Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
The authors examined whether mayors with re-election incentives (i.e., those not about to complete their term limits) were less corrupt than those without such incentives.
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Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
The authors examined whether mayors with re-election incentives (i.e., those not about to complete their term limits) were less corrupt than those without such incentives.
