

An example of looking at a stakeholder in the case study, through the lens of clientelism: SWAPO.

1. In reference to the stakeholder exercise, how could we look at SWAPO in terms of being a stakeholder, and what resources (“currency,” “resource assets”) does it bring to the table? How could members of SWAPO affect the success of the program? (I’m using SWAPO as it is referred to on p.3 of the case study.)
2. Although limited information is available from the case study, it is enough to determine that SWAPO is indeed a stakeholder, with gains and losses possible from the USAID program. It is not simply a matter however that some in SWAPO will want the program to succeed and others to fail. There may be particular aspects of the program that support or are antithetical to their interests.

What we can say generally, however, is that policies and decisions that affect the ownership and distribution of assets do not occur in a political vacuum on the basis of “this is a good policy idea.” They are the result of a coalition successfully pushing them through. This coalition includes a network of people, often at all levels, who are likely to benefit from the policy, either because they directly benefit economically, or because they strengthen the general position of a “leader” and show proof that he/she has a cadre that can be mobilized for political support in many areas. The factions within SWAPO are likely to affect the success of the conservancy program.

3. SWAPO may actually be TWO stakeholders, as presented in the case study, with different interests. One may be the group within the party that favors a “centralization and command” form of governance, and the second, that group that favors decentralization.
  - A. From our “power analysis” and patron/client perspective, we would need to go deeper than the level of information presented in the case. On what are their disparate views based, and what are the implications for providing the national level support that the conservancy program needs to succeed and be sustaining?
  - B. Their view: Is it likely that the two views of central/command and decentralization are based only on democratic philosophy? A patron/client perspective would argue “no.” We would examine the “power bases” of each party faction, or the “coalition” that is behind each party faction? For example, we should test the idea that the base of power of the “centralizers” is in the cities? That group may be urban based, perhaps strongly supported by “professional classes” and the middle class? On the other hand, for the “decentralizers” we need to look at their linkages to local governments and local elites. Is their power more “locally based?”

- C. Even if those hypotheses are true, it would be a false assumption to believe that under all circumstances the “decentralizers” would prefer individuals in the conservancy to gain the economic benefits and assets of the conservancy. They may, **if that strengthens their power coalition**. On the other hand, their primary linkages may be with certain elites that at the present time are disproportionately benefiting from the conservancies; they would therefore not support more equitable distribution of assets (economic and leadership) among conservancy members.

If that were the case, would they perhaps be more likely to support the creation of conservancies as entities (with the new resources and power base that entails), but less likely to support their autonomy and empowerment from local government? Would they be likely to prefer conservancy leadership that was closely tied to their political base that could “deliver” the conservancy, or more likely to encourage greater independence of conservancies?

- D. The analysts need to examine each party’s incentives for working with and strengthening different aspects of the conservancy program. What parts of this program would they be likely to support, because they strengthen their own support, or undermine the support of other groups? Will they see the conservancy as an institution threatening or supporting their power? How will they view emerging roles of new leaders? Will they want to strengthen or oppose an old guard (traditional local elite) that is learning how to manipulate the institutions to suit themselves?
- E. The analysis also needs to be done from the perspective of the various actors at the local level (leaders of conservancies, members of conservancies, local elites tied in to some of these groups). If unequal power and economic resource distribution is an issue, for example, how could conservancy members develop alliances with national SWAPO groups that could strengthen their hands? Is there a “national reform group” among the centralizers that has the strength and incentives to support this? Or a way that the “decentralizers” could see it as strengthening their own position? What would be advantages and disadvantages of the conservancies beginning to create such allies, if they don’t have them now?

In sum, because of the important policy and resource allocation role that SWAPO has, it is important to know the power of these national decision makers, even if initially they don’t seem directly related to the poor in a conservancy area, and to understand the network of relationships, which are informal but highly institutionalized, that is an important “currency” or “resource asset” that they have.