek shelter in other places, others find employment opportunities in private companies, and still others are subsisting in small enclaves between transmigration sites and rubber plantations belonging to local smallholders or oil palm plantations. Since Repelita IV, the responsibility for land acquisition for transmigration sites has been given to the Governor. Though the system for land acquisition has been developed, there are still some unsettled problems over land between the government and the local people.³⁰

Disappointments in the system have manifested in protests, demonstrations and violence against the plantation companies all over Kalimantan. Attacks on companies’ offices, barracks and equipment by the local people have been occurring in almost every plantation company in West Kalimantan (see Appendix III).

The protests occurred because the operation of logging, plantation, and transmigration projects appropriated around 1,150,000 hectares of Dayak land; these operations have also destroyed their environment. In many cases, the companies not only take Dayak land for farming but also destroy their rubber gardens, fruit gardens and even cemeteries.³¹ Logging and plantation activities violate the previously mentioned Dayak Seven Principles in the Management of Natural Resources. The plantations, are monocultural, market-driven, individualistic, dependent on chemical substances, and do not involve *adat* in its activities; they have destroyed the very basic element of the Dayak’s identity: their culture. The position of the farmers as workers for the company has also weakened and decreased the role of *adat* institution. When the Dayak practice their own natural resources management system, it is the *adat* that governs their life based on their own culture and traditions. However, when they live as plantation farmers, it is the company that governs them.

Forest Fires

In 1997, the haze havoc caused by forest fires received international attention due to its regional effect and its duration. Southeast Asian countries including Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Thailand and Philippines protested to the Indonesian government—who was considered to be the problem maker, as fires destroyed over 177,000 hectares of forests (13.5% of which was in West Kalimantan). In West Kalimantan alone, officially, over 23,000 hectares of forest was destroyed by fire in 1997; the data cited by Kalimantan Review from Kadisbun Kalbar is even greater.³²

In 1997, the National Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) reported that there were 600 “hot spots” detected in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Java. In West Kalimantan those hot spots were found in

areas belong to logging concession, plantation, national park and transmigration settlements.³³ Although at that time President Suharto stated that the “traditional” farmers were not the party responsible for the fires, in West Kalimantan, the Head of the local Department of Forestry accused the farmers of being responsible. This triggered anger amongst the Dayak farmers who later fined the official, Ir. Karsan Sukardi, using *adat* law.³⁴

The local Forestry Department stated that before July 1997, there were thirteen oil palm companies that conducted land clearing, which covers an area of about 27,000 hectares. One can only imagine the results if this amount of forest was to be burned all at once in a land-clearing activity. The haze has caused tremendous impacts to the economy and the health of the region. In Ketapang district, forest fires have caused subsequent hardships on the local population, as it was the impetus for a grasshopper plague. The dust particles which measured 123.72 micrograms per cubic meter in July, increased to 1,890 micrograms per cubic meter in October—37.8 times the normal level of 0-50 microgram per cubic meter. This means that the haze effect for a human being would be equal to smoking 189 cigarettes a day!

The condition of the villages surrounding the burned forest was far worse. Although no research has been conducted to measure the concentration of dust particles in the villages, it is easy to imagine how the condition would be far worse than in towns and cities. Fires destroyed thousands of hectares of rice field areas, primary forests, rubber gardens, fallow forests, sacred sites, grave yards and fruit gardens.

In Pontianak, the capital of West Kalimantan province, Supadio Airport was closed from September to October 1997 due to poor visibility. The loss caused by the closing of the airport was estimated to be around Rp 1 billion per day. The haze also created problems for sea and water transportation. Consequently, losses were incurred by various tourism businesses including, travel agencies, hotels, restaurants, and the entertainment industry.

As Indonesian Kalimantan suffered the severe forest fires, the Malaysian provinces of Sarawak and Sabah were also impacted. Like the governments of the major cities in Indonesian Kalimantan, the provincial government of Sarawak put schools on holidays. The federal government of Malaysia even planned to evacuate 2.3 million people in Sarawak to the Malay Peninsula if the haze condition did not change for the better. The Indonesian government responded to a very strong protest from Malaysia by sending 1,400 personnel of a fire brigade to help overcome the fire. The level of haze pollution in Kuching-Sarawak was reported to reach the level of 800 micrograms per cubic meter.

Due to poor management of the forest in Indonesia, forest fires continue to occur. In March 2000, NOAA detected at least fifty “hot spots” in West Kalimantan. The Standard Index of Air Pollution reached 280 microgram per cubic meter, and the visibility dropped to 100-800 meters. Although no flights were cancelled, the haze postponed flight schedules especially in the morning when the haze hit its peak. The local government found that eight logging concessions and industrial tree plantation companies had “hot spots” in their areas.³⁵

Grasshopper outbreak tragedy

A grasshopper outbreak occurred in Ketapang district after fires, logging and plantation companies destroyed the forests in this area. The plague originated in Kendawangan sub district, located in the southern part of Ketapang. According to the local people, the plague was triggered by PT. Alam Kendawangan Indah, which cut down the forests for a cocoa plantation in 1980. However, one year later, after the areas had been deforested, the company stopped its operation, claiming that they had gone bankrupt. This happened again in 1997, when PT Kertas Basuki Rahmat abandoned its area to *Imperata*

grass less than one year after they cleared the forests. The grasshopper population became uncontrollable and destroyed all productive crops belonging to the villagers.³⁶

The plague remained concentrated in one small area until the end of 1999, after fires destroyed most areas of Ketapang district during 1997-1999. The opening of the forests by plantation companies that used burning to clear land, has destroyed the remaining forests and provides routes for locust migration to surrounding areas. The elimination of the natural predators caused by fires has enabled grasshopper reproduction to become uncontrollable. The grasshoppers of *Locusta Migratoria* species have now spread to eight of the fifteen sub-districts in Ketapang district.

By the time of the locust attack in 1999, local farmers suffered a harvest failure due to forest fires, the long drought, and the El Niño effect in the previous years (1997-1998) that had already created a food crisis in the entire area. The local government attempted to control the locusts using a variety of methods; for instance, they sprayed Mivsin 50WP insecticide in some areas. Unfortunately, the population level and the reproduction rate of the grasshoppers was too high and too fast for the government to be able to give proper treatment to the vast areas that covered all eight sub-districts. The local government has also tried using another method; they encouraged the local people to catch the grasshoppers manually, and in return provided Rp 1,000 per kilogram as incentive for their effort. About 25 tons of grasshoppers have been killed so far using this method, but the locusts are still unable to be controlled.

The local people themselves have tried using any and all cultural methods they know including performing various rituals. Most of these rituals require solid co-operation from the entire community since they involve fasting, taboos, and several activities that are forbidden during and a few days following the rituals. However, this method is not always effective anymore since the members of the communities are now heterogeneous; migrants do not always abide by the local beliefs. The government's negative policy toward the indigenous peoples in Indonesia has caused a decline in indigenous beliefs by the younger generation of Dayak.

Most of the Dayak in Ketapang believe that this plague is nature's revenge. The grasshopper tragedy in Ketapang is a very good example of how nature has reacted against unfair and unfriendly treatment by human beings due the loss of forests, destruction of natural resources by fires and deterioration of indigenous belief. The Christian Dayak believe this tragedy is comparable to when the Israelites faced the ten calamities in their journey back to the land of Canaan.

Roads and Highways

On one hand, road construction has increased interaction between the Dayak people and the outside world. On the other hand, new infrastructure—especially roads—has accelerated the destruction of Dayak culture and natural resources. Road construction has allowed companies and investors easier access to remote areas to do their business. The roads are created to enable company's trucks, bulldozers, cars, and other heavy equipment to carry out exploitation activities, or to compensate for a company's operation in that area. Roads are not made for the Dayak. In fact, most Dayak do not own cars, trucks, bicycles, or motorbikes. However, they have to give up their land and natural resources for the roads.

The other negative impacts of the road construction include various accidents that occur in logging or plantation areas. Heavy machinery that operate everyday to transport logs in logging areas have their own traffic rules that are different from the standard ones in the country. When an accident happens, the company is not always willing to pay the *adat* fines.

DAYAK RESPONSES TO THESE THREATS

The revival of the Dayak began with what is referred to as the Pancur Kasih Movement by inventing a new strategy and approach in their struggle. The integrative approach covers ten areas: critical education, community organizing, cultural empowerment, community-based natural resource management, financial sustainability, community-based economy, gender, social security, socialization of ideas, and networking (see Appendix I).

The Pancur Kasih Foundation (PK) was established in 1981 by teachers working at church-run schools in Pontianak. A.R. Mecer, a Krio Dayak from Ketapang, was the most important figure behind the establishment of PK. With several other fellow teachers and a priest, Mecer believed that the struggle for better conditions for the Dayak's had to be done within the spirit of solidarity and self-reliance as well as with a strong cultural base.

Dayak Schools

The first activity of PK was to establish a formal school. There was no alternative under Suharto's strong political oppression; establishing a school using the Dayak's own potentials as teachers to build critical awareness—rather than to generate income from the school fees—was to struggle against this oppression. So, it was the Dayak empowering the Dayak. It involves two key principles: self-reliance and solidarity. The PK founding fathers believed that thinking critically was key to freedom and empowerment.

This spirit of self-reliance was the only asset owned by PK when it was established. They established a junior high school although they did yet not have the school facilities. They ran the school at an elementary school building (owned by the Catholic Brothers Mission in Pontianak) in the afternoon after the elementary school activities were complete. The teachers of the school did not receive any salary since all of them were PK founders. All the money they received from school fees was saved to construct future school buildings. Their income came from the salary they earned teaching at other schools.

In 1985, Pancur Kasih facilitated the establishment of six other schools in interior areas. Instead of running those schools directly under its umbrella, PK adopted the policy of enabling the schools to become self-reliant and to run on their own.

Dayak Credit Unions and Bank

The second field in which PK intervened was the economic field. This commenced in 1987 with the establishment of Credit Union (CU) Pancur Kasih. Initially the CU was established to meet the demand of PK's activists for easy-to-access credit with low interest. However, CU has since developed into a vital financial institution, not only for PK, but also for the people in West Kalimantan.

The Catholic Church had initiated a CU movement in 1975, and established approximately eighty CUs throughout West Kalimantan. However, by 1980, only five CUs remained. The rest collapsed or went bankrupt, due to mis-management and misunderstandings about the CU. This proved to be a traumatic experience in many Dayak communities that later created numerous difficulties for PK in their struggle to regain people's trust and confidence in credit unions.

When it was first established, CU PK had only 61 members with the total asset of Rp 617, 000. Now, after twelve years it has over ten thousand members with total assets of over Rp 8 billion and an

average monthly income of Rp 150 million. Although CU PK was not the first CU to be established in West Kalimantan, it has become the most successful CU, not only in West Kalimantan but also in Indonesia. The reputation of CU PK as the biggest and one of the most successful CUs is not only recognized by NGOs but also by the government. This can be seen through the legal standing of this CU, as well as the statement by the head of the local Department of Co-operatives during the members' annual meeting in February 1998 that CU PK is the healthiest credit co-operative. The heavy demand for facilitation by PK from various communities in Kalimantan as well as other parts of Indonesia cannot be separated from PK's reputation in running its programs successfully, most notably CU.

The role of CU as a supporting institution for PK is central to this movement. In 1992, a Rural Bank (BPR PAN BANK) was established by more than 200 CU members. They borrowed money from the CU as the initial asset of the bank. BPR PAN-BANK (*Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Pancur Banua Katulistiwa*) provides small business loans to the rural community to facilitate the empowerment of the people's economic livelihood. Although BPR PAN-BANK comes under the authority of the Central Bank (as do all other Indonesian banks), with total assets in excess of Rp 1 billion, it has received a clean bill of health in recent reports. BPR PAN-BANK also avoids the threats to other banks from the IMF reforms, as it is only involved in local lending.

With its Empowerment of Community-Based Economy Program, PK has facilitated the establishment of fifteen CUs in West Kalimantan since 1995, with the accumulation of assets to around Rp 12 billion with seventeen thousand members. Communities, not PK, run these CUs. The role of PK is to provide technical assistance in skills and consultancy to the local people. Now PK is also assisting other indigenous peoples outside of West Kalimantan, and as a result, two CUs were recently established by the local people in Siberut-Sumatra and Siang Murung-Central Kalimantan.

The core of the CU movement is not financial management but an educational process aimed at a mental and attitudinal change. The process leads to a strong spirit of solidarity and togetherness among its members with regards to solving their financial problems. The key word is EDUCATION and the motto is: "The CU has started, developed, controlled and depended on, EDUCATION."

Institut Dayakologi

In the late eighties, under the PK Department of Research and Development, an informal study group was established by Pancur Kasih to discuss cultural and political issues affecting the Dayak peoples. The subjects discussed by the study group attracted much attention within Dayak communities, especially the subjects concerning the impact of various Government Development Programs on the livelihood of Dayak peoples. Subsequently, there was public demand to formalize the study group into an official institution. In 1991, Pancur Kasih established the Institute of Dayakology Research and Development (IDRD).

Considering that IDRD might touch a wide range of issues, including those critical to the government, the Institute was established under LP3S-Jakarta's umbrella. There was an agreement between IDRD and the national NGO LP3S that LP3S only provide legal standing to IDRD. Although, IDRD serves as LP3S's branch board for West Kalimantan, in all its programs and policies IDRD is independent from LP3S. This is a strategy PK applied in its struggle so that if one unit of its struggle were to be affected by the government's repressive policy, other units would not be affected directly.

IDRD was established to aid in the struggle to preserve Dayak culture and knowledge in order that it be acknowledged, respected and valued by outsiders, and certainly by the Dayak communities themselves. The focus is on culture, as this is what relates directly to the identity and dignity of the Dayak. IDRD, which has since changed its name to Institut Dayakologi, runs programs on

documentation of Dayak oral traditions, researches Dayak culture, publishes books and a monthly magazine, Kalimantan Review, facilitates the tutorial of oral traditions at schools by local experts, and runs a radio program in the Dayak Kanayatn languages.

Dayak Legal Aid

PK was also responsible for the establishment of Lembaga Bela Banua Talino (LBBT) in 1993 in West Kalimantan, and Lembaga Bina Benua Puti Jaji (LBPPJ) in East Kalimantan. In establishing these two institutions, PK co-operated with IDRD and Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) Jakarta. These NGOs evolved out of a researched need for community legal empowerment, particularly with respect to Land Rights Cases. These institutions aim to revitalize indigenous law systems and empower the community through paralegal training and community organizing activities.

Dayak Forest Rights Advocacy

SHK (Community Based Forest System Management) is another Dayak organization that was initiated by Pancur Kasih, IDRD and LBBT to promote indigenous sustainable Dayak practices for community forest management. This institution focuses on the advocacy of Dayak natural resource management systems and Dayak rights over the management of their territory. As the government's policy on resource management has proven to be destructive and unsustainable, SHK offers other alternatives based in indigenous knowledge and wisdom. SHK has established a network of NGOs at the national level to join hands in carrying out advocacy works.

Dayak Maps

Communities have also been strengthened through participatory mapping projects. Pancur Kasih facilitates community mapping to document Dayak land and natural resource use based on indigenous knowledge and wisdom. Community mapping enables the Dayak to speak out with greater clarity and strength about their natural resource rights, demanding that they be respected and protected. This is essential to guarantee environmental conservation and prosperity, both now and in the future. Up to present time, PK has facilitated the mapping of 112 villages throughout Kalimantan. In carrying out mapping activities, PK, through its unit PPSDAK, conducts ten steps which enable the local community to participate fully in the mapping process. Through the Community Mappers (CM), selected and trained among the local communities, PK socializes the program and facilitates all necessary preparation in carrying out the mapping process. In the future, the implementation of this project will be handed over to the local communities through their respective CMs while PK fulfills the role of quality control. They plan to establish at least one service point in every district so that the mapping program can be fully managed within the local community.

Tapang Sambas is one of many villages which could provide an example of how mapping activity has contributed to empowerment of local communities in the management of their natural resources. After creating eight different maps (land use, animals, trees, rivers, sacred areas/cemetery ground, settlement, topography, and three-dimensional) of Tapang Sambas, the local community discovered a lack of land area available for use as a dry paddy field. On the other hand, the people realized that there was great potential for developing wet paddy fields. Conscious of their inexperience with wet paddy management, the people asked PK to facilitate them in an apprenticeship program for two different agricultural areas in Pontianak District. In Senakin, they learned farming techniques using chemical substances. In Sidas Daya, they learned development of indigenous technology using non-chemical substances. They chose the non-chemical system and started developing it in Tapang Sambas. Currently there are two farmer groups consisting of forty families working on non-chemical wet paddy fields.

The role of the maps for future empowerment of the Dayak is very significant. The Indonesian government recently launched a project to recognize the existence of the indigenous peoples, provided that they had *adat* territory, *adat* institution and *adat* laws. The role of the map as a tool to prove the existence of *adat* territory is a very important contribution to the recognition of Dayak indigenous rights.

Dayak Scholarships

In 1986 PK co-operated with World Vision International (WVI) of the United States to provide scholarships for school children. PK has provided scholarship for about three hundred children in Pontianak District. It is interesting how PK has managed the scholarships; the money is not given directly to the children but, instead kept as savings in the CU. These savings are in the parents' names so that the family can borrow money from the CU either to pay for the children's school fees or to conduct other business to increase the family income for the benefit of the children. At least two benefits result from this form of management. First, the scholarship is not spent at once but accumulated as a saving. Second, both the children and the family benefit from the fund. The scholarship amount varies from Rp 3,000 for pre-school children, Rp 3,500 for elementary school students, Rp 5,000 for junior high school students, Rp 6,000 for senior high school students and Rp 15,000 for university students. This project has funded five students' studies at the university level. This collaboration is seen by the WVI as very successful. Therefore, they have signed a contract for another 10 years, which will end in the year 2006.

PK also manages a Critical Education Program. The program has two objectives: to provide scholarship for studying at universities; and to join various courses provided by PK for empowerment purposes—such as social analysis, critical thinking, paralegal training, CU management, and mapping activities. The scholarship fund is collected mainly from its members, with extra financial support from donors for the management of the fund.

Dayak Rubber Cooperative

Rubber is considered the primary commercial crop to most Dayak in Kalimantan and is the main source of cash income. Although the tapping of rubber has provided opportunities for Dayak communities to enjoy necessary social benefits otherwise denied to marginalized peoples—such as enabling their children to obtain higher education—the industry is controlled by outsiders who pay the Dayak very little for their labors.

Managing the natural rubber gardens is in line with the indigenous Dayak ways of extracting natural resources. Natural rubber trees grow together with other natural trees and plants that are useful for the Dayak people. Given that the Dayak are socially, culturally and economically dependent on the biodiversity of their surroundings, any attempt to increase the income from rubber marketing would also protect the biodiversity of the naturally managed rubber gardens.

PK has been involved in the establishment of Pancur Dangeri, a West Kalimantan-wide cooperative for Dayak rubber farmers. This program aims to organize thirty thousand Dayak farmers into the Cooperative for the purpose of establishing a sustainable forest management program based on local rubber production. The vision of this program is to recover the economic dignity and sovereignty of Dayak people and to establish a permanent model of community control of natural resources—from the growing to the extraction process as well as the marketing. At the same time, this project will also prove that the indigenous Dayak ways of managing natural resources are both sustainable and productive.

Dayak Inter-ethnic Peace Initiatives

The ethnic conflict in West Kalimantan, especially between the Dayak and the Madurese has been latent over the years. Triggered by the burning of Pancur Kasih and CU offices in Pontianak and by the killing of Dayak by the Madurese during a road block set up by the Madurese in Peniraman (about 45 km from Pontianak), the Dayak in the villages, for the eleventh time in history, declared a war with the Madurese.³⁷ From late 1996 until early 1999, the world was shocked by a tragedy in which hundreds if not thousands of people were killed in the worst Dayak-Madurese conflict in West Kalimantan.

It is interesting how PK became one of the targets of attack by the Madurese, because PK has never involved itself—directly or indirectly—in any conflict that occurs.³⁸ Surely, PK has been seen as the symbol of Dayak existence in West Kalimantan, and therefore, an attack on PK could be seen as an attack on the Dayak peoples as a whole. This exemplifies the degree to which PK is rooted in the Dayak communities.

Ever since it was established, PK—with other organizations it has initiated—has chosen a non-violent approach to its struggle. This principle is clearly seen in the consortium’s vision that stresses the words LOVE and SOLIDARITY. All of their programs have been formulated based on respect for human dignity, tolerance, and the protection of human rights.

This spirit of love and solidarity is reflected in PK’s struggle in people-based economic development, such as the CU and its programs in education (the formal schools, ADP with the WVI, and the scholarship programs). None of its programs encourage ethnic exclusiveness. Although currently no Madurese are yet involved in the decision making body of the organization, other ethnic groups such as Javanese, Flores and Chinese can be found within this organization.

PK joined the forum set up by NGOs in Pontianak to open a dialogue between Dayak and Madurese intellectuals and prominent figures to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, although later it became apparent that the forum was powerless to address such a wide-scale conflict.

Dayak Solidarity with Other Indigenous Peoples

Although the institutions PK has initiated are all legally independent (ID, LBBT, PAN BANK, CU PK) and stand as a separate institutions, PK has the obligation to ensure that these institutions work within the same vision and not against it (Appendix I).

Therefore in 1996, all of these institutions, including PK, founded KPMD (*Konsorsium Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Dayak*) or the Consortium for the Empowerment of Dayak Peoples. This consortium functions as the coordination and networking body for its members in their struggle. A vision was then formulated: “The indigenous peoples, especially the Dayaks in Kalimantan, are able to determine and manage their own social, cultural, economic and political lives, towards self-reliance in solidarity, under the spirit of love, to regain their identity, dignity and sovereignty.”

The Consortium started with five members: PK, ID, LBBT, BPR PAN BNK and CU PK. AMA Kalbar, CU Keling Kumang, YBSD and Yayasan Hatan Tiring in Central Kalimantan have since joined. The Consortium monitors the programs and policies of its members to ensure they are in agreement with the vision of the consortium, not against it. The Consortium is able to cancel the membership of a member institution if it violates the vision. And if expelled, the expelled member could no longer access various services provided by the consortium.

In the future, the Consortium plans to manage the various welfare programs, currently handled by PK (e.g. Dayak Solidarity Fund, Health Insurance, Scholarship Program and Pension Plan). The Consortium is still limited to providing the forum where various policy concerns with relation to these programs are taken. The Consortium is also the arena where various members' programs are coordinated so that they coordinate with each other during implementation.

The role of PK in developing the NGO movement in Kalimantan and even in Indonesia is quite significant. On a regional level in Kalimantan, PK was involved in the establishment of Dayak Dynamic Network (JDD) and Kalimantan Human Rights Network (JAHAMKA). PK also co-founded the Borneo Indigenous Peoples Networking Program (BIPNP) that links NGOs working for Dayak peoples in Indonesia and Malaysia. At the national level, PK co-founded the Network for the Advocacy of Indigenous Peoples' Rights (JAPHAMA), the Consortium for Supporting Community-Based Forest System Management (KPSHK) and the Participatory Mapping Network (JKPP).

In the political arena, PK facilitated the establishment of West Kalimantan Indigenous Peoples Alliance (AMA Kalbar). AMA members are *adat* chiefs that represent Dayak from all over West Kalimantan. With other indigenous peoples from all over Indonesia, AMA Kalbar established AMAN or the Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago. The First Congress of AMAN was held in Jakarta in April 1999 as the first gathering of indigenous peoples from all over Indonesia in history. AMA Kalbar has also initiated a plan to establish a political party for indigenous peoples in Indonesia to accommodate the indigenous peoples' interests and to struggle for their rights through political channels.

Notes for Chapter 3

1. John Bamba is an *adat* leader who also serves as the Director of Institut Dayakologi: Jalan Budi Utomo Block A3 No. 4, Pontianak 78241, West Kalimantan, Indonesia; Tel: 62-561-84567; Fax: 62-561-84566; Email: petinggi@gn.apc.org; <http://www.gn.apc.org/Dayakology>.

2. The seven principles are: (1) sustainability; (2) collectivity; (3) biodiversity; (4) subsistence; (5) organic; (6) rituality; and (7) customary laws. For an elaboration of these principles, see: “The Wisdom of the Dayak: Principles of Natural Resources Management,” *Kalimantan Review* (English Version) 1 (May 1998).

3. Sujarni Aloy, *Keragaman Bahasa Dayak Di Kalimantan Barat Berdasarkan Epistimologi Tradisional* (unpublished report, Pontianak: Institut Dayakologi, 1999).

4. Two mining companies from the United States conducted exploration activities for bauxite in Marau sub-district in the early 1970s.

5. This exception is most likely due to the influence from Central Kalimantan, as Sumanjawat is located close to the Delang-Lemandau area of Central Kalimantan. The *adat* institution structure in this village is also unique in that there was a village-level “king” called *Gehara* who had dominant power within his village. The *Gehara* acted as the highest leader of the village government, as well as of the *adat* institution. He owned all the village property and wealth, and he had slaves as well.

6. One exception is the Simpakng Dayak of Ketapang. While most of the Dayak of Ketapang fall into the Melayic language group, the Simpakng Dayak speak a language that is considered Bidayuhic. Therefore, Simpakng culture and language are closer to those of the Dayak in the adjacent Sanggau district—especially the Pompakng Dayak. This difference in language helps to understand why the Simpakng Dayak have a different *adat* institution structure compared to other Dayak groups in the rest of Ketapang.

7. The Jalai Dayak in Tanjung awarded the author the honorary title of *Urang Kayaq*, which is the third highest level after *Keputut* and *Cendagaq*.

8. A case of this kind occurred in Tangerang Village, Jelai Hulu Sub District last year. The head of the village group asked the *adat* chief to cancel an *adat* ritual, concerning an extramarital pregnancy that was to be performed in the village. Being the subordinate of the village head, the *adat* chief did not have enough power to object to the instruction. This case was motivated by the personal sentiment of the *Kepala Desa* towards the *adat* chief who did not support him in his re-election for the next term of office. By saying that the ritual was too late for the accused couple as the girl had given birth—which was groundless according to *adat* laws—the head of the village group used his power to humiliate and display his authority over the *adat* chief. This head of village group won during the election, but there was a small group of people in the village, including the *adat* chief and the head of the village, who lodged a protest to the District government and accused the head of the village group of corruption and using various government subsidies for his personal benefits. Although his re-appointment was postponed for almost one year, due to his strong lobby, which included bribery of the district authorities, he was finally sworn in again as the head of this village group.

9. The name of the present RHA is Singa Bansa. He is the sixth RHA, replacing his eldest brother who was holding the position temporarily until Singa Bansa was old enough to become RHA. Singa Bansa was only 25 years old when he was sworn in as RHA on June 25, 1997. The RHA position goes to the youngest son in the king’s family.

10. A *keris* is a knife that is usually crafted by an *empu* [a person who is specially trained in making *kerises*]. The *keris* has a spiritual and social significance. The *empu* goes through a prolonged process in order to mentally prepare himself for the creation of a *keris* that will be appropriate for its eventual owner. The *keris* itself is the main element of the *pusaka*. The Dayak believe that it can even determine the state of the world. According to Djuweng, “This piece of metal, according to Ajim, is about one hand span long (*jangkal*, about 20 cm) and about as broad as a *lalang* leaf (*Imperata* grass, about 1 cm). Oral [tradition] has it that, at the times of Tamongokng Ria

Bansa, the Koling Stick was broader, but it grew thinner as the years passed and more and more sins were committed. When the Koling Stick finally wears out, tradition states, the whole world will come to an end.” Stepanus Djuweng, “Dayak Kings among the Malay Sultans” (unpublished paper, 1993).

11. *Kalimantan Review* No.36, August 1998; Jakarta Post September 1998.

12. Thomas Tion Sution, “Kerajaan Hulu Aik dan Raja Singa Bansa,” *Kalimantan Review* 36 (1998).

13. Mark Cleary and Peter Eaton, *Borneo: Change and Development* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1992), 52-53, 57.

14. *Tabloid Bebas* 7 (July 1999).

15. *Kalimantan Review* 35 (July 1998).

16. The embryo of the party was initiated through the agreement made by Dayak schoolteachers in a meeting in Sanggau in 1941. The Catholic and Protestant churches were two important institutions that helped facilitate the formal education of Dayaks. As formal education is seen as one of the symbols of modernization, the Dayak were very proud to become schoolteachers. Many parents sent their children to teacher training schools, and many Dayak teachers were produced. The education received by the Dayak made them realize that to struggle for better conditions, they had to do it in the political arena as well.

17. After J.C. Oevang Oeray completed his term as Governor in 1966, there has not been another Dayak Governor of West Kalimantan.

18. *Kalimantan Review* (English Version) 1, (1999).

19. In West Kalimantan, a Malay is not only someone originally from another island but also a Dayak who has become a follower of Islam.

20. In 1992, one NGO was established by the Diocese of Ketapang through the Justice and Peace Program, Yayasan Triu Keadilan (YTK). The Diocese was afraid that advocacy work done by YTK would threaten the existence of the Church in the government’s eyes. Although YTK’s work was very significant, especially in representing local people who became the victims of plantation companies, this foundation collapsed in 1998 due to lack of financial resources previously provided by the Church. Dependency on the Church and a lack of human resources to build strong networks and raise funds seemed to be the cause of YTK’s disappearance.

21. Many Dayak priests resign after a few years of their service; some Dayak never become priests at all because they withdraw their prior commitment soon after completing their study at the seminary.

22. Topatimasang Roem, *Hutang Itu Hutang* (Jakarta: Insist Press, 1999), 57.

23. *Eran HPH dalam Pembangunan Ekonomi Regional Kaltim [The Roles of Logging in the Regional Economic Development of East Kalimantan]* (Jakarta: WALHI, n.d.), 18.

24. Mubayarto et al., eds, *Perekonomian Rakyat Kalimantan [Kalimantan People’s Economic Lives]*, (n.p., 1992), 259.

25. Syarif I. Aiqadrie, “Dampak Perusahaan Pemegang HPH dan Perkebunan terhadap Kehidupan Sosial Ekonomi dan Budaya Penduduk Setempat di Daerah Pedalaman Kalimantan Barat” [The Impacts of Logging Concessions and Plantation Projects to the Socio-Economic Livelihood of the Interior Areas in West Kalimantan] (paper presented at the National Seminar on Dayak Culture and the Dayak Cultural Expo, Pontianak, September 1999), 18.

26. See Roem, 7-15 for the prediction by JICA and BAPPENAS.
27. Kapuas is the longest river in Indonesia (1,143 km). JICA's is concerned because this river is very flat, with only 50 meters of elevation between Kapuas Hulu and Pontianak. The deforestation that has been carried out by logging operations that was followed by the planned 3.2 million ha set aside for plantations will cause a tremendous impact in the form of heavy soil erosion, flooding, and chemical pollution to the river.
28. *Pontianak Post*, 9 September 1999.
29. Of the total number of hectares of Dayak land appropriated by different projects in Ketapang District, 535,184 hectares has gone to logging concessions, 75,766 hectares has gone to plantations, and 532,220 hectares has gone to transmigration.
30. "The Development Study on Comprehensive Regional Development Plan for the Western Part of Kalimantan," *Interim Report-Sector Paper* (JICA and BAPPENAS, 1998).
31. *Kalimantan Review* 23 (July 1997).
32. *Kalimantan Review* reports that in September 1997, the total number of burned areas was 183,339 hectares total in Indonesia, comprising 71,777 hectares in Kalimantan.
33. Industrial tree plantation areas contributed 38.36% or the majority of the hot spots found in West Kalimantan, followed by oil palm plantations with 28.76%. Transmigration settlements contributed 9.59%.
34. Dayak farmers demonstrated in Karsan's office twice to lodge their protest and asked the seven *adat* chiefs representing all the districts in West Kalimantan to fine him using Kanayatn *adat* law known as *Capa Molot* [blasphemy]. See, *Kalimantan Review* 26 (October 1997): 14.
35. The companies that were found to have "hot spots" in their areas included: 1) PT. Bumi Pratama Khatulistiwa, a tree plantation company located in Pontianak; 2) PT. Aria Jaya, a logging concession located in Pontianak and Kapuas Hulu; 3) PT. Kayu Pesaguan, a logging concession located in Ketapang; 4) PT. Tanjungpura Bhakti, a logging concession in Sambas; 5) PT. Tawang Meranti, a logging concession in Kapuas Hulu; 6) PT. Tri Kaka, a logging concession in Kapuas Hulu; 7) PT. Hutan Raya Utama II, a logging concession in Pontianak; and 8) PT. Sinar West Kalimantan, a logging concession in Ketapang.
36. *Kalimantan Review* 53 (January 2000); *Kalimantan Review* 55 (March 2000).
37. While many people believed that the conflict has proven that the headhunting culture of the Dayak, still exists, others argued that the economic disparities between the indigenous Dayak and the migrant Madurese has become the cause behind the conflict. Whatever the analysis, it is obvious that the relationship between the two ethnicities is so vulnerable that a conflict could emerge any time.
38. Although the police summoned A.R. Mecer following the attack by the Madurese on the PK office, there was no evidence to connect PK with the emerging conflict.

4

Protecting and Regaining Dayak Lands through Community Mapping

Ita Natalia^{1, 2}**A WAY OF LIFE UNDER SIEGE**

Nature, the soil, the rivers, and the forest are perceived by the Dayak as a “common house,” where all beings are nurtured and protected. When beginning any natural resource management activity we always ask permission from the universe and all beings living and dead. The Dayak would not think of treating it exploitatively as the soil is our body, the rivers are our blood, and the forests are the breath of our life. These three elements give us our identity as Dayak people, give shape to our culture and beliefs, and also provide us with our livelihoods.

–John Bamba, 1998

In practice, the government of Indonesia has not respected indigenous rights over ancestral lands. Although the law formally recognizes these rights, the government has used and abused a clause in the 1960 Agrarian Law which states, “... indigenous law shall be recognized, providing this does not contradict national and state interests.” Based on this law the government has effectively divided West Kalimantan into a number of timber concessions, large-scale plantations, transmigration sites, and protected areas, without consulting the Dayak. This has resulted in the disempowerment of the Dayak people and their culture. Progressively they are being stripped of their basic means of existence – the forests and the lands, which they have inhabited since time immemorial.

The Dayak fear that the central government’s development program named KAPET—a program which is designed to reduce the development gap between East and West Indonesia—will further alienate them from their land and heritage. The KAPET program was inaugurated in 1996, the result of a presidential decree that is dedicated to the development of oil palm plantations, bauxite mining, rubber plantations, and industrial timber plantations. Despite the fact that recent research by JICA revealed that West Kalimantan soil is not favorable for oil palm growth, the KAPET program aims to develop 3.2 million hectares of palm plantations. There is no doubt that this KAPET plan will push the Dayak people further off of their lands.

Development began in 1962; the government ordered all longhouses in the area to be dismantled, deeming them to be old fashioned, unhealthy, prone to fires and a hindrance to development. The Indonesian government encouraged people to live in individual family houses instead. New villages were created by the government and all rules were made uniform. Law on Village Government No. 5, 1979 dismantled *adat* institutions and functions of indigenous leaders.

The government then formed puppet *adat* institutions and rulers by creating the *Dewan* and *Majelis Adat* at the sub-district, district, and provincial levels (all part of the government's structure of administration). Capital-intensive companies have repeatedly used the *Dewan* and *Majelis Adat* to spearhead land acquisition to convert Dayak territories into industrial wood and oil palm plantations. Big companies that have the backing of the government have been able to use these puppet *adat* institutions to work for their own interests.

For example, the district head of Sanggau, Baisoeni ZA, recently held the *Ngudas* (a traditional ritual carried out when a community or family is opening some land for agricultural use). This ritual attracts high-profile media coverage. He proclaimed that this was an *adat* ritual to signify *premah tanah* (the releasing of land), a local community act of handing over land to an industrial wood plantation coming into the area. In another case, a *Temenggung adat* (*adat* chief) handed over his *Mandau* (traditional dagger) to the district head and the director of PT Kebun Ganda Prima (a industrial timber concession holder) to signify the handing over of the communities lands. In fact, according to *adat* law a *Temenggung* has no rights over community land whatsoever—he only has the right to rule the *adat* community by implementing the *adat* rule.

Since Dayak people now live in individual houses, kinship within the Dayak communities has been radically reduced. Community meetings cannot be held as easily. They no longer feel the need to carry out any community work, and their lifestyles have become individualistic. Meanwhile, the younger generation is not able to learn the *adat* knowledge; new influences from outside are seen to be much more enticing. This social condition has worked very well in the interest of big investors coming to exploit the area. For example, many companies are able to hire *panglima perang* (Dayak warlords), to guard against any Dayak people who come into conflict with these companies.

Many Dayak feel that outsiders are wiser than they are. This leads them to believe that any development plans from outside must be good, and that these plans would not harm them. Self-confidence in planning their own lives has eroded, and people are often apathetic. When Dayak sell rubber or any other type of agro-forest product, when asked about the price they will often say, “it's up to you,” rather than asserting the price they expect.

Yet some communities have preserved their indigenous institutions and laws (e.g. Tapang Sambas/Tapang Kemayau, Koyub, Resak Balai, and Merbang). In these places, *adat* law prohibits the felling of trees in the *adat* forests without special permission. Wood can only be used by the local people, and must not be sold to outsiders. If one breaks this law, not only will the wood be confiscated, but the culprit will also receive *adat* punishment.

PARTICIPATORY COMMUNITY MAPPING: RE-ESTABLISHING ROOTS, REVITALIZING CULTURE

Faced with the deteriorating situation outlined above, some Dayak have decided to resist alienation and protect their lands for the future of their children and their love of the forest, lands, and rivers that are absolutely required to maintain the Dayak cultural identity.

Pancur Kasih has spearheaded the community mapping movement by creating a community mapping facilitation unit, PPSDAK (Strengthening Community Based Natural Resource Management) in 1994. The community mapping movement began in Sanggau in 1995, when people in the villages of Merbang, Menawai Tekam, and Tapang Sambas/Tapang Kemayau were faced with oil palm plantations steadily approaching to eat up their lands. One hundred forty-nine communities have already mapped their lands and forests. This chapter describes how the process of participatory mapping has helped these communities re-establish their roots.




Figure 4.1 Participatory Community Mapping Process.

Introducing the idea of community mapping

During the introductory phase, PPSDAK community organizers explain the mapping process. A meeting is held in which the entire community (old and young, men and women, boys and girls) is present—these meetings are named *musyawarah adat*. The meeting begins with a discussion concerning the problems and threats the community is facing. The community organizer will then describe the community mapping process and what these maps can do to help the community address their problems constructively. The community organizer is also careful to explain the threats that the community mapping exercise could bring to them. Then the community discusses whether or not they think community mapping is an effective means of addressing their problems. If they agree that community mapping is a positive option, they will write a formal request to be sent to PPSDAK Pancur Kasih, asking them to provide community mapping facilitators to work in their village.

Communicating mental maps

During the *musyawarah adat*, the community is divided into a number of groups based on age and gender. Each group delineates mental maps of their territory into sketches. These sketches are presented to the community and discussed. This exercise bridges the gender gap. Not surprisingly women, especially the elders, have a profound understanding of what exists on their lands and in their rivers. Knowledge concerning indigenous biodiversity is in their hands. The mapping process has also consistently revealed the wealth of knowledge held by Dayak women, who were never fully respected before. In fact, the majority of information concerning varieties of agricultural and medicinal plants is in the hands of Dayak women. The elder men hold the knowledge of the far boundaries. The young often do not have a good grasp of either, and gain a whole new wealth of knowledge through this process. This process has proven to be a powerful cultural revitalization exercise.

Discussing the idea with neighbors

Before community mapping commences in a community, another *musyawarah adat* is held. This time, the elders from all neighboring communities are invited to receive an explanation about the plans to map the community's lands. This phase is very important; it must be carried out with care, goodwill, and openness, in order to avoid conflict over boundaries in the future. Facilitators from PPSDAK are always

careful to ensure that all parties fully understand what they are getting into before commencing the mapping process. Once a common understanding has been reached, all neighboring communities will give their permission to a community to map its territory.

Mapping the lands

Everyone is involved in the mapping process. The facilitators from PPSDAK introduce and explain all the different tools that are used in the process. The community learns to blend the traditional and the modern constructively. Using modern technical tools like the compass and GIS, they physically revisit their mental maps.

An inter-generational learning process is set in motion. The young follow the old in order to write down all the information concerning the boundaries of different zones. At least seventeen distinct special zones have been identified and mapped during the community mapping processes in Sanggau. These special zones reflect how the Dayak people relate to their natural environment as well as the ecologically sound wisdom this relationship is based upon (see Box 4.1); this is information that the younger generation does not learn in school.

Developing the maps accurately

Data from the mapping exercise are taken to the PPSDAK workshop in Pontianak. Using the workshop facilities and the assistance of PPSDAK facilitators, chosen community representatives finalize the maps.

Clarifying results

Once the maps are completed, they are presented to the community. The community checks the accuracy of the map. Have any places been overlooked? Are any place names incorrect? Any mistakes are taken care of during this phase.

Signing the maps

When the maps have finally been completed, another *musyawarah adat* is held so that the maps can be signed and delivered into the hands of the community. Once again, the facilitator from PPSDAK Pancur Kasih reminds the community that they hold the rights over these maps, and that they made these maps of their own lands; therefore they should sign them. The acknowledgement of the ownership of the maps—and all the rights and responsibilities associated with this ownership—is finalized by the signing of the maps.

The entire mapping experience within Dayak communities has revealed the serious generation gaps that exist between the older generation and the young, especially concerning the knowledge of the history, territorial boundaries, ecology-based wisdom, and tradition in general. The process of producing maps has effectively bridged these gaps and calmed the fear of losing precious cultural information. Now all the people in the community are informed about their roots, their history, and their territory.

Box 4.1 Indigenous wise management systems reflected in land use patterns.

The following is an example from the community of Kotip in Sanggau:

- *Ompik Bonuh* – an area used for building houses; this area consists of houses, gardens, and a bathing area (usually by the river).
- *Rimba* – a protected ancient forest; no agricultural practices can be carried out in this area; community members, with permission, may collect building materials here that are to be used in the community; these materials should never go beyond the community or be sold.
- *Tawang* – a swampy area where a variety of grasses that are used for weaving grow; this area must be protected to ensure that the community may sustainably collect weaving materials for household use.
- *Dorik* – a forested area atop a hill; this area is protected to prevent landslides and to protect water.
- *Mih* – an area used for a *ladang* (an area where Dayak practice swidden agriculture); some communities also have *mpolai* areas which are smaller than *mih*, but fulfill the same land-use criteria.
- *Lobak* – a swamp area in a community used for wetland agriculture cultivation.
- *Jameh* – an area previously used for *ladang* agricultural cultivation.
- *Domun* – an area cultivated as a *ladang* once only; if it has been used as a *ladang* twice, it is referred to as *domun dodok*.
- *Tembawang* – an area where a cluster of houses or a house used to exist—it is usually full of fruit, nut, and other productive trees; the *tembawang* is usually owned collectively; there are also *tembawang* where gatherers and hunters had set up camp, these are named *tembawang pelaman*.
- *Agao* – a part of the forest where fruit trees grow in abundance; these are open for everyone to use.
- *Keramat* – a sacred place for the Mayau Dayak; this area may never be made into a *ladang*, as it is strictly protected and revered; each year a ceremony is held here to ask for protection of the entire community.
- *Podagi* – a sacred area with a totem pole; this is where the spirits of the ancestors dwell, a very revered area of the community; each year a traditional ritual is held to ask for the blessing of the spirits.
- *Pongharen* – an area where the community buries the dead.
- *Kubon Ping* – a community area where the rivers are used for transportation and water consumption.
- *Balhe Ponodat* – an area where a smith's workshop has been built; here, the community makes its *parang* (a sword), and other agricultural and household tools from iron.

MAKING COMMUNITY MAPS WORK

Using the maps to resist encroachment

After completing the community mapping process and producing modern maps, the community is better prepared to deal with outside forces that encroach on their lands. They know exactly what the outside maps say, and they have their own maps to inform these newcomers where boundaries actually

lie. The community of Tapang Sambas/Tapang Kemayau prevented the establishment of oil palm plantations based on the legitimacy of their community maps. Tapang Sambas/Tapang Kemayau is now an oasis of forest in the middle of oil palm plantations. They have managed to safeguard their tradition and territory due to their community maps and their strong ability to manage their economy. The community credit union, which has approximately one thousand members, owns assets amounting to over Rp 2 billion.³

Using maps to raise community awareness concerning the present condition of their natural resources

Without maps, communities often have a false sense of territorial security. Because the community envisions their territory in their mental maps to span vast areas of land they think there will be enough forest or land for their use, as well as for the use of concessionaires. Under this false belief, they happily hand over land to timber concessions or plantation developers. In one case, the government gave a plantation company permission to convert 100,000 hectares of land into oil palm plantations. Dayak communities were ordered to release 10,000 hectares from each community to support this plantation development plan. Many communities agreed to this plan, and were extremely shocked when mapping revealed their community covered less than 10,000 hectares—which meant they would lose their entire *adat* territory! Thanks to community mapping, many communities have been able to decline involvement in oil palm plantation development.

This false sense of security is also apparent with regards to the state of rivers and forests. Prior to mapping, communities believe their rivers and forests are fine. For example, in their minds, they have 100 hectares of forest, while in fact, only forty hectares are found. Where did the remaining sixty hectares go? The answer could be that they imagined more than they owned, or that the sixty hectares have become damaged. It is also often found that the biodiversity in these areas has been seriously reduced from what was remembered.

Using the maps to plan ecology and economy improvements

Armed with community maps, PPSDAK facilitates Natural Resource Management Workshops in Dayak communities. Using these maps, the community can readily identify which areas can still be improved to produce more cash, and which areas need more active protection, conservation, or even rehabilitation. Using “Productivity Accounting” (Box 4.2), one community calculated that they needed to increase rice production and also recognized that they had many swamps within their *adat* boundaries. They decided to send some farmers from their community to another area to learn wetland rice cultivation so they could experience with “wet rice” in their own community.

Interestingly, it is the women who insist on developing plans and rules for natural resource conservation and rehabilitation. The maps reveal both biological wealth and biological degradation in some areas. Women consistently insist that these impoverished areas become replenished, and they develop management plans and rules to implement them—for instance, rules about hunting in protected *adat* forests. They hold a wealth of knowledge concerning the different varieties of rice and which variety grows best where; they hold the knowledge of different edible grasses and medicinal plants. Through the community mapping process, it becomes clear which of these is still intact and what is extinct—for which rehabilitation work must be incorporated into improvement plans.



Figure 4.2 Surveying the land (photo courtesy of Pancur Kasih).

Using maps to provide input to the government regional planning process

According to Spatial Planning Law No. 24, 1992 and Government Regulation No. 69, 1996 communities may participate in the regional land use spatial planning process. PPSDAK Pancur Kasih has been encouraging local governments to refer to community maps in developing regional development plans in the form of a series of maps (land use plans for the sub-district, district, and regional level). PPSDAK has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the regional government in West Kalimantan to ensure that community maps are taken into consideration when government works on development plans. The program also facilitates continued open dialogue between communities and government.

Using maps to assert territorial rights

Communities in Sanggau have successfully used community maps to administer *adat* punishment to a number of timber concessions and plantation companies for trespassing and stealing timber on *adat* lands. The maps have also been used to reject conversion of *adat* lands into palm oil plantations and industrial timber estates.

Box 4.2 Productivity Accounting

By closely examining existing land use layout and practices, communities are encouraged to do some productivity accounting. How many rubber trees do we have on one hectare of land? How much is our daily income from this? How much can we get per month? If our *ladang* only yields enough rice to last us for nine to ten months, this means we will have to buy rice for two months. How much must we then save from our rubber trade to make up the difference? These questions encourage communities to think critically and look for ways to use their lands more productively.

Responding to questions concerning whether or not the traditional *tembawang* forest was more productive than an oil palm plantation, farmer communities came up with the following information:

The *tembawang* forest means:

- Low risk/ no risk of losing our lands.
- No risk of becoming inundated by debts needed to buy high energy agricultural inputs like chemical fertilizers and pesticides.
- We can sell our rubber to any shop we like.
- We can continuously receive an income from our rubber.
- We are independent; we don't have much of a risk of becoming victims of fraud.

Joining the palm oil plantation means:

- Each farmer must hand over seven hectares of land to the nucleus company. Only two hectares are returned to the farmer, therefore farmers lose land.
- Farmers become inundated with debt. They must receive credit from the nucleus company to purchase chemical fertilizers and pesticides for the oil palm plants. They then have to pay 30% from the oil palm harvest for fifteen years to the nucleus company before this debt is considered paid.
- The harvest from oil palm fields may only be sold to the nucleus company.
- The farmer must work first for three to four years before the plantation is ready to harvest.
- The farmer becomes extremely dependent on the nucleus company.

SPREADING THE WORD

To ensure self-reliance in community mapping, all communities that have been mapped join a mapping network named JPMAPP (Network of *Adat* Community Mappers). This network meets regularly to inform communities of changes in their areas. If necessary, they also exchange experiences and provide support when problems are encountered.

JPMAPP also organizes dialogue sessions with local governments. The main objective of these sessions is to gain formal recognition of their maps. These sessions have resulted in a number of sub-district and district heads signing community maps, which signifies local government recognition.

JPMAPP is also actively working to spread the word about community mapping. JPMAPP members encourage communities who have not mapped their lands to join in the movement. They also encourage self-financing of these activities.⁴



Figure 4.3 Mappers in West Kalimantan (photo courtesy of Pancur Kasih).

REVITALIZED ECOLOGICAL WISDOM

The Dayak have lived in Kalimantan since before the state of Indonesia existed. They have existed with their *adat* rules, institutions, and sustainable natural resource management systems. The Dayak have very strong cultural ties with the forest and thus have practiced a distinctive forest resource management system for centuries. The wisdom behind this practice has been recently revitalized during the community mapping process.

Traditionally, the Dayak maintain knowledge of sustainable natural resource management practices. Their traditional agriculture system evolves around five to fifteen-year rotations. Most tribes will analyze their soil after harvesting rice, and if they consider the soil to be too fragile to plant rice again, they will put it under a mix of rubber, fruits, nuts, and *rotan*. Only after the rubber and *rotan* are no longer productive will they plant rice in this area.

The Dayak forest resource system is based on an intricate land-use plan. Land use within a community's territory is based on values related to sustainability, collective kinship, biodiversity and subsistence derived from the *adat*.

CONCLUSION

Community mapping has assisted *adat* communities to cut through the labyrinth of Indonesia's elite politics that never really touches upon the lives of "small people." Political elites who live in big

cities do not see *adat* rights as something worth working for. This is true even though the country is riddled with conflicts over land when big projects for mining, plantations, and forest concessions come to remote areas.

Participatory mapping—which is based on universal values of human rights, the importance of local initiatives, and social justice—has proven to be a powerful tool to strengthen *adat* resistance and communities' ability to protect their rights over lands and their unique way of life. Communication between generations and the genders has improved, as have the ties between the younger Dayak generations and their roots—strengthening the pride of being Dayak.

Out of the forty-seven hundred communities that we aim to map throughout West Kalimantan, one hundred forty-nine have already been mapped. These communities cover an area of 700,000 hectares, and are spread through five of the eight districts that constitute West Kalimantan. Many more communities are requesting assistance, and the movement is growing stronger.

Notes for Chapter 4

1. Ita Natalia served as the Director of PPSDAK from 1998 to 1999. She adds, “With all love and respect to *Adat* communities that have been my teachers and will never dry up as fountains of knowledge to share...”

2. Translation assistance was provided by Chandra Kirana.

3. Two billion Indonesian rupiah is about US\$215,000 at the current exchange rate of Rp 9300 to US\$1. The exchange rate is very volatile, having dropped from Rp 2500 to US\$1 since 1996.

4. JPMAPP welcomes contributions but does not charge fees for facilitating mapping. It gets its travel and operational budget from Pancur Kasih. The percentages are indicative of how villages divide up their voluntary contributions for actual mapping work in their village. For example, if members of the village Tanjung contributed a total of Rp 1,000,000 to the mapping work, Rp 500,000 goes to daily expenses contributions for local mappers and mapping technicians from Pancur Kasih; Rp 250,000 contributes to expenses needed for two village members to come to town and work with PPSDAK to finalize the maps; Rp 250,000 goes to JPMAPP representatives in the village for follow up work. The fund is managed by PPSDAK as it has a larger pot of money for all the work mentioned above.

5

The Power of Networking: Building Force to Navigate Cross-Scale Turbulence Where Solo Efforts Fail

Antoinette G. Royo¹

During the last eight to ten years in Indonesia, an emerging “force” of environmental cum human rights NGOs has evolved. This force is a social movement. But “force” is a much more descriptive term, as it draws strength from locals—both NGOs and communities directly under threat—to influence a specific course of action that not only benefits the environment, but also creates broader political impact. The experiences from West Kalimantan show that local customary “*adat*” groups, working with local NGOs and supported by strong NGO networks ensure ecological resilience.

It begins with the defense of territorial integrity. In the Kalimantan experience of the last thirty years, defense is triggered by the entry of extractive natural resource concessions—mostly plantations and mines. Once exploitation had transgressed locally perceived values of sustainability, with clear indicators of degradation, the villagers began to take action. It is important to note that this action comes from the deep commitment to forestall total degradation and the equally strong belief in territorial integrity, both for the survival of their culture and their people. To be effective, defense must be strong. The communities’ strength is not only in numbers, but also in their ability to use customary *adat* rules to regulate behavior. This strength is also enhanced by their capacity to mobilize the skills of other groups to support their cause. When threatened indigenous communities mobilize support groups, the fight to assert their *adat* control over their land and resources becomes even more powerful.

The *masyarakat adat* (*adat* based communities) or *masyarakat hukum adat* (communities regulated by *adat* law) adhere to principles of stewardship. As caretakers of the land for the future generations, they do not see environment as separate from their own life and work. Thus advocacy for land rights encompasses their rights to coexistence and survival as a people. As the illustrative cases show, local communities take the process of reestablishing the rules that govern interactions with the environment seriously. To them, outsiders as well as insiders are bound by these rules. Although enforcement mechanisms have become increasingly complex, local communities believe that the strengthening and reestablishment of *adat* rules is the only chance for the environment, and therefore their cultures, to survive. Understanding this perception separates the real NGOs—those I refer to as the “force”—from the opportunists.

In this chapter, I will describe some of the efforts of local *adat* communities in West Kalimantan, to show where and how they use and protect *adat* land through village agreements and the critical role of local NGOs in facilitating these *adat* agreements. I will also outline how these initiatives strengthened other groups to form networks that spread outside of West Kalimantan to the national and international levels. I will use two examples of networking, namely the birth of the Indonesian indigenous peoples’ alliance, called “AMAN” (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara*—Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of the

Archipelago), and the mobilization of forces to address the forest fires that ravaged Kalimantan. Not only are these networks are changing behavior among NGOs, but they are also influencing government’s behavior in dealing with local communities.

Three prominent groups operate within different, but overlapping, fields in this social movement: (1) local community organizations or peoples’ organizations that draw from each others’ strengths and experiences; (2) non-governmental organizations (local or national groups) that work with locals; and (3) networks (local or national alliances) that strengthen capacity, improve strategies for action and facilitate communication across scale. The three are distinct.

The first set includes village-based groups characterized by their adherence to *adat* rules. In general, these groups take small, short term—and at times sporadic—actions to prevent direct harm to their environment and the violation of their rights. Their strength comes from the knowledge that they are victims (that their lives and livelihoods are at stake as a result of any random decision for environmental exploitation) and also from solidarity and skills sharing. The second set includes registered NGOs that have a clearly defined vision and mission; they are generally externally funded, and are directly or indirectly accountable to local partners. These NGOs implement programs or projects based on their understanding of the issues and problems facing villagers, and on their assessment of their roles. The third set includes formal or informal networks characterized by multiple players, skills, strategies and tactics that at the minimum share a common vision. Their advantage is in numbers and skills. This chapter will show the relationship among the three, and the lessons learned from this interaction.²




Figure 5.1 West Kalimantan Model of Civil Society Partnerships.

The interrelationships between villagers, their support organizations, the training resource groups (in this case, mappers and the mapping network), and the law and policy advocates are mutually supportive (Figure 5.1). The three communities are illustrative of the more than 160 village mapping initiatives in West Kalimantan.

VILLAGE INITIATIVES

What do villagers do when confronted by imminent danger to themselves and their environment? They adapt. The six villages in West Kalimantan included in this study all relied on *adat*. These villages identified the threats, including those caused by their own people, and decided to use the one thing they believed could bind each and every village member: *adat*. In these representative Dayak villages, use of *adat* ceremonies is commonplace. In activities like land clearing, planting, harvesting, and adapting to natural disasters, villagers conduct specific *adat* ceremonies to summon the spirits for help. These practices, although threatened with extinction by various dominant religions, carried over to present times. As recently as 1997, the wave of ethnic conflicts that rocked West Kalimantan revived Dayak rules of war. As a consequence, people renewed their adherence to Dayak *adat* in all aspects of life.

In the areas surrounding Pontianak, Sanggau and Ketapang Districts, *adat* rules the management of natural resources. Harvesting activities in primary forests, secondary forests, fallow land, fruit gardens, rubber gardens, honey tree farms, rice farms and swiddens, sacred places, public or village roads, rivers and watersheds are governed by *adat*. In these areas, since 1995, rules regarding natural resources management have been revived in twenty-one conservation agreements. The conservation agreements regulate use and access to natural resources both by villagers and outsiders. A sample agreement is shown in Box 5.1.

Box 5.1 Tanggerang *Adat* Village Agreement

- Disallow all logging, plantation, mining and transmigration projects inside the *adat* territory.
- Ban the use of chainsaws within *adat* areas, except to cut construction material for local housing, with permission from all five communities.
- Ban burning of forests.
- Ban felling of *kampung buah* [fruit tree clumps], except if located near homes and gravely endanger lives of villagers, or for *adat* purposes.
- Prohibit *menubak-menjanuk* [poisoning of rivers to catch fish] in the *adat* territory, except if *tubak* is conducted for *adat* ritual to summon rain during a long drought. In this case, an *adat* chief conducts the ceremony with village participation and warnings not to use the water are evident.
- Prohibit hunting of protected animals including birds like *tingang* [hornbill], other birds like *kakah*, *ruik*, *tiung*, *semialau*, and other animals like *kelimpiau* and *penagung*, [similar to large cats] and *orang hutan* [orangutan].
- Replant *kampung buah*, rubber farms, *sungkai*, ironwood and other plants that are useful to Dayak life.
- Ban acceptance of *suap* or *sogokan* [bribes], which cause the loss or defeat of village *adat* community.
- Disallow the sale of logs to outsiders.

The process leading to the Tanggerang Agreement began with mapping. Community members from six adjacent villages who participated in mapping found an increase in encroachments, highly eroded watersheds, loss of forests, piles of waste floating in main waterways, deteriorating health among villagers, and declining economic conditions. Representatives from each of the six villages, namely Tanjung, Sei Kiri, Pasir Mayang, Pangkalan Pakit, Penggerawan, and Lamboi met and drew up a joint agreement to bind all six adjacent villages as one unit. They agreed to protect rivers, watersheds, forests, and other remaining resources within that unit. In addition, they outlined management actions and a management plan that assigned tasks and contributions from each village. They vowed to “support customary and cultural practices for management and conservation of natural resources inside their *adat* area,” and imposed sanctions against violators.³

CRITICAL ROLE OF NGOs: TRAINING, COMMUNITY SUPPORT, AND LEGAL OPTIONS

Building partnerships is key. The West Kalimantan model in Figure 5.1 illustrates a similar process that now occurs with many groups all over Indonesia. Many NGOs drew on this model as a set of learning principles.⁴ First, the NGO should facilitate village to village interchange; second, the NGO should promote an accountable and independent relationship among and between village groups and between village groups and themselves; and third, the NGO should build from positive interaction between and among local, national, regional and international NGOs and networks.

A local NGO called Pancur Kasih (PK) has been a leader in this movement. Pancur Kasih facilitates development-oriented activities of Dayaks in remote villages in West Kalimantan. PK assisted the creation of many sister organizations that provide a range of services for Dayak groups; these include a group that structures cultural support, and a group that provides legal education and assistance in advocacy. PK manages these units as a consortium under the name *Konsorsium Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Dayak* (Consortium for the Empowerment of Dayak Peoples) or KPMD.⁵ In 1991, PK began to organize training programs to map *adat* territories and land use. The trainers included mappers from World Wide Fund for Nature-Indonesia,⁶ and some contacts from Canada through the Silva Forest Foundation.⁷ This training resulted in the formation of a technical mapping unit, PPSDAK, managed by other skilled Dayak members of Pancur Kasih.⁸ PPSDAK became the sole unit responsible for responding to village requests for mapping. It also specialized in facilitating planning for management of natural resources in the villages mapped. The village agreements and regulations cited above all came about with active facilitation from PPSDAK with participation from other units of Pancur Kasih. The Biodiversity Support Program project PeFoR supplemented costs for mapping more areas and training more individuals in 1994, including individuals in other NGOs outside of West Kalimantan. PeFoR also introduced these individuals to mappers in the Philippines, Latin America, Canada and the United States. From this interaction, Indonesians became much more aware of the usefulness of participatory mapping in land rights negotiations. These mappers decided to organize an Indonesia wide workshop that gave birth to the mapping network in Indonesia, *Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif* (JKPP) in 1995.

The number of village mappers continues to increase, resulting in a multiplier effect. More village mappers means more areas with increased village capacity to define its land use and territory, in a given period, with minimum NGO input. Many of those who used their maps to negotiate boundaries shared their experiences with others who came to Pancur Kasih to submit their requests for mapping. There is an increasing number of socially and politically aware villagers, armed only with their oral history of land use and mental maps. They realized that maps are communications and negotiating tools, as well as “evidence” of long-term occupation. This spatial information has also allowed villagers to make clearer demands from government and concessionaires.

Maps do not automatically secure community land. While mapping capacity developed, local communities needed to learn ways to negotiate their maps better. This becomes harder when a significant part of the villagers, who directly experienced unfair treatment from concessionaires, want to resist by force. The NGOs offer them strategies for alternative but peaceful means of resistance. These strategies include: negotiations with the local government for recognition of maps; sending a delegation of leaders to government offices; community organizing; paralegal training; and apprenticeships. The NGOs also provide analysis of impacts and assist in conflict resolution as mediators or expert advisers. But many times NGOs find they cannot impose their advice or analysis on villagers. On the other hand, once villagers decide to engage in confrontation, NGOs cannot stop them. Some of these cases included: community confiscation of logs or heavy equipment of loggers to stop them from cutting into *adat* forests;⁹ demanding payment of *adat* fines; holding logs to serve as collateral for the making of village roads;¹⁰ burning of base camps; and demonstrations leading to actual physical confrontation.¹¹

Many issues related to plantations and forestry are too complex and difficult for the NGOs to handle. Pancur Kasih sister NGOs manage by tapping into skills of other NGOs within and outside of the KPMD. This functions as a local network, which expands to invite other organizations to join the network or develop sister networks. For example, at field sites, PPSDAK works in tandem with other KPMD units and the local church or diocese. The local church then takes up the role of follow up meetings, negotiations or further support actions with villagers. The same pattern emerges with LBBT legal assistance and advocacy actions. LBBT invited other human rights-oriented groups to form a network to respond to many human-rights violations around West Kalimantan. Another example is the work of SHK West Kalimantan. This NGO organizes communities around community-managed forest systems recognition issues. SHK West Kalimantan also sets up links with broader local networks like *Forum Langit Biru* (Blue Skies Forum), which mobilized for in reaction to the forest fires and the resulting haze and *Jubah Hijau* (Green Robe Network), which pushes for community-oriented forest policies. These are examples of how KPMD networks and expands into other groups in West Kalimantan.

Besides providing technical credibility to communities, mapping is mainly a tool that NGOs use to involve more local people in advocacy. Mapping has proved to be an easy entry point for activities in new sites. At the same time, it links many NGOs within one geographic area together. This link comes with the awareness that a map is not an assurance of anything. Hence initiatives to develop village agreements or processes leading to developing new village regulations are important. Specifically, units of Pancur Kasih (mainly LBBT, ID, PPSDAK, SHK, Credit Union) form teams of facilitators. These teams function as mediators for a negotiation process for decision-making on natural resources use and conservation at the village level. These facilitators bring crucial information about relevant policies, laws and analysis of current events. Ongoing village visits and discussions lead to more politically aware local institutions, who in turn, are in the process of adapting to ecological conditions. This process assists villagers in making rational and informed decisions for taking action.

When the opportunity for advocacy at the national level presents itself, Pancur Kasih calls upon other NGOs outside of West Kalimantan for assistance. For example, Figure 5.2 illustrates how ELSAM handled legal analysis and policy advocacy in tandem with the local LBBT.¹² The Agrarian Reform Consortium¹³ (KPA) gave KPMD members and local government members field orientation sessions about the Decentralization Laws.¹⁴ It conducted a special training for local parliament in Sanggau, West Kalimantan on understanding and applying the Decentralization Law at the district and village levels. Other national networks, the Community Forest Systems Consortium (KPSHK) and Indonesian Tropical Institute (LATIN) handle forestry policy research and advocacy using information provided by local NGOs and networks.




Figure 5.2 Model of Civil Society Relationships with Government.

Where interactions with government occur, NGO support groups that interact directly with local groups (in this illustration, the community forest network, legal support group, credit union group, and Dayak research group) join with their counterparts to fortify their positions with government in a dialogue or a negotiation. The training resource groups, like the mapping unit and mapping network, the decentralization training groups maintain their technical assistance, while the policy and legal reform groups engage both national and local governments as policy experts and legal counsel for the local groups or NGOs. This type of model also describes the relationships and interactions of specific partners of the forest policy or legal advocacy groups, in their own spheres.

The social movement relates to government at the local and national levels (Figure 5.2). At the center are the village groups with their support network. The government is a necessary partner but falls within the “outer” circle. Comparing this model with the West Kalimantan partnership model (Figure 5.1), the second layer (community initiatives) and third layer (local support) merge, as alliances with government develop.

THE INTERFACE IN NETWORKS: SOCIAL MOVEMENT EXPANSION

Local NGOs need national support to strengthen local initiatives. The sphere wherein a national NGO network operates with its local counterparts is the “interface.” This interface occurs formally or informally. The important feature is inter-dependence among players.

There is strength in numbers. The political reason for forming networks and alliances is the ability to show force. Government and policy makers have systematically denied community rights and asserted control over *adat* territory.¹⁵ Forests are public domain, and anyone living in the forest zone is a squatter.¹⁶ A show of force should move policy makers to recognize *adat* rights.

The practical reason for networking is to tap diverse skills from multiple players to push for desired changes. In Indonesia, there are a number of strong NGO alliances. In the environment and human rights sectors, these are WALHI *Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia* (Indonesian Environment Forum), YLBHI *Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia* (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation),

JAPHAMA *Jaringan Pendukung Hak Masyarakat Adat* (Adat Community Rights Support Network), and JAGAT *Jaringan Gerakan Adat Nusa Tenggara Timor* (Network of Adat Community Movement of East Nusa Tenggara). There are others catching up like KPSHK *Konsorsium Pendukung Sistem Hutan Kerakyatan* (Community-managed Forest Systems Consortium), JKPP *Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif* (Participatory Mapping Consortium), ELSAM, KPA. The newer ones include FPK *Forum Petaupan Ketouan* (Natural Resources Forum in North Sulawesi), PRO-BELA *Jaringan Investigasi Hutan* (Forest Investigation Forum), Jaring-PELA *Jaringan Pesisir dan Laut* (Coastal and Marine Consortium), KONPENMA *Konsorsium Pendukung Masyarakat Adat* (Adat Community Supporters Consortium), JATAM *Jaringan Tambang* (Mining Network), AMAN *Aliansi Masyarakat Adat* (Adat Community Alliance). BSP-KEMALA supports many of the older and most of the newer networks mentioned. Nonetheless half of these networks are self-sustaining. BSP-KEMALA provides seed money for new community initiatives and expands networks with high potentials for cross learning.

The impetus for expanding networks and alliances became stronger when student alliance actions contributed to the removal of Suharto in mid-1998. Other factors included a failing economy, a corrupt system, and the attention received by mass-based non-governmental alliances protesting these conditions on behalf of the Indonesian people. The spectators, NGOs and villagers who witnessed this drama unfold on television and radio, received affirmation that mass mobilization and alliance-building are effective ways to assert their rights.

In the natural resource management arena, JKPP, KPSHK, and ELSAM together with WALHI led the process for the forming of a strong indigenous peoples network whose ultimate incentive is the protection of the land, sea, and environment for the survival of their own cultures. Immediately after Suharto stepped down, these networks positioned themselves to demand from government accountability for the destruction of forests and degradation of the environment. It mobilized groups to press for a dialogue at the Department of Forestry. The network was hastily named “KUDETA” and it issued a declaration called “Return Natural Resources to the People!”¹⁷ Although the name KUDETA was later dropped, this network of NGOs later branched out to two: the Communication Forum on Community Forestry or FKMM (supported mainly by the Ford Foundation), and the Natural Resources Management Network or PSDA (supported by USAID-Natural Resource Management Program). Both groups continue to press for changes in policy for sustainable natural resources use in Indonesia.

The only drastic modification of this model is when human rights violations occur in an area in which military heavily use their force to assist a concessionaire in question. In these cases, the partnership balance is upset, and a strong urgency to mobilize bursts forth from below. In this case, the training resource, and policy and legal options groups coalesce as one force with the local community and their local support groups. At these times, the local NGOs become direct targets, along with local communities, accused of subversion for resisting development. Although Suharto is no longer in power, this danger has not ebbed, but has instead become subtler.

RESPONDING TO CRISIS: BUILDING STRENGTH TO COMBAT FIRE UNDER A BLANKET OF SMOKE

During the drought and forest fires of 1997 and 1998, when an estimated ten million people in Sumatra and Kalimantan were threatened by upper respiratory diseases, hunger, and starvation, several NGOs showed deep concern over the complacency of the government. Many of those who directly dealt with communities affected by the fires had to respond using their own resources. Local networks for quick response developed. In Kalimantan, there was PLASMA in the eastern side and Pancur Kasih in the west.¹⁸ Their work involved two types of responses. On one hand, they organized local task forces to supply disaster relief, including masks, medicine, food and recovery measures to affected local communities. Their other challenge was to prevent conversion of the burned community rattan gardens

into plantations. They received reports from villagers that industrial tree plantation companies were quickly taking over razed community land for a minimum fee. They learned from experience that these deals often end up making local farmers into laborers on their own land. So, their work also involved documentation, ground truth missions, and negotiations with government over issues related to protection of Dayak villages forced off their land due to plantation fires. Emergency measures also included provisions for rice seedlings needed to replant the burned farms in the next planting season. Valuable crops and forests were burned, leaving vast numbers of local communities under threat of hunger and famine.

NGOs joined investigation teams to monitor the situation and to determine the causes of fires. Several coordination centers of NGOs and government were set up to monitor spread of forest fires and to provide quick response to calls for emergency assistance from local communities. Several hotlines were set up. A movement to drum up action to expose companies involved in forest fires developed. NGOs from Jakarta/Bogor, worked with local NGOs and networks and some sectors from the government. They used satellite imagery of the fires and succeeded in naming more than a hundred companies. According to Environment Minister Juwono, 65% of the fires have been caused by companies.¹⁹ The International Forest Fire Management (IFFM) project in Samarinda found fires raging in the concessions of fifteen oil-palm and timber companies.²⁰

Through the organization of Pancur Kasih, LBBT, ID, local WALHI secretariat and WALHI national secretariat, an NGO post was set up in West Kalimantan to handle haze disasters. This unit was composed of local *adat* communities around the areas under threat. The local *adat* communities enlisted through their local *adat* leaders or government officials who are either *adat* or non *adat* representatives. They called themselves *Forum Langit Biru* (Blue Skies Forum) to describe their aspiration to look up the bright blue skies without haze cover.

“Blue Skies” became the slogan to call on all affected people to work on conserving the forests, environment and biodiversity to maintain the balance of ecosystems that sustain life. The Blue Skies Forum effectively used the crisis surrounding the forest fires and haze to open discussion on how human abuse of nature can destroy ecosystem balance. Environmental consciousness spread very quickly, as more and more haze victims suffered upper respiratory tract diseases from the distant fires.

As accusations flew, blaming swidden agriculturists for starting the fires, *adat* ways became the focus of public debate across West Kalimantan. The Dayak community considered the accusations an affront to their culture. The Dayak leaders from six districts of West Kalimantan used Kanayatn *adat* law *Capa Molot* against their accusers.²¹ Dayak leaders asked the provincial police (KAPOLDA) to call the erring party to a hearing where the Dayak leaders used *adat* law. The government official concerned paid the *adat* sanction and apologized in public for his statements. The media all over Indonesia picked this up. As a result, many newspapers printed articles describing the ecologically appropriate Dayak land management practices followed into print.

The press also received a list of industrial tree plantation and logging concessions that were accused by the Forestry Department as responsible for the haze. The Forestry Department used satellite imageries of haze, overlaid with the maps of concession areas of companies, and field updates by NGOs to determine the culprits.²² Charges were filed against these companies but to no avail. The rule of law being weak in Indonesia, many of those who were accused managed to avoid responsibility once the haze dissipated. WALHI filed charges against eleven companies suspected of starting fires in East Kalimantan for environmental damage, based on information supplied by the local network of NGOs in East Kalimantan.

The NGO networks at local and national levels contributed to the quick spread of important information that improved public knowledge about the forest fires. The NGOs and many allies within government used this knowledge to shape policy regarding respect for traditional swidden agriculturists and regarding public accountability of erring forest concessionaires.

ALIANSI MASYARAKAT ADAT NUSANTARA (AMAN): BIRTH OF A NATIONWIDE INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT

In July 1998, two months after Suharto stepped down from power, a meeting of about three hundred Dayak representatives in Pontianak pressed for a halt to large-scale conversion of community managed lands to concessions (oil palm, industrial tree plantations, transmigration, mining). The aim of the meeting was to show how well the areas are managed by villagers, and to show the potential strength of a pan-Kalimantan alliance. The meeting was organized by PPSDAK and Pancur Kasih Consortium. Its purpose was to allow local communities who entered into agreements with their neighbors on common resource management sharing to exchange experiences and field notes with members of communities who had mapped their land use, boundaries, and other important village features. A handful of participants were local experts in traditional farming systems, in *tembawang* (highly diverse forest gardens), in medicinal plants, and in negotiating agreements and maps when there are conflicting claims and interests. From their field experiences, they agreed that Dayak traditional systems of resource management and land use are still strongly practiced, but are under threat.

This was followed by a gathering of local Dayak representatives in West Kalimantan to allow local peoples to tell the government directly about the social and political conditions in the villages. During Suharto's time, meetings like this rarely happened without arrests or other repercussions. The meeting made use of the political space of the reform period. It culminated in the sending of a delegation of Dayak leaders to the local government-planning agency, BAPPEDA. They talked about the need for the local government to seriously listen to the silent majority – the local Dayak people - in planning any kind of development in the area. The meeting also gave birth to the *Aliansi Masyarakat Adat* (Alliance of Adat Peoples in West Kalimantan) or AMA. This became the inspiration for NGOs to assist in the formation of the much-awaited Indonesia-wide alliance of indigenous peoples.

JKPP, working closely with JAPHAMA, KPSHK and WALHI, using AMA as an example, organized the regional preparations for a nationwide meeting of indigenous peoples. They formed the Steering Committee to galvanize preparations for the first ever National Congress of Indigenous Peoples—*Kongres Masyarakat Adat Nusantara* or KMAN—in March 1999. Network representatives from outer islands were: JAGAT, AMA, KONPENMA, and BAILEO. Those from Jakarta/Bogor were: JKPP, SHK, WALHI, JAPHAMA, JARING-PELA, KPA, Bioforum, INFID and JATAM. Other support organizations include: YLBHI, ELSAM, Telapak, LATIN, RMI, WARSI, Riau Mandiri, and Koslata. The Steering Committee elected an Organizing Committee that was responsible for implementing the planned Congress. No one ethnic group would dominate the representation of the indigenous peoples group in one area, which was pegged at the Provincial level. To avoid this pitfall, a local and regional meeting to select representatives was encouraged so that local groups could elect their representatives and decide on their key agenda for the Congress. At least nine regional meetings occurred in Papua, West Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, Aceh, West Sumatra, Jambi, Java (only once), East Nusa Tenggara and Maluku.²³

International support came in the form of solidarity messages, supplementary funding and direct participation of other donors like IWGIA (International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs), USAID-Natural Resources Management Program-EPIQ, BSP-KEMALA, International Center for Research in Agroforestry, Center for International Forestry Research, Coastal Resources Management Project, R. F. Kennedy Center for Human Rights, Down to Earth, and Philippine Indigenous Peoples Network. This

support assisted in establishing the *Kongres Masyarakat Adat Nusantara* as part of the international indigenous peoples' rights advocacy movement.

The First National Congress of Indigenous Peoples was a success. For the first time, almost five hundred representatives from approximately three hundred ethnic groups found a captive audience in the government for five straight days.²⁴ They spoke about forest, seas and coastal management systems, tenure rights, culture and history, and the problems they face in protecting their land and environment.

The representative from the State Ministry of Agrarian Affairs responded positively to local peoples' demands for land rights recognition. After the Congress, Agrarian Ministerial Decree No. 5, 1999 outlined ways in which a local *adat* community may possibly register its land claims to government. For the first time, this decree helped to popularize and legitimize government officials taking sides with marginalized ethnic groups. Six months after the Congress in Western Sumatra, the government showed some changes. It established the Mentawai District by decree.²⁵ In another case, park authorities of Lore Lindu National Park in Central Sulawesi, confirmed the rights of Katu people to live inside the park and to manage portions of it. Similar types of recognition followed across Indonesia.

In the *Kongres Masyarakat Adat Nusantara*, the network of indigenous peoples showed its sheer number and force. This force contributed heavily to the government awareness of indigenous people's roles and their function as legitimate members of Indonesian society.

During the Congress, a formal organization called *Alliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara*, or AMAN, was set up. The Indonesian archipelago was divided for purposes of coordination into Western, Central and Eastern regions. Each region elects one representative who comes to the Secretariat office in Jakarta during secretariat meetings, but otherwise remains in the region throughout the rest of the year, and an Executive Secretary who is based in Jakarta. Four of them comprise the Secretariat. The AMAN Council is made up of two representatives from each province (except for Papua, which has four representatives). There are fifty-four Council members to date.

Since AMAN is a relatively new organization, it is beginning to organize itself through continuing grassroots consultations. A provincial "socialization" process has begun that puts emphasis on protection of the environment. "Socialization" is a process that promotes community members to interact with AMAN representatives and their NGO supporters. A total of 1307 local community representatives from twenty-one of the twenty-six provinces in Indonesia participated in twenty-seven socialization sessions from May to September 1999. These representatives either come in their individual capacity or on behalf of their tribal group. For example, those from Aceh, Papua, East and West Nusa Tenggara came on behalf of a number of tribal and ethnic groups in these areas. The socialization sessions also resulted in the formation of seventeen *adat* peoples' alliances that link up with AMAN. These meetings do not merely expand the alliances, but they also educate, discuss strategies, priorities, and actions from the bottom-up. More than a dozen socialization sessions from different provinces stressed their opposition to large-scale exploitation to prevent further environmental damage. The local communities also committed time and skills to protect their immediate environment.

CONCLUSION

The State's interest in economic recovery is as forceful as the military forces that power it. An organized counter force will have to prepare itself to engage the State on all fronts in order to be effective. These are composed of village institutions, local NGOs and networks, as well as national NGOs and networks all intersecting at various points with help from appropriate government and private agencies.

The village institutions rely on *adat* or customary rules to regulate resource use and access. The local NGOs and networks understand these rules and supply communities with the appropriate skills and services to maintain them. Mapping is used to bring awareness of technical as well as political issues involving land. The national NGOs and networks fortify these initiatives by pushing a critical mass for rights recognition, by facilitating cross-scale communication and skills sharing, and by clarifying strategies and targets for reform.

Throughout the building of alliances described above, the NGOs serve as facilitators, documenters, and linkers. Facilitation requires skill, sensitivity, an understanding of local problems and *adat* systems, awareness of political demands, and most of all, trust from the local people. Documentation requires skill to outline important issues that promote the reasons why *adat* communities should receive government recognition. And to be good linkers, NGOs need experience as organizers, fundraisers, and advocates.

To stress that NGOs are supporters does not diminish their role. In a self-sustaining social movement like the one described above, qualities like social solidarity, ability to recognize political opportunity, networking of multiple organizations, local leadership and even financial independence are marks of NGO influences. NGOs played a key role in rekindling these qualities, while allowing the local communities (the *adat* bound communities) to lead a social movement.

This movement is linked to a revival of ways that are environmentally sensitive. The core of conservation is the recognition that one's cultural history is dependent upon and rooted to nature. Without respecting nature (or defending the environment), one's survival is under threat. Without a secure and integrated territory, it will be difficult to defend the environment.

Notes for Chapter 5

1. Antoinette G. Royo serves as a senior program officer for the BSP-KEMALA program which supports civil society networks in Indonesia: BSP-KEMALA, Ratu Plaza, 18th Floor, Jalan Sudirman 9, Jakarta 10270, Indonesia; Tel: 62-21-720-9596; Fax: 61-21-720-7845; Email: nroyo@indo.net.id; <http://www.bsp-kemala.or.id>. Ms. Royo has extensive experience with NGO networks in the Philippines and is one of the founders of the Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center in Manila.

2. The KEMALA Forum in Bali, February 2000 made attempts to articulate these principles from learning experiences of more than twenty individual NGOs and six NGO networks.

3. See documentation of agreement, "*Kesepakatan Masyarakat Adat Desa Tanggerang tentang Pemberdayaan Adat-Istiadat dan Budaya Terhadap Pengelolaan dan Pelestarian SumberDaya Alam Dalam Kawasan Adat Desa Tanggerang*" August 12-14, 1999. PPSDAK Files.

4. The KEMALA Forum held in February 2000 in Bali, made attempts to articulate these sets of principles from learning experiences of more than twenty different NGOs and six NGO networks.

5. Yayasan Karya Sosial Pancur Kasih (Pancur Kasih) is a non-governmental organization registered in 1981. It was the brainchild of a Dayak, Anselmus Mecer, who was inspired by other Indonesians to take pride in his own ancestry. Contrary to the dominant Indonesian neo-colonialist perception at the time, he wanted to show that Dayak people are not stupid and poor. He began focusing on education for oneself and one's own people and credit cooperatives to support Dayak business initiatives. Currently, KPMD has 17 consortium members with a total of more than 200 staff. It operates more as a credit cooperative with various business interests than as a political organization. It provides discounted services to members for the use of its printing press, vehicles and trucks, copying machines, meeting rooms or office spaces. However, PK responds quickly to threats on rights including threats against the freedom of expression of individual members who are more articulate. Many villages where credit unions organized by KPMD have been accused of being subversive for pushing for reform. KPMD often get the brunt of the accusation. Yet, KPMD does not push for a political position. It respects villagers' decisions.

6. Martua Sirait mapped villages inside the Kayan Mentarang National Park in East Kalimantan in 1991-92 and began discussions with Yayasan Pancur Kasih on the issues arising from this process. At this point, LBBT and PPSDAK were most interested. Sirait wrote and shared his experience in Long Uli village in the Common Property Conference in 1993. The Ford Foundation supported his initiative and ensured that follow through with West Kalimantan NGOs happened. Ford and BSP/PeFoR supported the development of PPSDAK and sent Frank Momberg from WWF-Indonesia to conduct training in West Kalimantan in 1994.

7. Alix Flavelle provided sufficient material and hands on training for Yayasan Pancur Kasih and later on its technical mapping unit, PPSDAK. She interfaced technical mapping training with PRA and social analysis. She also encouraged Pancur Kasih to send trainees to Thailand to get comparative perspectives on mapping. Up to the present she continues to assist mapping training of trainers in West Kalimantan, and all of Indonesia.

8. Pemberdayaan Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam Kerakyatan or PPSDAK. It is a unit of Yayasan Pancur Kasih, and, a member of KPMD.

9. This happened in several sites in Ketapang, Sanggau, and Sintang. For details of the conflict, see documentation from LBBT and the Kalimantan Review files.

10. This is in the case of PT Alas Kusuma in Sintang, see LBBT for records.

11. This is in the case of PT Alas Kusuma in Ketapang, see LBBT for records.

12. ELSAM or *Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Hukum* (Legal Advocacy and Research Institute) has a legal and community program that works with local public interest lawyers to conduct participatory legal analysis and action at field levels. It develops the skills of these local lawyers for legal research and analysis, at the same time involves local communities in decision-making for action.

13. *Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria* [Agrarian Reform Consortium] or KPA is a national network that works on issues related to land tenure rights for local people. They have developed a training module for local leaders and policy implementers for decentralization. They used this module to conduct special orientation sessions and training on decentralization in West Kalimantan. The module was then revised and will be used further in other District parliament trainings planned throughout Indonesia.

14. Law No. 22, 1999 on Local Government and Law No. 25, 1999 on Balancing Finances Between Central and Local Government.

15. Law No. 5, 1979 on Pemerintahan Desa forces the “Desa” unit of governance from Java into all of the villages in the outer islands. This resulted in the break up of *adat* areas and governance structures into units of Village (Desa) and Sub-village (Dusun) that ignores existing *adat* boundaries.

16. Law No. 5, 1967 as revised by Law No. 41, 1999 on the Basic Forestry Law, Law No. 11, 1967 on Mining, and the more recent, Law No. 5, 1990 on Natural Resources and Ecosystem Conservation all reaffirm state jurisdiction and control over resources. There are improvements in Law No. 41, 1999 on *adat* rights, but state control over these rights prevails.

17. See Appendix II of this publication for a transcript of KUDETA’s press release.

18. PLASMA was set up in 1983 as an NGO with the purpose of developing capacity for environmental monitoring and protection. Though it did not take long, PLASMA found itself defending rights of indigenous peoples over their land and forests, which did not endear them to local authorities, especially the military. It led the formation of the East Kalimantan fire command post, whose work focused on disaster relief.

19. See, *Down To Earth* 37 (May 1998) 2, citing Asiaweek 9/3/98.

20. *Down to Earth*.

21. This law governs *Kanayatn* Dayak areas where most of the forest fires occurred.

22. A total of 176 companies were listed. Forestry Minister Djamaludin took action but nothing happened. Later, he offered to resign from government over the forest fires. Environment Minister Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, who was very vocal about the criminal liability of the concessions and plantations, was dropped from Suharto’s Cabinet in March 1998. DTE 37, citing Kompas 10/2/98, Kontan 23/1/98. See also BAPEDAL/KONPHALINDO book on forest fires.

23. Unlike West Kalimantan, many of the indigenous peoples’ groups in most areas are not organized. In Central Kalimantan, for example, the representatives selected were head of the District, and a local logging magnate. The Organizing Committee felt there was a need to expand consultations even after AMAN. The Organizing Committee sent eighty-two letters to local NGOs in all the provinces that did not hold regional *adat* representatives selection. The letters invited the NGO to facilitate selection of a given number of representatives. The numbers depended on the size of the provinces. The hope was for NGOs in the same geographic areas to organize a good selection of representatives. That was not easy. True to its word, the Organizing Committee addressed the need to follow through with local consultations on the processes and vision of the Alliance. Immediately after the Congress, intensive meetings per sub-district or region occurred using resources saved up from Congress. The local facilitators were Alliance representatives from each region. More than two dozen local groups formed after this consultation.

24. There are approximately 1000 different and distinct indigenous cultural communities in Indonesia.

25. The Mentawai area is composed of a group of islands of Sipora, Sikakap and Siberut, which used to be a small appendage to Padang, West Sumatra and is occupied mainly by indigenous Mentawaians.

6

Lessons about Tactics and Strategies: Recommendations for Supporting Social Movements to Recouple Society to Ecological Feedback

Janis B. Alcorn, John Bamba, Stefanus Masiun,
Ita Natalia and Antoinette G. Royo

The success of a social movement is measured by results in the form of the enhanced role of civil society in governance and significant policy change. By these measures, the Dayak movement has achieved some successes. Why? What are the lessons for others?

Policy change ultimately occurs through advocacy toward government decision-makers within the national political system. Advocacy is “a process that involves a series of political actions conducted by organized citizens in order to transform power relationships. The purpose of advocacy is to achieve specific policy changes that benefit the population involved in this process. These changes can take place in the public or private sector. Effective advocacy is conducted according to a strategic plan and within a reasonable time frame.”¹ Yet surprisingly, none of the Pancur Kasih (PK) associations has advocacy as its explicit purpose.² Rather, the PK associations: (1) support the base of a social movement; and (2) provide fora for that community-based polity to voice their demands for policy change. These fora create opportunities for political leaders to emerge, and for advocacy NGOs to learn about policy issues and the changes that civil society wants. Such fora provide a solid constituency base that legitimizes advocacy NGOs who are working for appropriate policy changes.

Our Dayak case study offers some valuable lessons for those who are interested in supporting movements to recouple society to ecological feedback. These lessons are particularly relevant for NGOs, civic associations, donors, and other support groups that work with communities who:

- are rural, geographically-dispersed, and dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods;
- have insecure tenurial rights;
- are politically marginalized;
- live in high biodiversity or ecologically fragile areas;
- have indigenous institutions weakened by government interventions designed to integrate indigenous populations into mainstream culture;
- use agricultural practices that maintain biodiversity resources and ecological processes and;
- value their ancestral relationship with their lands.

QUIETLY BRINGING DIVERSE SPHERES OF INFLUENCE INTO ALIGNMENT BEHIND A COMMON CONCERN

Dayak associations have not focused on environmental issues per se. Instead, they have worked to consolidate progress in three areas: social solidarity (which to Dayak means including people and nature in solidarity); critical thinking; and economic progress. PK's founders shared a belief that Dayak self-reliance and solidarity were the key to freedom and empowerment. If self-reliance and solidarity could be achieved among many families, communities and small support units, then the movement could constantly adapt to change and gather force from its multiple roots whenever its branches were cut back. If solidarity were expanded to the national scale, then ecological resilience could be restored at local and regional levels.

Working under a repressive regime, and with a vision of weaving a decentralized movement, PK followed a strategy of supporting the development of many separate associations so that if one unit of the struggle were repressed, other units would not be directly affected. In this way, the Dayak have been able to nurture and reconnect elements of a Dayak social movement that have been in place for centuries, surviving as restless ghosts repressed by the Indonesian military regime since 1960.

The separate units have always coordinated closely with each other, but coordination was done quietly until it was safe to put a more prominent public face on their relationship. Today, the PK umbrella consortium (Consortium for the Empowerment of Dayak Peoples - KPMD) has seventeen members, the original PK sisters as well as other Dayak associations from across Kalimantan including the new West Kalimantan Indigenous Peoples Alliance (AMA Kalbar), and a total staff of some 240 people. The consortium is charged with coordinating the member organizations so they do not work against each other, but collaborate to follow a common vision. Together, these associations affect the lives of millions of Dayak people.

As these seventeen support units assist people to achieve their own basic needs, security, and self-actualized identity, they renew the *Masyarakat* (the consensus-based community), which in turn generates a new vision to mobilize new associations. By meeting people's perceived needs, the various PK associations have recruited the energies of people with diverse interests from geographically dispersed communities into a broader social movement. The association units and the consortium now interface with, and support, other local movements in other parts of the country. Over the past decade, their activities have slowly spread from a few villages in West Kalimantan to networks across Borneo and beyond to nurture related movements on other islands and among other cultures in the Indonesian archipelago.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONCERTED ACTION

The Dayak associations have focused on four factors that have been identified as crucial to the emergence and development of a social movement: (1) strength of organization; (2) collective assessment of prospects for success; (3) political opportunities at any given time; and (4) responses by the group in power.³ Their successful attention to these four factors can be ascribed to the following fifteen guiding principles. These principles are equally important and essential.

NGOs can use these principles to guide their work. Donors can use these principles to guide direct grants to NGOs, and to shape their efforts to create enabling environments for civil society involvement in governance.

1. Build grassroots strength through community organizing as the core of all other work.

This is a primary principle for PK associations. When a person joins the staff of a PK association, that person accepts a moral obligation to continue to facilitate change in their home village. This ensures the maintenance of enduring grassroots connections. This single rule reflects the source of PK's power—attention to building the strength of the parts, working from the lowest levels upward and laterally (from the level of individuals to crosscutting community sub-units to regions) so that strength becomes a “force” at higher levels. The whole movement, like each association, is energized by its grassroots base.

If donors apply criteria for separating NGOs that are truly committed to grassroots organizing from those that organize people for project activities, donors will be contributing a stronger foundation for democratic reform.

2. Revitalize indigenous institutions.

Local institutions provide mechanisms for negotiating a way forward when people have different perspectives. Mapping and associated discussions have been particularly helpful to renew Dayak institutions that maintain resilience when new types of disturbances happen unexpectedly (e.g., the sudden arrival of a logging concession or the slow increase in local extraction) or through slow erosion of authority and legitimacy (as when a leader refuses to be held accountable to *adat*). As described in Chapters Four and Five, participatory mapping is a tool to create community solidarity so that the community is prepared to confront internal and external problems. Mapping builds resolve to confront concessionaires. Mapping can also stimulate communities to create new local institutions or reform them to be more democratic. The *adat* institutions and values provide a strong foundation for adaptation to change.

The Dayak associations facilitate bi-directional feedback. Renewal of local institutions requires communication links to larger scales, ideally creating positive feedback loops and accountability between the institutions at different scales. From an ecological perspective, revitalization efforts at the local and provincial levels push the lagging national and international institutions towards reorganizing and re-coupling themselves to ecological feedback. Cross-scale feedback is necessary for changes at multiple scales—regional feedback can help to change local rules, and local feedback multiplied upward can change higher level rules.

When designing and implementing decentralization programs, donors can support bi-directional cross-scale ecological feedback and accountability. When donors encourage efforts to renew existing self-organized local institutions, they can strengthen local voices role in monitoring and amplifying awareness of ecological feedback.

3. Promote dialogue and fora for discussion.

An indigenous social movement is comprised of heterogeneous voices. By integrating the democratic principles into the PK associations, the associations are oriented towards nurturing the dialogue of different community voices essential for movement solidarity. By promoting self-governance of credit unions, PK demonstrates the benefits that accrue when neighbors work together using good governance principles.⁴

Donors that recognize the need to nurture dialogue among people with heterogeneous perspectives are supporting the growth of a healthy civil society. By offering training in conflict resolution and negotiation skills and supporting opportunities for citizens' civic organizations to engage in discussion with government officials at local and national levels about their aspirations and problems, donors support the foundation for improving governance.

Box 6.1 Guiding Principles.

1. Build grassroots strength through community organizing as core of all other work.
2. Revitalize indigenous institutions.
3. Promote dialogue and fora for discussion.
4. Build a collective understanding of the problem.
5. Weave together different interest groups within and across dispersed communities.
6. Value accountability, and do not take it for granted.
7. Remain financially independent from donors—especially in the long run.
8. Create constituent control through reliance on financial support from the constituency.
9. Create solidary incentives through organizations that meet people's needs.
10. Increase membership numbers, because force lies in numbers.
11. Support self-generating communication networks among members that also reach out to non-members.
12. Nurture leaders who listen, and give them opportunities to build a track record.
13. Create multiple local organizations for nurturing civil society.
14. Take creative advantage of political openings.
15. Use identification with land as a strength which links people back to nature.

4. Build a collective understanding of the problem.

Groups of people create meaning as they react to events and attribute their problems to a system rather than to isolated individual actions. People will submit to oppressive conditions unless they collectively define these conditions as unjust and subject to change. PK's educational processes promote critical thinking and recognition of shared injustice. PK's educational units are not just trying to teach people from a curriculum, but rather are trying to change the way people value their own experience and empower them to use that knowledge to make their own assessments of any situation.

As one analyst has noted, "a social movement is not simply made up of efforts to change government policies. Rather, a social movement consists of efforts to change the whole host of public and private expression involved in the issue at hand."⁵ By having a shared frame for discourse, people are more likely to "chang[e] the prevailing economic, political, moral, cultural, and social dispositions of society which support environmental degradation."⁶

Creation of collective identity is one of most central tasks facing a movement.⁷ Indigenous groups like the Dayak have an advantage, not because they are inherently in harmony with nature, but because they already have a culturally-based discourse that supports links to ecological feedback and a collective cultural identity on which to build a movement. The public dialogue and consensus processes supported by the PK associations provide mechanisms for collective identities to be transformed. People move from seeing themselves as weak to seeing themselves as resourceful shapers of their own destinies. Collective beliefs are reconstructed through the myriad ways that PK helps communities to build

solidarity to face loggers, map their own territories, discuss environmental problems, and renew *adat* laws. Collective protests against plantation, logging and mining companies further raise consciousness of shared injustice and expand collective identity.

Donors interested in ecologically-sustainable development can build public commitment to that goal by creating opportunities for indigenous representatives to participate in national and international fora where sustainable development is on the agenda. When supporting conservation projects, donors can support broad public participation in prioritizing strategic interventions to reduce threats to biodiversity across the landscape.

5. Weave together different interest groups within and across dispersed communities.

The key to the Dayak movement's success is that resilience is being created by the communities which the Dayak associations crisscross. The associations weave together a larger polity from previously disorganized populations. In any village, one person can be a member of the rubber cooperative, the credit union, and the school. Another might be involved in community mapping and the credit union. By associating with different subgroups that share the same broad vision, the individual is woven more tightly into the social movement.

Donors can avoid creating or supporting new organizations that compete with organizations that have emerged from the grassroots. By supporting alliances among NGOs and citizens' associations, donors can create new synergies.

6. Value accountability, and do not take it for granted.

PK and its associations hold themselves accountable to their community constituents by meeting their needs and seeking their feedback. They strive to create a situation where communities will in turn act to create a situation where governance levels are held accountable to each other, laterally and hierarchically. For example, the river basin agreements hold communities accountable to each other. Under *adat* assemblies, community members hold each other accountable. Within each association and credit union, financial controls are put in place to prevent unauthorized use of funds. Similar controls prevent the use of community maps or information without consent.

Donors can provide technical assistance and small grants to assist local NGOs to develop the skills and democratic processes to better serve local constituencies, and to empower those constituencies to hold NGOs and government accountable.

7. Remain financially independent from donors—especially in the long run.

The Dayak associations have been wary of becoming dependent on donors, yet they need donor support. While accepting donor support as sole support for new initiatives, they have created ways for the movement to be supported by Dayak themselves through credit unions, better prices for goods, improved education and payment for established services.

Donors can invest in building NGO accountability to their local communities so that NGOs do not become substitutes for government or independent agents. They can also assist local NGOs to support community-based institutions such as self-governed credit unions.

8. Create constituent control through reliance on financial support from the constituency.

If the movement is not serving the people, people can withdraw their financial support to the associations as well as their moral support for the movement. The people's power over the purse strings contributes to keeping the associations accountable to their constituents. At the same time, people are more likely to be actively involved, if they invest their own funds or in kind contributions.

Donors can help NGOs and NGO networks to assist each other to hold themselves accountable to constituents.

9. Create solidary incentives through organizations that meet people's needs.

Democratic reforms are achieved through addressing real issues related to people's needs, not by revising abstract structures. Civil society organizations can negotiate real changes when they represent the united voice of many people. PK has created organizations that meet Dayak needs, thus providing solidary incentives. Because people belong to PK organizations that meet their felt needs—such as marketing, schooling and credit—it is not necessary to create other incentives to entice people to be part of the social movement.

Donors can strengthen NGO capacity to evaluate what needs communities find most pressing and then assist those NGOs to facilitate development in that sector. At the national level, donors can support policy change that enhances the effectiveness of civil society in directing national development plans and programs.

10. Increase membership numbers, because force lies in numbers.

Social movements, by definition, depend on united action by large numbers of people. People must join the Dayak associations in order to receive their benefits, and this in turn builds the numbers that contribute to the force of the social movement.

Donors can monitor whether membership numbers are good indicators for member appreciation of benefits or whether members are inactive.

11. Support self-generating communication networks among members that also reach out to nonmembers.

Indigenous social networks are critical resources for a social movement, because networks serve for mobilization. Established organizations form a communication infrastructure, and their patterns determine the spread of the social movement. Widespread communication networks enable the movement to become more than local spontaneous protests. This is a key element of PK's success.

Maps are one of the tools used to build new communication networks. PK has facilitated the mapping of over one hundred sixty communities, covering more than 700,000 ha of Dayak territory—protecting over half a million hectares of forest and bringing those one hundred sixty communities into networks with each other in the process. When PK uses apprenticeship methods to train and network people from distant places, they build new relationships and shared visions. The maps themselves serve as communication tools, graphically portraying environmental damage and social injustice to outsiders who in turn share that information with others in urban centers.

*Donors can fund technical assistance to help NGOs evaluate their progress in building self-generating or self-sustaining communication networks. By supporting community-based mapping programs, donors can catalyze intra-community communication.*⁸

12. Nurture leaders who listen, and give them opportunities to build a track record.

Loose federations of “flat” (non-hierarchical) small associations create more opportunities for leaders to emerge. Those leaders gain following if they empower the group to create a consensus-based strategy and action plans that build social solidarity.

Donors can recognize local, accountable leaders and support their commitment to local issues through special award programs, training, and opportunities to contribute their ideas in national fora.

13. Create multiple local organizations for nurturing civil society.

Small organizations with specific mandates from the people are better prepared for negotiating on behalf of their constituency. Multiple local organizations can form viable networks for self-reliance when a single organization might be under government scrutiny.

When political parties have failed to demonstrate their capacity as accountable institutions for social change, NGOs, donors and other support groups cannot create legitimacy for such organizations. To be involved with political parties at such times is to invite accusations of patronage interests that can undermine broad-based support. The strategy of establishing a single organization to maintain a social movement often fails because of oligarchization, co-option by donors, or loss of indigenous support.⁹ The Dayak movement has avoided these pitfalls so far. Each association provides a particular service and the movement depends on no single association or organization. Each association is just one rung among from the people, giving it legitimacy, yet the mandate for each association is kept narrow.

Donors can avoid supporting national organizations that attempt to work at the local or regional level, yet bypass civil society processes. Donors can make national NGOs more accountable by providing support to vibrant networks of smaller, local NGOs that link to national NGOs. Local NGOs can support those national NGOs that are responsive to local concerns, thus holding them more accountable.

14. Take creative advantage of political openings.

For a social movement to be effective, its leaders must creatively take advantage of political opportunities to scale up and become nationally visible. PK has used community-based maps to take advantage of a political opening provided by Spatial Planning Law No. 24, 1992, under which provincial authorities should consult with communities when creating land use plans for the province. West Kalimantan provincial officials have signed the community land use maps as recognition of their legitimacy as official land use plans. PK has also initiated action to take advantage of a political opening under a new GOI project (Ministry of Agrarian Affairs Decree No. 5, 1999 on Adat Land Dispute Handling) to recognize indigenous peoples if they have evidence of an *adat* territory (a map), *adat* law, and *adat* institutions.

The 1997-98 Reformasi social crisis in Indonesia provided a significant political opening for the Dayak social movement. PK used this opening to facilitate the emergence of indigenous political organizations at regional and national levels across Indonesia. The idea of creating a political party for all the indigenous peoples of Indonesia is being discussed in order to accommodate indigenous peoples' struggle through political channels. One of PK's founders was recently selected as a Parliamentary representative, sending one Dayak voice to the national level and providing the indigenous movement with new insights into national policy making and new intelligence on potential opportunities. Dayak have used their international connections to support their movement. Dayak work with international NGOs to make their voices heard outside Indonesia to protest against foreign investors' actions. For example, the Asian Development Bank NGO Working Group has helped the Dayak negotiate with the Indonesian government about ADB projects.

By providing flexible funding to NGOs that have good track records, and trusting their instincts to recognize and respond to political openings, donors enable NGOs to be nimble players in creating space in civil society. Donors can also assist by supporting mentoring programs where established NGOs nurture nascent, local organizations with small grants and "NGO to NGO" technical assistance.

15. Use identification with land as a strength which links people back to nature.

The Dayaks' close identification with their geography is a strong asset to the movement.¹⁰ The Dayak social movement converts the Dayak attachment to their land into a political demand for recognition of Dayak rights to coexist with the Indonesian state. Simultaneously, the movement renews Dayak awareness of the importance of managing for ecological resilience at local and national levels. Dayak lands, the actual sites of conflict, are associated with ancestors, religion, family and home. Each river bend, forest, and peak has its own Dayak name that cannot be separated from Dayak history. Dayak are also linked to their lands through economic activities.

PK's mapping work overlays the distribution of rare and valuable species, and environmental degradation, with the spatial land use patterns of economic activity. This encourages the community members to tackle different local management problems. PK has also used "productivity accounting" to assist communities to analyze the costs and benefits of land use alternatives.

Many donors are concerned with natural resource management for sustainable development, and have become frustrated with the patronage politics that shape national governments' failure to stop resource degradation. By supporting rural movements, donors can support civil society to limit the destructive local effects of patronage politics. At the same time, if donors assist government and local people to assess the economic values of natural ecosystems, and map rare species and habitats among land use patterns, donors can build local and national awareness of the positive links between economy and ecology.

MOVING BEYOND INDONESIA: HOW CAN LOCAL INDIGENOUS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS BE SCALED UP TO A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY MOVEMENT TO RECOUPLE HUMAN SOCIETY TO ECOLOGICAL FEEDBACK?

The futures of "the local" and "the global" are intertwined and interdependent as never before. Humankind and their companion species cannot survive and thrive locally without supportive policies at larger scales. The trend of fragmentation and simplification of ecosystems continues, with the loss of species and ecosystem functions in and around indigenous peoples' lands. These trends threaten to change planet-level climate and genetic resources. These trends began centuries ago. By the early 1900s in many places, such as the United States, indigenous peoples had been forced to abandon their lands and

resource management practices so that prairies and watersheds could be converted into intensive agriculture or tree plantations.¹¹ At the beginning of the 21st century, the global economy has penetrated the last remote bastions of biological and cultural diversity in order to convert natural resource assets into immediate profits for newcomers who ignore social justice and ecological feedback.

A transnational civil society is emerging.¹² Indigenous peoples live in ecologically fragile areas, yet they are among the weakest voices in global discussions about new standards for governing the behavior of international corporations and governments. They remain largely invisible in this global discourse except when they are linked to the habitats of species that are also endangered by resource extraction, migrants and other threats. Their languages are disappearing at unprecedented rates, together with their place-based knowledge, their value systems, and their collective understanding of what it means to be human. They are often viewed as tiny minorities of populations who lack basic services, rather than as voices threatened with extinction. They seek self-determination, yet they face assimilation. Animal rights advocates, who speak for animals that lack voices, receive more recognition than indigenous peoples at global fora on conservation and sustainable development. Change is unlikely, however, unless a pluralistic, global civil society asserts a shared concern about ecological justice.

A global social movement could modify the ecologically destructive pressures that flow down from the global level, but despite the potential for isolated indigenous peoples' movements to join a global movement for ecological sustainability, and despite the growth of small regional indigenous networks and nascent global networks, the world's indigenous peoples cannot focus their energies on nurturing a global social movement from the grassroots. They must focus their resources on their own struggle to survive.

Donors could support a global movement by applying the recommendations from the Dayak movement to increase international support for local movement networks, while at the same time nurturing connections between similar movements across many countries. Such support would sustain the growth of local movements and nurture a web of grassroots allies for the global social movement that is attempting to recouple global society to ecological feedback.

Notes for Chapter 6

1. The Arias Foundation, cited in *Networking for Policy Change: An Advocacy Training Manual*, (Washington DC: The Policy Project, The Futures Group International, 2000), 11-14.

2. Recent reviews of donor support for democracy support the conclusion that civil associations and social movements, not activist NGOs, are critical for consolidating democratic reforms. For reviews on this subject, see Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, "Toward Civil Society Realism," in *Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion*, ed. M. Ottaway and T. Carothers (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), 295.

3. Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). McAdam discusses the four factors that are crucial to the development of a social movement, using examples of African American struggles against institutionalized racism in the United States.

4. The World Council of Credit Unions has assisted Pancur Kasih. For more information on credit unions and their democratic principles, see the internet site <http://www.woccu.org>.

5. Paul Wapner, "In Defense of Banner Hangers: The Dark Green Politics of Greenpeace," in *Ecological Resistance Movements*, ed. B. R. Taylor (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 311.

6. Wapner, 311.

7. For more information on the creation of collective identity, see: Carol M. Mueller, "Building Social Movement Theory," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theories*, ed. A. D. Morris and C. M. Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); and D. Friedman and Doug McAdam, "Collective Identity and Activism: Networks, Choices and the Life of a Social Movement," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theories*, ed. A. D. Morris and C. M. Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

8. Janis B. Alcorn, *Borders, Rules and Governance: Mapping to Catalyse Changes in Policy and Management*, Gatekeeper Series, no. 91 (London: International Institute for Environment and Development, 2000).

9. The reasons for the failure of social movements can be found in McAdam (cited above), and W. F. Fisher, "Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 26 (1997): 439-464.

10. Paul Routledge, "Critical Geopolitics and Terrains of Resistance," *Political Geography* 15 (1996): 509-531.

11. See Thomas Davis, *Sustaining the Forest, the People and the Spirit* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000) for more information regarding the loss of indigenous resource management practices in the United States during the early 20th century.

12. Ann M. Florini, *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and The Japan Center for International Change, 2000), 211; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 1-37.

APPENDICES

Appendix I. Pancur Kasih Support Networks.

<p style="text-align: center;">PANCUR KASIH CONSORTIUM FOR THE EMPOWERMENT OF DAYAK PEOPLES</p>									
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>VISION</u></p>									
<p>Indigenous Peoples, the Dayak Indigenous Peoples in particular, are able to determine and manage their social, cultural, economic and political lives, toward self-reliance in togetherness in the spirit of love to struggle for their dignity and sovereignty.</p>									
Critical Education	Community Organizing	Natural Resources and Environment	Culture (Identity)	People-Based Economy	Financial Sustainability	Gender Justice	Social Security	Socialization of Ideas	Networking
YKSPK ADP	LBBT AMA KALBAR LPPSEPK	PPSDAK PPSHK PeFoR EAF ATA YBSD	ID	KPD CU-PK PEK	BPR MITRA KSIH RADA KING	P3D	DSMD Health insurance Accident insurance Pension plan	<i>Kalimantan Review</i> Books Radio	WALHI INFID KPSHK KPA JPMAP JAPHAMA AMAN

Appendix II. KUDETA's (Coalition for the Democratization of Natural Resources) Political Statement, "Return Natural Resources to the People!"

We, the Coalition for the Democratization of Natural Resources, consisting of Indonesian non governmental organizations, networks, student organizations, and individuals, strongly urge the transitional government of Indonesia and other parties who have conspired to profit from the exploitation of Indonesia's natural resources, to immediately return those natural resources to the people.

For 32 years the New Order regime systematically plundered Indonesia's natural resources for undemocratic industrial development, benefiting a few, and building a corporate nation filled with corruption, collusion, and nepotism. This ravaging of natural resources was based on a New Order development paradigm that tolerated all means for satisfying economic ambitions—by strangling people's political rights, violating human rights, destroying the environment, and through military repression.

In the end, the destruction of natural resources has caused a prolonged economic, ecological, and food crisis. This fact is proof that the New Order regime was incapable of guaranteeing prosperity for and protection of the Indonesian people, especially village communities and indigenous peoples. Conversely, the industry sector that was built from the plundering of forests and natural resources has proven to be both frail and unable to provide neither work nor prosperity for urban communities.

Therefore, the New Order is responsible for the destruction of forest and natural resources in Indonesia, the bankruptcy of the nation, and the suffering of the Indonesian people. Throughout its administration, the New Order made fundamental mistakes by:

1. Ideologically following conventional notions that were exploitative and extractive, excluded local knowledge, and split the production and conservation functions of forest natural resources;
2. Exclusively giving forest exploitation rights over an area of 64 million hectares to a handful of companies who did not have the knowledge nor skills for just and sustainable natural resource management;
3. Recklessly determining 30 million hectares of land and natural forests to be destroyed and made into huge plantations, mining and transmigration areas, and for other development activities;
4. Institutionally being unable to manage forest fires that caused the recent burning of 5 million hectares of forest;
5. Undemocratically claiming 143 million hectares of forest to be controlled and managed by the Department of Forestry, who clearly were not able to manage, control, supervise, and utilize Indonesian forest resources because of its centralist, nepotistic and unprofessional nature;
6. Arrogantly scorning and ridiculing traditional communities and other local communities who for generations have been dependent on natural resources, by taking over traditional lands and forcing communities living on these lands to change their cultures; and
7. Visibly manipulating reforestation funds for grand projects of the New Order regime.

Demands

Based upon the above facts, the **Coalition for the Democratization of Natural Resources**, demands that the transitional government of Indonesia immediately carries out the following steps:

1. Immediately revoke the status of state forests by redefining the boundaries between state forests and forests that have been owned and controlled by traditional and local communities.
2. Restructure state institutions who are responsible for the management of natural resources and the environment; and

3. Redirect the development and utilization of natural resources by making traditional and local communities the main actors of natural resource management as producers of both timber and non timber forest products, to fulfill subsistence, domestic, and export needs.

Furthermore, the **Coalition for the Democratization of Natural Resources** strongly urges **Moeslimin Nasoetion**, Minister of Forestry and Estate Crops, to carry out the following reforms:

1. Cease all Forest Concessions (*Hak Pengusahaan Hutan, HPH*), Timber Estates (*Hutan Tanaman Industri, HTI*), Large Private Plantations (*Perkebunan Swasta Besar*), and Timber Use Permits (*Ijin Pemanfaatan Kayu, IPK*).
2. Cancel the conversion of forests for large plantations, transmigration and mining activities.
3. Revoke all regulations and policies regarding the exploitation and the violation of community rights to manage natural resources.
4. Revoke all regulations and policies that restrict the trade of forest and plantation commodities produced by traditional and local communities.
5. Declare the recognition of access and control by local communities to manage state-claimed forests.
6. Reallocate natural and forest resources to be directly controlled and managed by local and/or traditional communities.
7. Provide complete open access to information regarding the utilization and protection of natural resources to the general public.
8. Purge the Department of Forestry and Estate Crops from Collusion, Corruption and Nepotism (*Kolusi, Korupsi dan Nepotisme, KKN*).
9. Bring to trial forest and plantation companies proven to have burned forest resources.
10. Conduct open consultation and dialog with different groups, especially traditional and local communities in various areas to define the substance of and steps for total reformation in natural resource management.
11. Reject governmental forestry reform that does not have a transparent process and does not address fundamental issues in forestry and the management of natural resources.

Jakarta, 11 June 1998

Appendix III. Ten Protests against Concessionaires in Ketapang, West Kalimantan.¹

1. In 1993, the Dayak in Randau and Sungai Laur, took a survey team hostage when they found out that the team belonged to PT. Prakarsa Tani Sejati, an oil palm company. The company cancelled its operation.
2. In August 1993, Krio Dayak from ten villages in Sandai Subdistrict staged a demonstration against PT. Lingga Tedja Wana, an industrial tree plantation. Since there were no responses from the company, the villagers burned the company's base camps, bridges, equipment and nurseries. The company was finally closed down.
3. In 1997, the Dayak in Sedawak, Marau Subdistrict sued PT. Golden Hope, a Malaysian oil palm company, for destroying dozens of cemeteries. The community lost in court, but the company has changed its policies since then.
4. In 1997, the Dayak in Jungkal chased away a team that belonged to PT. Benua Indah Group. The company cancelled its plan to operate in this area.
5. In August 1997, Jalai Dayak in Manismata Subdistrict, chased away a team that surveyed their areas for an oil palm plantation that belonged to PT. Harapan Sawit Lestari. The company cancelled its operation.
6. In September 1998, the villagers in Sungai Kelik, reported PT. Benua Indah Group to the National Commission of Human Rights for appropriating 5 ha of the villagers' land and 2 ha of land belonging to an Islamic school. There is no resolution for this case yet.
7. In February 1999, transmigrants representing five hundred others from Tumbang Titi staged a demonstration in front of the local parliament building to demand that PT. Bangun Maya Indah, an oil palm company, fulfill their promise to hand over small estates to the transmigrants. The demand was fulfilled by the company.
8. In June 1999, Krio Dayak burned the base camps and security post belonging to PT. Halisa (Alas Kusuma Group). The villagers demanded that the company pay Rp 3 billion as compensation and give up 30% of its bonds to the villagers. The company moved and paid part of the compensation.
9. In July 1999, the Dayak from Pawan, Bihak and Kayong River rejected PT. Azas Mitra, an oil palm company. The letter of rejection was signed by village heads of Cinta Damai, Beginci Darat and Chairman of the Sandai Adat Council. The company cancelled its operation.
10. In July 2000, the Dayak in several villages in Manismata Subdistrict cut down five hundred productive oil palm trees belonging to PT. Harapan Sawit Lestari, as the company failed to fulfill its promises to the villagers.

1. These examples illustrate the hundreds of protests that occurred during the past decade, and continue to occur. Gathered from reports published by *Kalimantan Review*.

Appendix IV. Areas of Forest Burned in West Kalimantan (July-August 1997).¹

Name	Type of Land Use
PT. Finantara Intiga	Logging
PT. Multi Dayap	Logging
PT. Inhutani II	Logging
PT. Antar Mustika	Logging
PT. Lemba Jati Mutiara	Logging
Plantation (OECF)	Plantation
PT. Inhutani III	Tree Plantation
PT. Lahan Cakawala	Tree Plantation
PT. Meranti Laksana	Tree Plantation
PT. Rimba Equator Permai	Tree Plantation
PT. Inhutani II	Tree Plantation
Gunung Palung	National Park
Danau Sentarum	Wild Life Sanctuary
Baning	Recreation Forest
Transmigration	Transmigration areas
Bukit Sehak	Other forest

Source: Regional Forest Office of West Kalimantan

1. See the link to the Global Forest Watch on the World Resources Institute's website, <http://www.wri.org>, for additional information on forest fires and concessionaires.